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The Use of Information Concepts in the Dialogue between Science and Theology 
hy Mario A. Marais 
Summary 
We are living in the information age and this has had an effect on both science and 
theology. Our understanding of the fundamental role of information has increased 
significantly. One can even say that information has become an overarching metaphor 
in the world of science. This dissertation gives an overview of the impact of the 
information-based scientific world-view on the dialogue between science and theology. 
The study investigates the metaphorical use of information concepts to secure a better 
understanding of God's action in the world and the role that information plays in the 
processes of life. The focus is on the role of biological information, and its relation to 
divine action is investigated. The scientific importance of information and the possible 
impact of information concepts on the science and theology dialogue of the future are 
discussed. 
Key Terms 
information, biological information, metaphor, divine action, intelligent design, 
biosemiotics, Dembski, Shannon, Gitt, Davies. 
1 Introduction 
We are living in the information age. In fact, we might say that we are swimming (or 
drowning) in a sea of information. According to Tom Siegfried (2000:44-45), we are 
now at the point where 'the computer ... has clearly become society's dominant 
machine, and information has become science's favourite superparadigm'. His 
so-called 'cartoon history' of modem science states that we have moved from the 
clock/force era (in which the clock was the dominant tool in society and force was the 
metaphor for the scientific world-view), through the steam engine/energy era (in 
which the steam engine was the tool and energy was the metaphor), and we are now in 
the computer/information era (in which information is the current metaphor of choice 
for the scientific world-view) (Siegfried 2000:45). 
In addition, there has also been an increase in our understanding of the fundamental 
aspects of reality. Our sense of wonder has grown as scientists have discovered 
"deep" connections between what were thought to be disconnected ways of 
understanding the world. Recently, the concept of information has emerged as a very 
important, fundamental way of connecting quantum mechanics, computational theory, 
complexity theory and evolution. According to David Deutsch (1998:28), the four 
main strands from which our understanding of the 'fabric of reality' is composed are: 
quantum theory, the theory of evolution, epistemology and the theory of computation. 
His view is that 'the four of them taken together form a coherent explanatory structure 
that is so far-reaching, and has come to encompass so much of our understanding of 
the world, that in my view it may already properly be called the first real Theory of 
Everything' (Deutsch 1998:28-29). As a result, we have seen the growth of the field 
of quantum computation, which has also provided an important stimulus to the study 
of the fundamental role of information. 
These new ways of thinking about the fabric of reality and the fact that information 
may be the dominant paradigm of our age have also had an effect on the dialogue 
between science and theology. Information has been used in many areas and in many 
ways. Infonnation concepts have been used metaphorically to try to shed new light 
on topics such as the nature of God, divine action, revelation, etc. Information is a 
complex topic and this dissertation starts with an overview of the different contexts or 
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roots of information. It then covers the 'hard' science side of the dialogue by 
examining divine action, specifically biological information, which is the new active 
area. The general question of how information concepts are used in the dialogue 
between science and theology is then surveyed, with the main focus being on how to 
bridge the gap between science and theology through the metaphorical use of 
information concepts. The different points of departure of the participants in the 
science and theology dialogue are discussed within the framework of Tan Barbour's 
typology of the relationship between science and theology. In conclusion, the 
possible roles of information concepts in the unfolding dialogue between science and 
theology are discussed. 
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2 Putting information into perspective 
2.1 The scientific roots of information 
2.1.1 Shannon's information theory 
The birth of a formal theory of information is usually traced to research done into 
communications at Bell Laboratories in the 1920s. Ralph Hartley was the first to 
propose a measure for the amount of information in a message in 1927 (Brown 
2000:42). Claude Shannon extended Hartley's idea of using the logarithm of the total 
number of possible messages by including the probability of any one message (Brown 
2000:43). Shannon's ideas were first presented in an article entitled: "A mathematical 
theory of communication" which was included in a book published in 1949 (Shannon 
& Weaver). 
Shannon's formula (Brown 2000:43) can be expressed as: 
infonnation = - log (probability) where we are referring to a base 2 logarithm'. 
Tf a message is very unlikely (as in a string of random letters, abfjlsfgahek .... ), then 
the information content is high. If the message has a high probability (as in the same 
letter repeated many times, aaaaaaaa .... ), then the information content is low. Note 
that nothing is said about meaning at all. 
The probability of the message will vary between 0 and 1. The logarithm will 
therefore vary between minus infinity (Z-00 = 112'" = 0) and 0 (2° = !). The negative 
sign thus ensures that information is always reported as a positive number between oo 
and 0. A very unlikely message will therefore have a very large "information content 
number"2 • 
1 The base 2 logarithm of 2' ~ x or log(2') ~ x. So the base 2 logarithm of 8, which is 23, is 3. 
'Let us assume that the probability ofa message is I in 1024. Now 1024 ~ 2 10• so the probability~ 
1/1024~ 1/2 10 ~2' 10• Thebase2logarithmof 2' 10 islog(2' 10)~-IO. Theinfom1ationcontentisthen 
-(-10)~ 10. 
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In computer terms we refer to something called a "bit" (binary digit), which is derived 
from the binary (base 2) number system. For example, decimal 2 is represented as 10 
(1 x z1 + 0 x 2°)3. Flipping a coin is the usual way of explaining probability and bits 
(Siegfried 2000:2). A coin can land with either heads or tails up. There are therefore 
two, equally likely possibilities. These can be represented by the 0 and the I of the 
binary system, which is referred to as one bit. One bit is the information that is 
required to distinguish between the two equal possibilities (Siegfried 2000:65). If we 
were picking out a single word from a dictionary with eight words, (23) then we 
would need three bits to convey the information content, that is which word was 
selected out of the eight possibilities. For an extensive discussion of information 
theory, refer to Gitt (1997:170-178). 
2.1.2 The link with entropy 
From the outset the connection between Shannon's measure of information and 
entropy (the thermodynamic measure of disorder) was proposed. Shannon also terms 
his measure entropy4 in order to bring out the similarity in fonnulation (Siegfried 
2000:65, Brown 2000:45). 
Boltzmann's definition of entropy is really a measure of statistical disorder, where one 
looks at the fact that there are more possible disordered states than ordered states and 
hence the probability of a system being in an ordered state is low. Systems are 
therefore more likely to be in a disordered state. An observer can discover less about 
a disordered state, and in that sense it has less information than an ordered state. 
According to Brown (2000:45), Boltzmann also saw entropy as a 'form of missing 
information'. 
It is not certain that there is a deep connection between information and 
thermodynamic entropy. People have argued that 'the utility of equivalent 
'In the base 10 we system we normally use, 10 stands for (1x10 1 + 0 x 10°) ~ 10+ 0 ~ 10 . 
.i Entropy, a measure of disorder, is linked to the famous second la\V of thermodynamics which states 
that the total amount of entropy of a closed systen1 can never decrease. Boltzn1ann's formula S= k log 
\V expresses the entropy S as a measure of atomic disorder, \Vhere W is the probability of a certain 
state. k is Boltzmann's constant (Brown 2000:44). 
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mathematical formulas in thermodynamics and communication theory has no more 
significance than, say, the general utility of the Gaussian normal distribution' ... in a 
wide variety of disciplines' (Harms 1998:478). Harms (:479) goes on to point out that 
the reason that entropy can be used as an information measure is because 
mathematically it satisfies the intuitive requirements for a measure of uncertainty. 
However, new developments have led some people, such as Tom Siegfried (2000:66), 
to feel that the time has now come to state: 'The physicist's entropy and Shannon's 
entropy are two sides of a coin'. According to him, this deep connection has been 
made via studies of the physics of computation and the study of information 
processing, which has 'solidified the conclusion that information is more than a 
metaphor' ( :66). Brown (2000:45) makes a similar case that studies of the physics of 
computation, in particular that of the issue of the energy consumed in computation, 
have revealed deep connections between 'knowledge and physics'. In fact, to 
Siegfried (2000:66), 'one of the deepest and most important while least appreciated 
and least understood discoveries of modem science' is: "information is physical"'. 
This line. of thinking has been extended by Ed Friedken, who views the universe as 'a 
gigantic digital computer processing information' (Brown 2000:59). 
Roy Frieden (1998) has pointed out the importance of another measure of 
indeterminacy that is related to entropy, namely Fisher information. Frieden (:2-3) 
has developed a theory of physical law, called Extreme Physical Information (EPI) 
which is an expression of the 'inability to know' a measured quantity (:2-3). This 
'inability to know', or the quality of any measurement, can be specified by a form of 
information known as Fisher information(:!). The fundamental issue is that physics 
quantifies phenomena that are observed and that, as a paii of this exercise, physics 
also defines the fluctuations or errors from the ideal values that occur (:2-3). Physics 
defines the laws of physical fluctuations and Fisher information is the quantitative 
measure of physical fluctuations (:3). This means that Fisher information is 
'intrinsically tied into the laws of fluctuation that define theoretical physics' (:3). It is 
5 The Gaussian normal distribution refers to a particular \vay that errors are distributed about a mean. It 
is named after the famous German mathematician, Karl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855) (Reader's Digest 
Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary 1964). 
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also the measure of the state of disorder of a system and hence is related to entropy. 
The overall message is that information is fundamental to how we describe the world. 
We will come back to this whole issue later'. First, we want to complete the picture 
regarding information by giving a brief overview of alternative and complementary 
fonnulations of information. 
2.1.3 The different formulations of information 
Siegfried (2000: 175-176) compiled the following summary of the different ways of 
looking at the quantification of information: 
Shannon entropy (or Shannon information) 
The negative logarithm of the probability of a message i.e. a measure of uncertainty or 
freedom of choice in composing a message. 
Algorithmic information content 
(also called algorithmic complexity, Kolmogorov complexity or the Kolmogorov-
Chaitin theory of algorithmic information) 
The number of bits in the smallest program that outputs the message string when run 
on a universal Turing machine. It is dominated by randomness (see also Davies 
2000:116-120, Cilliers 1998:9-10). Randomness is defined by Chaitin not in terms of 
uncertainty, but in terms of incompressibility or of how densely the information is 
packed (Cilliers 1998:9). We can therefore say that this is a measure of complexity in 
terms of denseness of information. 
Logical depth 
The number of steps in a deductive or causal path connecting a thing with its plausible 
origin, or the time required by a universal computer to compute the object in question 
from a program that could not itself have been computed from a more concise 
program; a measure of organisation. 
"Entropy is discussed again in Subsection 5.6.7.3: Wheeler's '!tji·o111 Bit'. 
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Statistical complexity 
The amount of memory m bits required for a machine or agent to predict its 
environment at a given level of accuracy, or the minimum amount of historical 
information required for optimal forecasts of bits in an object at a specified error rate; 
a measure of stmcture. 
In addition, we can go back to the origins of the word 'information'. 
In Latin we have (Collins Latin Dictionary plus Grammar 1997): 
• informatio, informationis - sketch, idea 
• informis (adjective) - shapeless; hideous 
• informo, informare, informavi, informatum (transitive verb) - to shape, 
fashion; to sketch; to educate. 
• Jonna, formae - form, shape, appearance; mould, stamp, last; (person) beauty; 
(figurative) idea, nature, kind. 
John Puddefoot (1996:302) mentions the German informieren and the French 
informer as well. 
These meanings of the term have been used to view the fundamental meaning of 
information as being the act or result of informing (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 
1992:87). Harms (1998:497) regards the original meaning of 'to inform' someone as 
being to give form to his or her mind, in other words to teach. 
To summanse, we can tum to John Puddefoot's fundamental threefold distinction 
between the ways in which the term 'information' is used (1996:302): 
• Counting information includes all the mathematical forms of information, with 
the focus on various measures of information (as we have indicated above -
Shannon information, algorithmic information content, logical depth and 
statistical complexity). 
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• Meaning information is information in its normal everyday meaning, namely 
information in the sense of imparting knowledge, which is largely dependent 
on language and culture (see the next section on communication). 
• Shaping information denotes information as a noun, describing the action of 
giving form to something. 
From the perspective of a person interpreting information, we can tie together all the 
uses of the tenn by stating that counting information is the basic raw input that must 
give form to our minds, thus informing us in the sense of shaping information, and 
thereby conveying meaning information to us (Peacocke 1996:326, Puddefoot 
1996:312). 
2.2 The human roots of information - the wide world of information 
2.2.1 Introduction to the theory of communication 
The study of all the varied processes of communication between humans, and between 
humans and animals, is called the 'theory of communication' (Fauconnier 1987:11). 
The theory of communication is a multi-disciplinary study that derives concepts and 
views from the other sciences which it tries to 'assimilate to form a coherent whole' 
(: 11 ). 
The scientific research field of communication theory varies greatly and can include 
one or more of the following branches (Fauconnier 1987:23): 
• Communication processes in general: human, animal, mechanical (technical) 
• Human communication 
• Animal communication: zoosemiotics, ethology 
• Technical communication: electronics, cybernetics, data processmg, 
informatics, telecommunication 
• Biochemical communication: genetic information, the study of DNA, cellular 
communication 
• Neurophysiological communication: perception of stimuli, processing by the 
brain, the study of sense organs, etc. 
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2.2.2 What is communication? 
Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of this field of study, it should come as no 
surprise that there are at least 160 definitions of communication (Fauconnier 
1987:28). Fauconnier ( :31-36) finds four basic points of distinction in the definitions, 
namely: 
• the observation level (Are we dealing with communication in general or just 
human communication?) 
• the intentionality of the source (for example, a teleological view focuses on 
the source's intention of having the message received, whereas the behavioural 
view is that all behaviour is communicative) 
• normative judgment (Did the communication succeed or not? Was a certain 
idea elicited in the mind of the interpreter?) 
• the direction of the communication process (uni-directional or bi-directional). 
Tn addition, Stappers distinguishes six types or categories of definitions (as quoted by 
Fauconnier 1987:36-38): 
• Emphasis on the recipient (who selects from the unlimited number of 
messages coming in) 
• Emphasis on the source (the intention of the source to influence the recipient -
the classic view) 
• Linking (the partnership between source and recipient - the interaction is 
important) 
• Commonality (the result of linking - the sharing and participation in each 
other's thoughts) 
• Transmission (the channel through which the message is transmitted) 
• Use of symbols (the importance of the encoding system - no thought possible 
without words?). 
Fauconnier (1987:38) makes the point that the definitions are created in a certain 
scientific environment or context in which they are indeed useful for the purposes of 
that environment. The underlying issue is the behavioural theory that is being 
subscribed to. Positions range from extreme behaviourist through to interactionist and 
to phenomenological ( :39-40). 
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Being based on a broad behavioural-communicative view, Fauconnier's own 
definition of communication is as follows: 
From a general communication-theoretical point of view, human or social 
communication is a process in which a source tries to make data available to a 
recipient by means of a channel, signs and symbols, with the intention of 
letting the recipient process the data into information with a meaning intended 
by the source. 
(Fauconnier 1987:167). 
In order to further clarify what is meant by communication, it is useful to investigate 
models of the communication process. 
2.2.3 Models of communication processes 
There are more than 50 models of the communication process (Fauconnier 1987:46). 
To illustrate the concepts involved, we will use the mechanistic Shannon-Weaver 
model as shown below (:42-46). 
Person A talking on telephone Person B listening on telephone 
encoding decoding 
l transmitted received l message 1nessage 
sender recipient source destination 
• 
___..channel ___.. 
' 
I Noise source I 
Reper / \ Reper 
Tory of( tory of 
signs A signs B 
' 
- -
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The context of this model is that of a telephone conversation. We can distinguish the 
following elements: 
• A source and a sender (person A and the telephone handset) 
• A receiver and a destination (the other telephone handset and person B) 
• Encoding and decoding (converting the content of the mind into a code (based 
on signs) that can be transmitted, and the reverse process) 
• Repertory of signs (the media) by which the message is carried. The source 
and the recipient each have their own repertory and these must partially 
correspond. Each sign combines the signifier and the signified. 
• Signals (the arrows in the drawing) are the physical entities such as 
electromagnetic waves that are reconverted into signs when decoding takes 
place. 
• The channel is the means by which the signs and signal are transmitted, e.g. 
. . 
copper wife or air. 
• The medium is the object that carries the message or the technical medium that 
enables us to receive the message via our senses, e.g. television or radio. 
• The message is that which is being expressed and transmitted - meaning, 
information, feelings, etc. A position that can be held is that data that is 
transmitted become information once it has been 'assimilated in the thought 
system' ( :45). 
• Feedback is what happens when the source gains information as a result of the 
communicative action. 
• The noise source refers to signal noise that can occur in the channel, thus 
distorting the message. 
There are different perspectives on the communication process, resulting in different 
models, namely (Fauconnier 1987:46): 
• Structural or analytical models that focus on the components or factors of the 
process and their relationships 
• Dynamic models that focus on the evolution of movement of the process 
• Functional models that show causal relationships and interactions 
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• Operational models that enable the prediction and measurement of 
communication. 
The model of Shannon and Weaver as described above is an example of a 
graphic-dynamic model and is often used since it provides the simplest way of 
describing the communication process and introduces many of the concepts 
(Fauconnier 1987:58). One should, however, be careful in this IT (information 
technology) world that we live in, not to reduce the richness of the communication 
concepts to bits and bytes. For example, what we called the 'message' is quickly 
reduced to a focus on the data that is being transmitted. The point is that the data only 
become informative once it has been received and understood by the person it is 
communicated to. The role of the recipient in selecting which message to hear is also 
important. 
In order to press this point home, we will look at the analytical communication model 
(see below) of M van Schoor which stresses the role of the recipient (Fauconnier 
1987:55-57). 
co1nmunicato sign, code, recipient 
inedium 
9 expression message interpretation 9 1 1 
r r 
c expression; "decoding": c u u 
m 
":dit interpretation m s s t transm 5100 t 
a ~ a 
n transmission n 
c c 
e 
"decoding"; feedback: e s s 
"encoding " 
understanding 
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The focus in this model is on the communicator, the medium and the recipient. The 
communicator wants to send a message intended for a recipient and uses a medium, 
which is a combination of codes and signs. The recipient plays an active role because 
he or she is not just a termination point, but the turning point of the message, since the 
message could go back to the source. The potential value of the message is turned 
into real value by the recipient through interpretation. The essential characteristic of 
communication is intersubjectivity, i.e. the mutual understanding that develops. This 
presupposes that the communicator and the recipient have many things in common, 
such as language rules and social circumstances. 
The four levels of the model represent (from the top): 
• the externally perceptible level (we can see the communicator, the signs, the 
medium, etc.) 
• the inner dimension in which the meaning of the message is expressed and 
interpreted 
• the performance level at which the actions of encoding, delivery and decoding 
take place 
• the encompassing level of the social circumstances m which this 
communication process takes place. 
Finally, the diagram shows that the quest for mutual understanding is the core of all 
human communication. 
The philosophical basis of van Schoor's model is that communication 1s the 
experience of reality or, as Fauconnier states, using Ortega y Gasset's terminology, 'it 
is a dialogue between man and his circumstances' ( :57). 
To sum up this overview of communication models: 
• The communication process is too complex to be fully represented by a model. 
Issues such as personality, motives and other social variables play a role. 
• By examining the explicit or implicit communication model that is being used, 
one can determine the point of departure of the researcher. 
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In the context of this dissertation, the following conclusion by Cronkhite is very 
important: 
Your choice of models will depend on what you want to look at, and what you 
see will be determined by the model you choose 
(as quoted by Fauconnier 1987:58). 
If we now step back and look at the multi-disciplinary nature of the study of 
communication, we can distinguish five main points of view (Fauconnier 1987:89): 
• a psycho-philosophical view of the relation between symbol, meaning and 
communication 
• a cybernetic systems-theoretical view 
• a socio-psychological view 
• a pragmatic view 
• a symbolic-interactionist view. 
In the context of this study we do not need to cover these views in detail. The purpose 
is merely to ensure awareness of the richness and complexity of the study of 
communication. In the dialogue between science and theology, the mathematical or 
information theory-based approach, which forms part of the cybernetic systems-
theoretical view, has tended to dominate. 
We will now move to less familiar territory. We have discussed information in the 
traditional contexts of mathematics and physics, and human communication, but now 
we move to the biosphere and examine communication between all living things. 
2.3 Tfze biological roots of information - from biosphere to semiosphere 
J esper Hoffmeyer makes the fundamental point that with the emergence of life, we 
moved beyond the sphere of physics to the sphere of communication and 
interpretation (Hoffmeyer 1997). Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991) take issue with the 
trend in biology to use terms such as 'code' and 'information' borrowed from the 
mathematical theory of information (as formulated by Shannon). Their point is that 
these concepts are not unambiguous and when we talk of 'biological information' we 
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are dealing with a concept of information that is understood as an 'objective 
quantifiable entity' (Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991 :3). They make the point that this is 
not the same concept of information that we use in the context of human 
communication, in which we become informed via conversation and that we need a 
semantic level of analysis, not just the statistical analysis of information theory. 
Biological information, since it deals with teleonomic living systems, should also 
participate in this semantic or meaning dimension. Emmeche and Hoffmeyer admit 
that the cost of this is the abandonment of information as an objective quantity, 
measured in bits or genes, and a moving on to information as a subjective category. 
The definition of information that then becomes appropriate is that of Bateson, 
namely that information is taken to mean 'a difference that makes a difference to 
somebody' (Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991:4, Bateson 2000:315). This introduces the 
subject, without which information does not make sense. Information is something 
that is generated by a subject; it is always information for someone (an intentional 
creature) and it cannot be quantified into just bits and bytes (Hoffmeyer 1996: 65-66). 
Emmeche and Hoffmeyer's (1991 :4) thesis is that 'living systems are real interpretants 
of information: they respond to selected differences in their surroundings'. This is the 
basis for the use of analogies from the context of human communication to understand 
the purposeful behaviour of living systems. 
The point of departure here is that of describing the dynamics of living systems from 
the perspective of communication or the exchange of signs. The Greek word for sign 
is semiosis and the study of signs is called semiotics. This approach is therefore called 
biosemiotics, the study of living systems from a sign-theory perspective. Hoffmeyer 
goes on to define biosemiotics further by stating: 
In the biosemiotic v1s1on natural entities and processes are seen as 
interconnected webs of relations, shaking hands so to say between levels in the 
hierarchical scale, stretching along the spatial dimension from the single cell 
to the biosphere or, along the semantic dimension, from pheromone-signalling 
to the human psycho-neuro-immuno-endochrine system. 
(Hoffmeyer 2000) 
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This view of nature is based on the theory of signs of Charles S Peirce and not on the 
other main semiotic tradition, namely the linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991:4). 
Peirce's logic is based on the fundamental assumption that three-factor relations 
(triads) are needed since two-factor relations are too limited to represent logical 
processes as a multi-dimensional network (Hoffmeyer 1996: 17). The outcome is that 
a valid thought consists of the relation between three things, for example cause and 
effect and the observer who made the connection. Logic is intimately bound up with 
the idea that someone exists to make the inferences. Peirce regarded logic as the 
philosophy of communication and the science of the general laws of signs (:18). 
Peirce called his triad a sign, his logical theory semiotics and the process by which 
signs are exchanged, the functioning of signs, semiosis. The definition of a sign is 
that it represents a relation between three factors, namely: 
• the primary sign or the sign vehicle 
• the object to which the primary sign refers 
• the interpretant - the system that creates the relationship between the primary 
sign and the object (:19). 
This may be represented as follows: 
Sign vehicle Object Red spots Measles 
lnterpretant Doctor 
Hoftineyer (1996:19) gives the example (shown above) of red spots (the sign vehicle) 
which are associated with measles and are interpreted by the doctor via a mental 
process. 
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The semiotic approach deals with two metaphors: nature-as-language and life-as-
language. The world is seen as 'a universal language instead of a giant clockwork' 
(Turbayne as quoted by Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991:27). Life is seen as a sign-
relation network rather than an information-processing machine (Hoffmeyer 1996:37). 
All organisms live in a world of signification (:vii). The semiotic network between 
creatures participating in semiosis constitutes an emergent level, which is called the 
semiosphere (:58-59). Our description of the world now includes a semiosphere in 
which the biosphere is immersed. The semiosphere 'penetrates to every corner of the 
other spheres, incorporating all forms of communication: sounds, smells, movements, 
colours, shapes, electrical fields, thermal radiation, waves of all kinds, chemical 
signals, touching, and so on. In short, all signs of life' (:vii). 
Hoffmeyer (1996:96) uses the following model: 
Inner Nature 
he 
psycho-
somatic 
Culture 
The bioserniotic 
area 
environ-
mental 
rea 
Outer Nature 
The biosemiotic area is seen as 'the mediator between man's outer and inner natures 
and, hence, between culture and nature' (:96). With the biosemiotic approach to 
biology, biology becomes a meeting place between physics and the humanities 
(Hoffmeyer 1997). We can represent an overview of the levels of information as 
follows: 
People Human 
communications The Organisms Cells talking to 
semiosphere 
cells -
exchanging 
si.gns 
Atoms Physics of 
information 
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3 A brief overview of the divine action debate 
3.1 Why is this debate important? 
Simply by framing this question: 'How does God act in the world?', we have made 
many assumptions, the most important being that such a thing as a God exists and that 
he/she/it is capable of acting on the world in some fashion. 
Why should we ask this question? According to Moltmann (1995:207), the question 
of 'God's action/interaction with the world' is embedded into a larger context of a 
theistic model of God. A whole host of questions are related to this question: 
• What are the prospects of natural theology? 
• What about the 'God of the gaps' problem? 
• God must make a difference if I am to believe. Who would believe in a 
powerless God? 
• What world-view and what view of God lie behind the last question? 
Some of these questions were addressed in a series of conferences, sponsored by the 
Vatican Observatory, on the topic of God's action in the world in the light of recent 
developments in science. The purpose of the conferences was to further investigation 
into the possible relations between religion and science. The particular topic of God's 
action was chosen because: 
• The question of how God acts 1s at the heart of many conflicts between 
science and Christianity. 
• Different views of divine action have had a great deal to do with creating the 
differences between liberal and conservative views of theology. 
• This issue is the point at which modem science has had its greatest impact on 
theology in the modem period (Murphy 1997:33, 66). 
Wildman (1996:54) states that the problem of divine action is 'one issue in need of a 
breakthrough' and that 'very little of major consequence has changed in the shape of 
this problem'. Polkinghome's (1996:41) opinion is that the issue of divine action 
remains at the top of the agenda for science and faith discussions. 
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Peacocke (1993:150) says that 'without some plausible (certainly not mechanistic) 
account of how God might interact with the causal nexus of individual events in the 
world, including human-brains-in-human-bodies, we cannot with integrity assert that 
God does, or might, do so'. 
Trigg (1998:79) asserts that we must face the full-blooded metaphysical question of 
whether science could in any circumstance accept the intervention of God. Peacocke, 
Barbour and Polkinghorne refuse to use the word 'intervention' and prefer to use the 
term 'interaction' for divine acts (Polkinghorne 1996:41). To Trigg (1998:125), 'the 
whole point of believing in God is that He is not "causally inert"'. For Trigg (206), 
religion concerns human relations with a God who is active and can enter into 
relations with people. 
Bultmann's view is that the action of God is hidden from every eye, except the eye of 
faith (Trigg 1998:97). 
Gregersen and Van Huyssteen (1998:80) make the point that what is at stake for 
theology in the dialogue between science and theology 'is whether or not it would be 
possible plausibly to revise the belief that God works out God's purposes in and 
through the processes of the natural world'. 
3.2 Biological i11Jormatio11 - The new arena of the divine action debate 
The focus of the science-theology debate has shifted away from cosmology to 
evolution and molecular biology. This has been due to our increasing understanding 
of the intricacies of life. The futurists are proclaiming that the information revolution 
is now being followed by the biological revolution. The synergy between these two 
revolutions will lead, and has led, to a real explosion in our scientific understanding of 
the fundamentals of life. The decoding of the human genome in record time is 
evidence of this explosive synergy. The evidence is that this will remain the hot issue 
of our time and that, as new insights develop, new perspectives on the divine action 
debate will be opened. For now the concept of biological information is the specific 
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area in which new insights are being developed, since old questions are being asked in 
a new language. 
20 
4 Three approaches to biological information 
4.1 I11troductio11 
In order to introduce the various concepts that are being used, we will discuss in some 
detail the contributions of Werner Gitt, Paul Davies and William Dembski, who cover 
different parts of the spectrum of approaches. Gitt is a young Earth creationist. 
Davies adopts a carefully reasoned stance, which is somewhat outside the boundaries 
of 'hard science'. Dembski is a prominent member of the Intelligent Design 
movement, which believes that the presence of design can be proved scientifically, 
but does not demand a literal interpretation of the Bible in terms of six days of 
creation. 
We start with Werner Gitt's work since he has given the most complete overview of 
all aspects of information and has worked out the most comprehensive system of 
laws. 
4.2 Werner Gitt 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Prof Dr-Ing Werner Gitt is an information scientist at the German Federal Institute of 
Physics and Teclmology. He is also a Christian who has written many books and has 
lectured widely on the topic of 'Faith and Science' in many countries, including South 
Africa. Professor Gitt believes strongly that God created the world in a week (Gitt 
1997: 162), and dismisses theistic evolution theories in his book Did God Use 
Evolution? (Gitt 1993). In this dissertation we want to discuss the full exposition of 
his ideas on information and its usefulness in supporting his position against 
evolutionists, as captured in the book In the Beginning was Information. 
4.2.2 Gitt on information 
The purpose of the book is to 'help uproot the current evolutionary paradigm' (Gitt 
1997:24) and show that we need to involve God as the creator, as 'the Person Who is 
the Prime Cause' (:10), in order to explain the origins of life. This is made abundantly 
clear by the title of the book as well. 
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In order to achieve his two objectives, Gitt (1997:9) focuses on information: 
Because information is required for all life processes, it can be stated unequivocally 
that information is an essential characteristic of all life. All efforts to explain life 
processes in terms of physics and chemistry only, will always be unsuccessful. This is 
the fundan1ental problem confronting present-day biology, which is based on 
evolution. 
Gitt (1997:9) considers information to be a 'fundamental entity on equal footing with 
matter and energy'. 
The method used is to formulate natural laws of infomiation which are then used to 
'develop an alternate model which refutes the doctrine of evolution' by showing how 
evolutionary theory violates these laws (Gitt 1997:10). 
4.2.3 Gitt's description of the scientific approach 
In a chapter called 'Principles of laws of nature', Gitt (1997:22) formulates the 
scientific method as being: observing the world, followed by organising the 
observations systematically, and finally, deriving principles that are formulated in the 
most general manner possible. Gitt ( :22) stresses that the scope of science is limited: 
'Questions about the origin of the world and of life, as well as ethical questions, fall 
outside the scope of science, and such questions cannot be answered scientifically'. 
Within the domain of science, Gitt ( :22) makes clear that the outputs of the scientific 
method have varying degrees of certainty. He develops a classification scheme based 
on the degree of certainty. The degree of certainty is determined by evaluating the 
degree of testing to which a statement about natural events has been subjected. The 
most certain statements are the laws of nature which have been 'verified repeatedly in 
a reproducible way so that they are regarded as generally valid' (Gitt 1997:22). 
According to Gitt (:22), statements about natural events can be arranged according to 
decreasing degrees of certainty as follows: 
• Law of Nature 
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• Model 
• Theory (Greek theoria = a view, consideration, investigation) 
• Hypothesis (Greek hypothesis= assumption, conjecture, supposition) 
• Paradigm (Greekparadeigma =example, sample) 
• Speculation 
• Fiction. 
In his discussion of hypotheses, Gitt ( :23) raises the issues of falsification (one fact 
can cause rejection of a hypothesis) and later (:24) the issue of verification (theories 
must be experimentally verifiable). 
It is especially interesting to focus on Gitt's definition of a paradigm and to reflect on 
the position that it occupies in this hierarchy. Gitt's (:23-24) definition of a paradigm 
is as follows: 
Paradigm (Greekparadeigma: example, sample): When a certain theory (or a 
system of hypotheses, or a world-view) pervades entire fields of research or an 
entire scientific era, it is known as a paradigm. Such a view then dictates the 
scope for specific researches and delineates the presuppositions used for 
explaining individual phenomena. If a system of hypotheses has been derived 
from presuppositions dictated by a world-view, it usually cannot be reconciled 
with the available facts. A typical example is geocentricity (refuted by 
Copernicus) .... It is hoped that this book will help to uproot the current 
evolutionary paradigm. 
Gitt raises the issue of the influence of a 'world-view' here, with the intent of attacking 
the 'evolutionary paradigm' which is derived from a certain world-view as he sees it. 
Having established the varying degrees of certainty, Gitt ( :25) goes on to attack the 
absolute certainty with which statements are formulated. I presume that this is aimed 
at some of Richard Dawkins' pronouncements. Gitt (:25) quotes Max Born, a 
physicist and Nobel laureate: 
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Ideas like absolute correctness, absolute accuracy, final truth, etc. are illusions 
which have no place in any science. With one's restricted knowledge of the 
present situation, one may express conjectures and expectations about the 
future in terms of probabilities. In terms of the underlying theory any 
probabilistic statement is neither true nor false. This liberation of thought 
seems to me to be the greatest blessing accorded us by present-day science. 
Gitt (1997:25-26) goes on to make the point, via further quotations that refer to 
Thomas Kuhn's well-known work on research paradigms, that paradigms are 
persistent and lead to people actually explaining observations in such a manner that 
they fit the established theory instead of (possibly?) correcting or falsifying it. With 
time, this effect becomes worse. As Gitt ( :26) phrases it: 'The persistence of a 
paradigm which has survived the onslaught ofreality for a long time, is even greater'. 
It is interesting that Gitt uses the phrase 'onslaught ofreality'. .. as if reality itself, 'pure' 
observations', rather than the people who are making these, possibly biased, 
observations about reality are involved. 
To Gitt a fixed yardstick or corrective remains essential. He states (1997:26): 'A 
minimal requirement for testing whether a theory should be retained, or whether a 
hypothesis should not yet be discarded, or that a process could really work, is that the 
relevant laws of nature should not be violated.' The ultimate 'paradigm-breaker' is the 
laws of nature. 
Gitt spells out the special properties of the laws of nature via nine theorems. The laws 
of nature are (Gitt 1997: 26-32): 
1 . based on experience (and thus are empirical statements that cannot be proved, 
but 'they are nevertheless valid' (:27)) 
2. universally valid 
3. equally valid for living beings and for inanimate matter 
4. not restricted to any one field of study 
5. immutable 
6. simple 
7. (in principle) falsifiable. 
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Furthermore, the laws of nature: 
8. can be expressed in various ways 
9. describe reproducible results. 
These nine theorems have been 'derived from experience' and 'their correctness cannot 
be proved, but can be tested repeatedly in the real world.' (Gitt 1997: 33). Gitt (:33) 
now goes on to formulate a tenth theorem which 'depends on the personal view of the 
user' and hence he gives two different versions: 
lOa. Natural events can be explained without God. 
1 Ob. The present laws of nature became operational when creation was completed. 
Although Gitt (1997:33) does acknowledge that 'both views are equally a question of 
belief and conviction', he goes on to take up the position that we can decide which 
view is more useful to us. In his further arguments, the type of usefulness he is 
referring to seems to be related to what makes sense. 
Gitt (1997:33) bases theorem !Ob on Genesis 2:2 and his interpretation of the creation 
narrative is that the laws of nature were 'installed during the six creation days', hence 
the laws only became active by the seventh day of creation. This then means that one 
cannot explain creation, including the origin of life, in terms of the laws of nature, 
since all life was created before the laws became active (:33-34) . 
Gitt (1997:34) also makes the following strong claim: 'The moment that historical 
questions (e.g. about the origin of the world and of life) or future events (like the end 
of the earth) are considered, then N!Oa [Theorem 1 Oa) is entirely useless.' This might 
be based on his standpoint that God, being the Creator of the laws of nature, has 
absolute control and is not limited by laws ( :34). This means that God has absolute 
control over both the past and the future and it is frnitless to consider just the 
possibilities due to the effects of the laws of nature. 
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Having established a basic set of natural laws, Gitt (1997:40) derives a set of laws or 
theorems about information which, according to him, are also laws of nature and to 
which all the properties of natural laws apply. 
4.2.4 Gitt's information laws 
4. 2.4.1 Introduction 
Gitt makes a major classification of all aspects of information with 30 theorems or 
laws of information, five levels, two fundamental properties, three forms of 
information and three kinds of transmitted information. 
Gitt's (1997:44) point of departure is that information is a fundan1ental quantity, at the 
same level as that of matter and energy. He ( :44-45) goes on to show that Shannon's 
information theory' covers what he calls 'a very minor aspect of information', namely 
the statistical aspect. Shannon's theory does not deal with the contents of messages, 
only the statistical likelihood of a message. Gitt's goal is to bring in a new dimension 
with respect to information. He (:46) calls the assumption that information is a 
material phenomenon 'a fundamental fallacy' that has led to 'seriously erroneous 
conclusions'. Gitt (:46) quotes the father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener: 'Information 
is information, neither matter nor energy. Any materialism which disregards this, will 
not survive one day.' Gitt (:46-47) produces further quotes which bring in the issue of 
meaning, the semantic aspect of information, which leads on to the questions 
regarding the senders and recipients of information. Gitt's (:47) conclusion is that 
'information, being a fundamental entity, cannot be a property of matter, and its origin 
cannot be explained in terms of material processes'. This leads to the first of the 24 
theorems of information: 
Theorem I: The fundamental quantity infonnation is a non-material (mental) 
entity. It is not a property of matter, so that purely material processes are 
fundamentally precluded as sources of information. 
7 Subsection 2.1.1 contains Shannon's full definition of information. 
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This then naturally leads to us to ask: 'What then is the cause or the source of 
information?' Gitt's (1997:47) answer is that our volition, our will, is the cause of 
information and hence he introduces what he calls a 'fourth fundamental entity, 
namely Will (volition), W.' Information is thus seen to be always dependent on the 
existence of a sender who issued information according to his/her will (Gitt 1997:48). 
This leads Gitt ( :48) to formulate the next theorem: 
Theorem 2: Information only arises through an intentional, volitional act. 
He ( 1997 :49) describes the following generic process for how the non-material entity, 
intentional information, can control matter: First, there is an intention to solve a 
problem, then a 'conceptual construct for which the information may be coded in the 
form of a program, a technical drawing', and, finally, the concept is implemented. An 
agent with volition is obviously present throughout as well. Tims all constructed 
objects have been produced via pre-existing information, and none were created 
'through some form of self-organisation of matter' ( :49). Gitt( :49) then draws the 
conclusion that 'information was present at the beginning, as the title of this book 
states'. This position is then summarised in the next theorem: 
Theorem 3: Information comprises the nonmaterial foundation for all 
technological systems and for all works of art. 
Gitt has now dealt with one aspect of design, namely, man-made systems, or design as 
in that practised by engineers and artists. The further challenge is to move to 
biological systems and in order to do so he wants to 'formulate the theorems in such a 
way that they are valid as laws of nature, then they would be universally valid 
according to the essential characteristics of the laws of nature, N2, N3 and N4' (Gitt: 
1997:49). N2, N3 and N4 basically entail that the laws of nature apply to everything, 
animate and inanimate matter, and to all fields of study. 
Having sketched the outlines of Gitt's argument, we can now move on to summarise 
the full reach of Gitt's 'architecture' of all the aspects of information, as depicted in the 
diagran1 below (Gitt 1997:56): 
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There are five aspects of information and the role of the sender and the recipient must 
be factored in. It must also be borne in mind that, the 'information concept also 
includes the expected/implemented action (pragmatics), and the intended/achieved 
purpose (apobetics)' Gitt (1997:56). 
Since we have already discussed the first level or aspect, namely the statistical aspect, 
we give a brief overview of the other four levels. 
4.2.4.2 Syntax 
Syntax includes 'all structural properties of the process of setting up information' 
which involves 'the actual sets of symbols (codes) and the rules governing the way 
they are assembled into sequences (grammar and vocabulary), independent of any 
meaning they may or may not have' (Gitt 1997:58). This level has two parts, namely 
the code (the set or system of symbols selected), and the syntax proper, which 
describes the inter-relationships among the symbols (:58). 
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In line with his general approach, Gitt (1997:63) makes a clear distinction between 
what he considers prerequisites for identifying a code system: 
• A set of symbols is a code if: 
o 'it can be decoded successfully and meaningfully' (the one and only 
sufficient condition) 
• It is not a code if: 
o 'it can be explained fully on the level of physics and chemistry, i.e. 
when its origin is exclusively of a material nature', or 
o 'it is known to be a random sequence (e.g. when its origin is known or 
communicated). This conclusion also holds when the sequence 
randomly contains valid symbols from any other code.' 
As an example ofa code that has a purely material nature, Gitt (1997:63) mentions the 
periodic radio signals received that were later identified as originating from pulsars 
(rapidly rotating stars). 
As an aside here we can note that it is in practice very difficult to determine whether 
or not a sequence is random. Chaitin has shown that it is in fact theoretically 
impossible to determine whether a sequence is random, because there is no algorithm 
that can do this (Gitt 1997:126). 
To Gitt (1997:64) a code 'always represents a mental concept, and, according to our 
expenence, its assigned meaning always depends on some convention. It is thus 
possible to determine at the code level already whether any Diven [sic] system 
originated from a creative mental concept or not.' 
The third level of information is semantics. 
4.2.4.3 Semantics 
Gitt (1997:69) gives the following translation of the Greek term semantik6s: 
'characteristic, significance, aspect of meaning'. The essential characteristic of 
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conveyed information for Gitt (:69) is: 'not the selected code, ... but it is the message 
being conveyed, the conclusions and the meanings (semantics).' 
As soon as we talk about meaning, a sender and a recipient are involved (Gitt 
1997:70). Meaning is the only invariant property of information and hence it is 
essential to information (:70). Gitt (:70) sees meaning as always representing mental 
concepts and therefore his 15th theorem reads: 
When its progress along the chain of transmission events is traced backwards, 
every piece of information leads to a mental source, the mind of the sender. 
Gitt (1997:71) also brings in the issue oflanguage at this point: 
All suitable ways of expressing meanings (mental substrates, thoughts, or 
nonmaterial contents of consciousness), are called languages. Information can 
be transmitted or stored in material media only when a language is available. 
The different kinds of language are: natural languages used by people for 
communication, artificial communication languages and languages used for signalling 
(Esperanto, traffic signs), formal artificial languages (logic, mathematics, computer 
programming languages), special technical languages (building plans) and the special 
languages found in living organisms (genetic languages, bee gyrations, instincts ... ) 
(Gittl 997:72). 
According to Gitt (1997:72-73), language involves two processes: the sender 
fonnulates and the recipient comprehends, and both are, in general, accepted to be 
intelligent beings, or, in the case of a communication system (e.g. bee gyrations), an 
intelligent being must have been involved in creating the system. 
From meaning Gitt moves on to purpose, the fourth level of information. 
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4.2.4.4 Pragmatics 
Gitt (1997:73) gives the following translation of the Greek term pragmatike: 'the art 
of doing the right thing; taking action.' Here we are dealing with the purpose the 
sender has in mind for the recipient with the transmitted information (:73). Language 
is used to get the recipient to take some action (:74). 
Finally, there is the highest level, dealing with the purpose that the sender has in 
mind. 
4.2.4.5 Apobetics 
Gitt (1997:76) coined the term 'apobetics' in order to conform to the titles of the other 
levels. The term is based on the Greek term apobeinon, which Gitt translates as: 
'result, success, conclusion.' 
This deals with the teleological aspect of information, the sender's plan, the 
premeditated purpose behind the information (:76). According to Gitt (:78), the other 
four levels are 'only a means for attaining the purpose (apobetics).' Gitt (:78) does 
note that 'the teleological aspect may often overlap and coincide with the pragmatic 
aspect to a large extent, but it is theoretically always possible to distinguish the two.' 
Gitt (:78) feels that 'evolutionary doctrine' is in conflict with this aspect of information 
since it 'deliberately denies any purposefulness that might be apparent.' 
4.2.4.6 Summary of the information levels 
It is important to note that Gitt (1997:79) claims that all of his theorems are 'based on 
empirical reality' and therefore, he argues, 'they may thus be regarded as natural laws, 
since they exhibit the characteristics of natural laws'. These characteristics were 
discussed under Subsection 4.2.3: Gitt's description of the scientific approach. 
Gitt (1997:80) summarises what he deems to be the most important results as follows: 
• There can be no information without a code. 
• Any code is the result of a free and deliberate convention. 
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• There can be no information without a sender. 
• Any given chain of information points to a mental source. 
• There can be no information without volition (will). 
• There can be no information unless all five hierarchical levels are involved: 
statistics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics and apobetics. 
• Information cannot originate in statistical processes. 
Another way of summarising the information theorems and the levels of information 
is according to Gill's hierarchy of phenomena (1997:81) or levels of complexity: 
• Life 
o Life theorems: Gitt (:81) quotes Louis Pasteur: 'Life can only come 
from life'. 
o Life is not just information, although information is required for life. 
• Information 
o At the level at which Gitt's information laws operate, information is 
non-material. 
o Information 1s not matter, but it requires matter as a medium for 
storage, etc. 
• Matter 
o This is the level at which all natural laws operate. 
Gitt's (1997:81) critique of the evolutionary view is that it regards life and information 
as 'purely material phenomena.' 
Gitt (1997:84) formulates two fundamental properties ofinfomrntion: 
Property 1: Information is not the thing itself, neither is it a condition, but it is 
an abstract representation of material realities or conceptual relationships, like 
problem formulations, ideas, programs or algorithms. The representation is in 
a SLiitable coding system and the realities could be objects, or physical, 
chemical or biological conditions. The reality being represented is usually not 
present at the time and place of the transfer of information, neither can it be 
observed or measured at that moment. 
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Property 2: Information always plays a substitutionary role. The encoding of 
reality is a mental process. 
Just as with Theorems I to 3, an intelligent sender is required (Gitt 1997:84). 
Gitt now moves on to use the theorems to discuss the issue of information in living 
organisms, as well as the theory of evolution. 
4.2.5 Gitt on life and evolution 
Not only is information essential to life, but, to Gitt (1997:88), information is the 
'central characteristic' of all life and it regulates all of life's processes. Of the three 
fundamental concepts, namely matter, energy and information, it is information that 
distinguishes the living from the non-living. 
Gitt (1997:88-93) demonstrates that information is essential to life by discussing the 
way that the basic constituents of life, proteins, are manufactured in living beings. 
Proteins are built up from 20 different amino acids. Each of the 50 000 proteins in 
humans consists of a specific sequence of these amino acids. This sequence must be 
encoded somehow using a coding system, and then decoded by the protein 
'manufacturing plant' in the cell. 
The nucleic acid, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), a double-stranded molecule forming 
a double helix, is the storage medium used by the coding system. DNA is built up out 
of nucleotides, which consist of a carbohydrate, deoxyribose, to which one of four 
bases are attached, namely adenine (A), guanine (G), cytidine (C) or thymine (T) 
(Bebe 1998:265). The nucleotides can become joined to each other via phosphate and 
hydroxyl groups attached to deoxyribose and DNA molecules range in length from 
several thousands to a billion nucleotides ( :266). The nucleotides can also form 
weaker bonds (hydrogen bonds) with each other: A can bond to T and G can bond to 
C. This is the basis for the formation of the two strands, each of which is 
complementary to each other (:266, 268). Each amino acid is uniquely identified by a 
group of three contiguous nucleotides. So we have a code based on an alphabet of 
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four 'letters' (A, G, C, T) which are grouped in threes to form 'words', and each 'word' 
codes for a particular amino acid (Gitt 1997: 90). 
In a cell, transcription and translation take place with the help of RNA (ribonucleic 
acid) (Behe 1998:269). An RNA copy of a section of DNA, made via the 
transcription process, is then used in the translation process to produce a protein 
(:269-270). DNA and RNA are very similar in structure, except that in RNA the 
carbohydrate is ribose and uracil (U) replaces thymine ( :265). 
As an example: the amino acid serine is coded by the sequence: AGC AGU UCA 
UCCUCGUCU 
Gitt (1997 :94-96) contends that this coding system for the 20 amino acids is optimal. 
He argues as follows: 
There are two parameters involved: the number of different letters (4 for DNA) and 
the length of the word coding for a particular amino acid (3). 
The table below shows the number of combinations that are possible, for example, 
with 2 different letters (n=2) and a word length of three (L=3), 23=8 possible 
combinations of 3-letter words can be made. With 4 different letters and a word 
length of 4, 24=256 possible combinations of 4-letter words can be made. 
Word Length (L) 
L=2 L=3 L=4 
-;: n=2 4 8 16 
~ 
,,, 
~ n=3 9 27 81 
" ...l 
c n=4 16 64 256 
" ~ ~ 
i:S n=5 25 125 625 
~ 
0 
0 n=6 36 216 1 296 :z: 
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Due to the fact that there are 20 amino acids, we can exclude all possibilities that 
result in fewer than 20 possible combinations. 
Gitt ( 1997:94) mentions the following requirements for the design: 
I. To minimise the storage space required in a cell, the number of letters used to 
code for an amino acid must be as small as possible. 
2. The number of different letter types must be even due to the need for 
replication and transcription of DNA. 
3. To make replication more robust, a measure of redundancy in the code would 
be required. 
4. The higher the number of different letter types, 'the longer the alphabet' and 
the higher the complexity of all the mechanisms such as replication, so 
copying errors should increase. 
To mimm1se the storage space, any option with too many possibilities can be 
excluded, for example (n=4, L=4, 256). 
On the basis of the second requirement, namely that the number of letter types must 
be even, we can exclude n=3 and n=5; this leaves n=2, 4 or 6. 
With the binary code, n=2, with large words, a word length of at least 5 (32 
combinations) or 6 (64 combinations) is a possibility. 
The quaternary code, n=4, with a word length of 3, provides 64 combinations. The 
word length of 3 results in fewer letters being needed to code for an amino acid 
compared with the binary word length of 5. The complexity is higher since there are 
now 4 different letters, vs 2 for binary, but the redundancy is also higher (64 
combinations vs 32 for n=2, L=5). The end-result is that quaternary is more suitable 
than binary. 
The other possible candidate is n=6, L=2 with 36 possibilities (with L=3 there are 216 
possibilities which is far too many). Compared with the quaternary option, the 
complexity is higher (6 vs 4 letter types) and the redundancy is lower, (36 vs 64) and 
therefore the quaternary option, n=4 with L=4, is the optimum choice. 
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Gitt (1997:95) draws the conclusion that the fact that the coding system used for 
living beings is optimal 'strengthens the argument that it was a case of purposeful 
design rather than fortuitous chance'. Furthermore, since information is present, and it 
is not a different kind of information (see Theorem 25). Gitt (:97) simply applies his 
Theorems 1 and 2 to come to the conclusion that an intelligent source of the 
infom1ation is required (Theorem 26), and any theories that do not include such a 
source are false (Theorem 27). He (:98) also adds the argument that a 'cyclic 
information-controlled process' occurs in living cells, namely: 
Enzyme-controlled synthesis of DNA 
DNA-controlled RNA synthesis 
RNA-controlled enzyme synthesis 
This leads to the question of how such a process could have originated - surely it 
must have been complete from the very beginning? 
Finally, Gitt advances arguments against specific aspects of evolutionary views. 
4.2.6 The core of Gitt's argument against evolutionists 
The core of Gitt's argument, as is abundantly clear from the foregoing theorems, is 
that life started with information and one must be able to explain the origin of the 
information. According to Gitt (1997:99), 'All evolutionary views are fundamentally 
unable to answer this question'. 
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Gitt attacks several scientists for not fundamentally answenng this question. He 
(1997: 100) summarily dismisses the self-organisation argument as presented by 
Manfred Eigen, since it 'does not rise above the level of statistical information' and 
since Eigen offers 'Information arises from non-information', which to Gitt, is 'but a 
confession of materialism, and it fails the tests required by reality'. 
Having 'established' his laws and levels, Gitt simply measures an argument against his 
yardstick. 
Gitt also attacks scientists for simply assummg that evolution is true and then 
interpreting all of nature accordingly. His (1997:101) argument is that this point of 
departure is not based on sufficient fact. Rather, a point of departure is assumed and 
then 'all phenomena of nature is placed under the all-encompassing evolutionary 
umbrella'. This is 'pre-programmed folly', a 'mental corset', and the scientists 'degrade 
themselves to mere vassals of a materialistic philosophy'. Furthermore, 'evolutionary 
theory bans any mention of a planning Spirit as a purposeful First Cause in natural 
systems, and endeavours to imprison all sciences in the straight-jacket called the "self-
organisation" of matter' (:101). Gitt's (:110) reaction is aimed against Franz Wuketits, 
who he claims supports evolutionary theory with 'near ideological fervour, and 
accuses everybody of fable mongering, who claims to be scientific and speak of ... a 
11 desig11er" in nature 1• 
Gitt (1997:101) quotes Karl Popper, the noted philosopher of science, with approval 
since Popper, a supporter of evolution, once characterised the doctrine of evolution as 
a "metaphysical research programme". This classification removes, for Gitt (:101), 
the usefulness of evolutionary theory as a 'viable scientific leitmotiv'. 
Apart from self-organisation, Gitt (1997:102-104) also discusses other relevant 
models for the origin of information in matter, namely cumulative selection, genetic 
algorithms and evolutionary models for the origin of the genetic code. 
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4.2. 6.1 Cumulative selection 
Gitt's (1997:102) argument against cumulative selection is directly mainly at Richard 
Dawkins and his 'computer monkeys' who arrive at a pre-determined phrase via 
mutation and selection mechanisms. Gitt (: 102) makes the point that a goal-directed 
software program was used to achieve this, and that no information has been 
generated because, since the goal, the information-laden phrase, was pre-programmed, 
the computer always selected the phrase closest to the target phrase. 
Gitt (1997:102) uses his Theorem 27 to refute this: 'random processes cannot give rise 
to information'. In my opinion this is an oversimplification since, just as Dawkins 
'cheated' by using a goal-directed program, Gitt oversimplifies by not taking into 
account the random process and its interaction with its environment. The selection 
pressure caused by the environment may not be as goal-directed as Dawkins' 
software, but it does contain a measure of structure or order as a result of the action of 
the laws of nature. Ayala (1998:105) sees natural selection as a non-random process 
that selects combinations that are useful to the organism and hence the typewriter 
analogy needs to be refined as follows: 
• We postulate that there are at least three kinds of typewriter. 
• The first typewriter selects meaningful words every time they appear as a 
result of random typing. 
• The second typewriter uses words rather than letters and meaningful sentences 
are selected when they occur. 
• The third typewriter uses the sentences delivered by the second typewriter as 
its keys and selects meaningful paragraphs when they occur. 
In this fashion a book could ultimately be produced that had 'meaning'. We could not 
treat this book in the same way as one produced by an author with a definite goal in 
mind, but it would have been selected to be useful, meaningful, in its environment, 
without there ever being something such as a predetermined goal. 
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In general, we can say that it is possible that interplay between the random process 
and the 'structured' enviromnent could give rise to order and information'. 
Gitt ( 1997: 127) denies that mutations can produce new information. His argmnent is 
that mutations only alter existing information, there is no increase in information and 
new creative information cannot arise; for example, new organs cannot arise. This is 
the old argument against the creation of complex organs such as the eye from light-
sensitive cells via a chain of mutation and selection. Randomness, as evidenced in the 
form of mutations, cannot produce new information. The argument against this 
position as given in the previous paragraph is pertinent here as well. 
4.2.6.2 Genetic algorithms' 
Gitt (1997: 104) uses the famous travelling salesman problem (What is the shortest 
overall route if you have to visit several cities?) to illustrate the principles of genetic 
algorithms: Using predetermined samples of bits (sequences of noughts and ones), 
each position is regarded as a gene. The sample is then modified (mutated) by 
allowing various genetic operators to influence the bit string (e.g. cross-over). A 
'fitness function', assumed for the process of evolution is then applied to each result. 
Gitt (1997: I 04) dismisses genetic algorithms as 'purely a numerical calculation 
method, and definitely not an algorithm which describes real processes in cells', and is 
of the opinion that 'Numerical methods cannot describe the origin of information.' 
This is again a somewhat cursory dismissal. The fitness function, as in 'What is the 
shortest route?', does serve to guide the process, to select the best, but it does not fulfil 
the same role as the target phrase in the cumulative selection example. The target, the 
shortest route, is NOT known in this case. To my mind, info1mation has been 
produced, i.e. the shortest route has been selected via random mutation and selection. 
8 See also the discussion of Davies' work in Subsection4.3.6: Fro1n the first living thing to 111icrobes. 
'J Genetic algorithms are also discussed in Subsection 5.2.2.4: Intentional causes and i1~fo1?nation as 
carrier o_fn1eani11g and in 5.6.7.8: Co1nputational neuroscience. 
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4.2.6.3 Evolutionary models 
In general, Gitt (1997:104) dismisses all evolutionary models for the origin of the 
genetic code as 'imaginary' due to lack of support via empirical evidence. In any case, 
Gitt's eleventh theorem 'lays down the law' that information cannot arise in matter! 
Gitt (1997:105) quotes the attack by Fred Hoyle on the primeval soup theory of the 
origin of life (Hoyle's own 'panspermia' (life seeded via comets ... ) theory is hotly 
debated): 
I don't know how long it is going to be before astronomers generally recognise 
that the combinatorial arrangement of not even one among the many thousands 
of biopolymers on which life depends could have been arrived at by natural 
processes here on the Earth. Astronomers will have a little difficulty at 
understanding this because they will be assured by biologists that it is not so, 
the biologists having been assured in their tum by others that it is not so. The 
'others' are a group of persons who believe, quite openly, in mathematical 
miracles. They advocate the belief that tucked away in nature, outside of 
normal physics, there is a law which performs miracles. 
The incredible odds against random arrangements of molecules creating the complex 
biopolymers such as DNA, is well known'°. Hoyle's argument does not support Gitt's 
information-based argument directly. Gitt brings in Hoyle purely to show that other 
scientists also disagree that evolution and chance can explain the origin of life. 
Another version of the argument regarding the interdependency of living systems is 
used by Lwoff, who states that: 
An organism 1s a system of interdependent structures and functions. It 
consists of cells and the cells are made of molecules who have to cooperate 
smoothly. Every molecule must know what the others are doing. It must be 
able to receive messages and act on them. 
10 Davies mentions odds of 1040 000 to 1 for a fairly simple system of proteins in Subsection 4.3.4: 
Front cheniicals and energy to self-organisation. 
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(Gitt 1997:106). 
Gitt (:106) phrases Lwoffs argwnent in information language, stating that a 'complex 
net of available information' is needed by living organisms. 
Gitt's arguments against evolutionary theories can be summarised as follows: 
• Where does biological information come from? There must be a sender 
matter alone cannot create information. 
• Information needs a carrier. Where do the biological information carriers such 
as DNA come from? How can they originate by chance? The high odds make 
spontaneous genesis highly improbable. No experiment has been able to 
create the information carriers spontaneously. 
• Even if DNA did originate by chance, life depends on complex and 
interdependent systems and DNA on its own would not result in life. 
Or in the simplest form: Where there is a code, there must be a sender. 
Gitt's book could have been called: In the beginning there was a Sender. 
4.2. 7 Gitt on information and the Bible 
In Gitt's scheme, any information-transmission system that sends creative information 
(see Appendix B) was designed by intelligence, and such a system comprises the 
following (Gitt 1997:115): 
A Sender (the source of information) 
Information storage and/or Information transmission 
A Recipient (the receiver of information) 
Gitt applies this scheme to the origin of life, the communication between God and 
humankind and the communication between humankind and God. Here we will only 
discuss the application of his scheme to the origin of life. 
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4. 2. 7.1 The origin of life 
To Gitt (1997:137), the origin of the biological, operational information is the creative 
information from God. Science can only analyse the operational information and 
cannot find the Sender, which can only be revealed via the Bible. This view is 
expressed in a diagram (Gitt:l37): 
Sender God the 
Genesis 1: 'and God said' appears ten times. 
Psalms 33:9: For he spoke, and it came to be; he 
commanded, and it stood firm. Creator (Source of 
creative 
information) 
John 1: 1: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with 
God, and the Word was God. 
John I :3: Through him all things were made; without him nothing 
was made that has been made. 
The scientific boundary - science can investigate up to here t 
Inforn1ation storage and/or Information transmission 
-!. 
Recipient Living organisms 
With the levels of Syntax (Code, Genetic code in DNA information (operational grammar) 
information): Semantics (Meaning) Transcription of DNA 
Translation of DNA leading 
Pragmatics (Action) to protein synthesis, and 
construction of the \Vhole 
organism. 
Apobetics (Result, Existence of life goal) 
As we can see, science is being limited to the domain of the recipient. Finally, Gitt 
deals with Biblical analogies of the fundamental entities. 
4.2. 7.2 Gitt's Biblical analogy of the fimdamental entities 
Gitt's position is (Gitt 1997: 162): 
• The four entities are: mass (or matter), energy, information and volition. 
• Mass and energy are material. 
• Information and volition are non-material. 
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• The material quantities are subject to conservation laws, but do not exist 
forever; they were created by God and have been performing their functions 
'only since creation week' (Genesis 2:2, Jeremiah 10: 12, Romans I :20). 
• Jesus was the active Person at creation, 'through Whom He made the universe' 
(Hebrews 1 :2) and also the Sustainer, 'sustaining all things by his powerful 
word' (Hebrews I :3). Also relevant are John 1: 1-3 and Colossi ans 1: 16. From 
all the above Gitt concludes the following: 
o 'Jesus is the Source of all energy, 
o Jesus is the Source of all matter, and 
o Jesus is the Source of all biological information.' 
• Information was established in the beginning through volition (:163): 
o 'You created all things, and by your will they were created and have 
their being' (Revelation 4: 11 ). 
o 'Christ, in Whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge' (Colossians 2:3). 
• 'Everything that exists, does so through Christ; He is the First Cause of all 
things', a 'personal sustaining will' (:163). 
For Gitt (1997:163), the four basic entities have a spiritual dimension in the Bible 
where humankind is concerned. For example, in Corinthians 2:14-15 'a distinction is 
made between the natural man and the spiritual man'. 
A spiritual person lives in 'close communion with God (Ephesians 5: 18-20), is 'in 
Christ' (John 15:4) and has access to the spiritual dimension of the Bible(: 163-164). 
Tn analogy to a spiritual person, Gitt (:164) talks about 'spiritual' matter, 'spiritual' 
energy, 'spiritual' information and 'spiritual' will. These entities 'originated' from God, 
the Creator. 
Spiritual infomrntion is created by God by the sending of his Word, as per Isaiah 
55:10-11, and he achieves his purpose (Gitt 1997:164). Spiritual information affects 
people by (:166): 
• saving them from going astray 
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• preventing them from wasting their lives 
• optimising their life situations 
• saving their lives from damnation, giving them eternal life. 
4.2.8 An appraisal of Gitt's approach 
Gitt separates science and religion into two domains: science focuses on the HOW 
questions and religion on the WHY. Conflict arises when science oversteps its 
boundaries and tries to explain why, when first causes, the origin of things, is being 
discussed. In order to keep the delineation clear, Gitt uses explanatory schemes in 
which levels and hierarchies are defined. The top level, for instance the apobetic level 
of information, the issue of purpose, remains out of the reach of science. In Gitt's 
information-transmission scheme, the boundary of science is clearly indicated -
science cannot discover the Sender (Gitt 1997:137). Gitt works with a particular 
model of information, which arose from a particular context, namely the 
communication model of communication theory. Although Shannon's mathematical 
communication model focuses on the communications channel only, the context is 
that of human communication and hence the issues of sender and receiver arise. This 
suits Gitt's purpose of convincing his reader that God is the Sender of information. 
Other contexts for information models are also possible, as Davies and Fisher have 
shown. 
It is important for Gitt to emphasise the provisional nature of the findings of science. 
Various degrees of upcertainty and the issue of 'valid versus proven' are stressed. All 
this is used to undermine the strength of the claims made by people such as Dawkins 
by showing that they are operating outside the boundaries of science's domain and 
that their claims have no special status there since the claims are not empirically 
verifiable. 
Gitt follows an aggressive approach, using the methods of science to refute scientists' 
claims. Science is not used against science itself, but Gitt sees two doctrines being 
pitted against one another: the doctrine of evolution versus the doctrine of creation. 
Gitt prefers to talk of the doctrine rather than the theory of evolution, which is 
normally the term preferred and used by creationists, since he wants to emphasise 
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that, like Kuhn, we are dealing with a prevailing paradigm in scientific circles. Gitt 
does go further by attacking the scientific basis of evolutionary theory via his 
'scientific' laws of information, a version of the design argument (the optimal coding 
scheme for amino acids carried by DNA) and complexity arguments. 
To my mind the design argument does not fare well against evolution. Gitt is very 
selective in focusing on the optimal DNA design, without answering the obvious 
questions as to just how optimal are all of the designs we see around us. The designer 
can be accused of wastefulness and inefficiency if we look at all the species that have 
become extinct and the existence of vestigial organs that have no obvious purpose. 
To a certain extent the argument is one of: What do you consider most likely or most 
believable - a Designer and Sustainer or blind chance? Gitt has to stress the 
improbability of spontaneous self-organisation and try to show that a Designer is a 
probable explanation. 
Note the use of the phrase 'regarded as generally valid' with regard to the laws of 
nature (Gitt 1997:22). Does Gitt believe that general acceptance is based not only on 
'scientific' reasons but also on social reasons? 
The laws of nature occupy the top of his hierarchy of certainty in solitary splendour. 
They are elevated above paradigms. To Gitt, it is clear that paradigms cannot 
determine what he regards as the laws of nature. Yet it can be argued that this is 
exactly what Gitt does, by including Will in his theorems for example. 
Note that Gitt subscribes to the model that the facts will speak for themselves. Does 
this not demonstrate that he is just as pre-programmed as the evolutionists are (Gitt 
1997: 101 )? 
Concerning the issue of design vs evolution, the question must be asked: Can 
evolution come up with an optimal design? Note that this argument is mostly used by 
creationists in the form of the complexity of a complete design (as per Gitt's argument 
about the RNA, DNA, protein synthesis cycle). Gitt also makes the simpler point that 
the coding scheme used for amino acid sequences is of optimal design. The point 
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being made is that evolution may come up with a local optimum, but is it always 
simply the best? 
Gitt states that information theorems cannot be used to refute the theistic view of 
evolution, the position that God initiated the process of evolution and guided it (Gitt 
1997: 136). Why not? Theistic evolution acknowledges the role of the intelligent 
Sender, but perhaps does not take the Bible literally enough for Gitt? 
To Gitt, any argument that does not include a non-material source of information is 
simply not scientific. He (: 136) quotes Dawkins' book, The Blind Watchmaker: 'The 
purpose of this book is to provide a non-supernatural explanation for the existence of 
complex organisms'. To Gitt (:136) then: 'we cannot expect to find a scientifically 
based answer in his discussion'. Gitt uses his edifice, or set of laws, which he says is 
based on empirical evidence and thus is scientific, to determine whether other 
approaches are scientific. 
Gitt offers both of the types of explanation that Gregersen (2000:29-30) has 
elucidated. Gregersen ( :29) discusses a higher-order metaphysical explanation of 
nature in general and scientific theories, so-called Explanation 1. Gregersen's 
paradigmatic example is the anthropic principle". Gitt's main focus, however, is on a 
type of theological explanation that overrides scientific explanations, by calling in 
God to explain particular features of the world. Gregersen (:30) calls this 'the strong 
form' of Explanation 2. He believes that it is problematic since it casts God as the 
competitor rather than as the Creator of the laws of nature. Gitt denies that the Jaws 
of nature can produce information, since God is the source. Gregersen (:30) sees as 
more viable a so-called 'softer' version of explanation in which God is 'invoked to 
complement scientific laws' [Gregersen's italics]. Thus a theistic hypothesis may be 
used to explain why evolution leads to non-trivial outcomes (Gregersen 2000:30). Gitt 
dismisses evolution outright and cannot be 'accused' of supporting the weaker version 
of Explanation 2 ! 
11 The anthropic principle refers to the links between the fact that life exists and many universal 
paran1eters having particular values_ The various forn1s of the principle are discussed in Subsection 
4.3.4: Fron1 chen1icals and energy to self-organisation. 
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Gregersen (2000:29) does not believe that the role of theology is 'primarily that of 
explaining a world already explained by the sciences' and he warns against 'conflating 
the levels of a natural and theological explanation' [Gregersens' italics] (:30). 
Theology's role is to 'engage in a constructive re-description of a world already 
explained by the sciences' (: 31 ). 
Ultimately, Gitt uses a form of the God-of-the-gaps argument in which God plays a 
direct causal role. This arises from particular points of departure about the nature of 
God, how the Bible must be interpreted and the relationship between science and 
theology. 
From Gitt, we now move to a naturalistic view of life, evolution and information as 
propounded by a scientist, Paul Davies. 
4.3 Paul Davies 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Paul Davies is a theoretical physicist, currently working at the University of Adelaide 
in Australia. He has written more than 20 books popularising science, including such 
bestsellers as About Time, The Mind of God and God and the New Physics. Davies 
won the 1995 Templeton Prize, from the Templeton Foundation, for his work on the 
philosophical meaning of science. In this study we will focus on Davies' recent book, 
The fifih miracle: The search for the origin and meaning of life, since it adopts an 
information-based approach to the problem of the origin of life. The title of the book 
refers to Genesis 1: 11 in which vegetation is mentioned as being the first form of life 
and, counting miracles from the start of Genesis I, this seems to be the fifth miracle. 
In the preface to his book, Davies spells out his reasons for writing the book and how 
his understanding of the problem of life grew. Originally he was convinced that 
science 'was close to wrapping up the mystery of life's origin', but his opinion changed 
and now he feels that 'there remains a huge gulf in our understanding' since 'we have a 
good idea of the where and the when of life's origin, but we are a very long way from 
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comprehending the how' (Davies 2000: 17). The gulf in our understanding is not 
merely just about some technical details, but it is 'a major conceptual lacuna' (: 17). 
Davies makes it clear that he does not suggest that a supernatural explanation is 
needed, but he believes that we are 'missing something very fundamental' and that 'a 
fully satisfactory theory of the origin of life demands some radically new ideas' (:17). 
It is interesting that Davies feels that scientists are reluctant to admit in public to the 
remaining mystery of the origin of life, since they do not want to open the door to 
'religious fundamentalists and their god-of-the-gaps pseudo-explanations' (: 18). The 
perception of conflict between science and religion has had far-reaching consequences 
in restricting our options and hardening our positions. 
Davies (:18) makes it clear that the mystery of the origin of life, or biogenesis, is on 
par with other deep problems such as the origin of the universe and the origin of 
consciousness, since it 'tests the very foundations of our science and our world-view'. 
In order to solve the biogenesis problem, Davies (: 19) feels that we must first have a 
'deep understanding of the nature of life'. Fundamentally, it is here that information 
comes into the picture. Davies' (:19) position is that although life is a chemical 
phenomenon, the 'secret of life comes instead from its informational properties; a 
living organism is a complex infonnation-processing system'. Thermodynamics, 
especially entropy, provides the context for 'the ultimate problem of biogenesis: 
namely, where biological information came from', and, 'life was sparked not by a 
molecular maelstrom, but - somehow!- by the organisation of information' [Davies' 
italics] (:19). Note that Gitt asks the very same question as the core of his argument 
for the role of God as the Sender of information. Davies (:20) goes further to point 
out that if organisation of information is the key, then the 'cmcial step involved the 
creation of an information-processing system, employing software control' and this is 
associated with the 'appearance of the genetic code.' To Davies (:20), the 'peculiarity 
of biological complexity' (vs other forms of complexity) makes genes seem almost 
impossible and he has come to the conclusion that: 
... no familiar law of nature could produce such a stmcture from incoherent 
chemicals with the inevitability that some scientists assert. If life does form 
easily, and is common throughout the universe, then new physical principles 
must be at work ... Though I have no doubt that the origin of life was not in 
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fact a miracle, I do believe that we live m a bio-friendly umverse of a 
stunningly ingenious character. 
Note that Gitt would agree with Davies that the origin of life is not a miracle, in the 
sense that there was a Designer at work rather than 'a miracle'. Davies agrees that the 
end-result is 'stunningly ingenious' but does not infer or postulate a designer. Davies' 
solution to the problem is to postulate 'new physical principles', and in this he is in 
agreement with Gitt's overall approach of formulating information theorems or laws 
of nature. However, the contents of these principles differ radically from those of 
Gitt, as we shall see. 
4.3.2 The origin of information and life 
In his investigation of biogenesis, Davies covers a grand sweep from the birth of the 
universe to the appearance of conscious beings. He follows what he calls the 
top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The top-down approach starts with 
the present living beings and tries to following the 'evolutionary path back in time and 
down in size' to ancient microbes (Davies 2000: 81 ). The bottom-up approach starts 
with the environment of the newly formed Earth and tries to reconstruct the molecular 
events that led to the start of life (:81). In the diagram below the whole 'history' is 
summarised: 
Humans 
t 
Conscious beings 
t 
The tree of life 
t 
Microbes 
t 
The first living entities (replication, etc.) 
t 
Self-organisation 
t 
Chemicals+ energy 
t 
Stars and planets 
1' 
• 
Beginning of the universe 
Top-down 
r 
Bottom-up 
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We will use this schema to explicate the role that information plays in biogenesis. 
Note that the top-down and the bottom-up arrows do not meet; this illustrates one of 
the gaps in our understanding. 
4.3.3 From the beginning to stars and planets 
Life needs energy and information. Where does biological information come from? 
Biological information is a special type of information, namely information with a 
context or meaning, i.e. semantic information (Davies 2000:60). To Davies (:60), the 
source of semantic information can only be the environment of the living organism, 
and then one has to ask: Where and how did the environment get this information? 
The ultimate environment is the universe, so we need to know the origin of the 
information content of the universe. 
Here we come to the ultimate connection between energy, matter and information. 
The universe as a whole actually has zero energy. The sum total of the positive and 
negative energy at the Big Bang was zero. The positive energy became matter and the 
negative energy was stored in the gravitational field (Davies 2000: 61 ). The universe 
'popped' into existence out of nothing, creating space and time, but required no energy 
input' If we say that information was present at the beginning, then we have to deal 
with the second law of thermodynamics, since the appearance of information is 
equivalent to an increase in order and thus a decrease in entropy. A decrease in the 
total entropy of the universe is against the second law of thermodynamics. 
Furthennore, studies of the cosmic heat radiation have shown that the fledgling 
universe was in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium, which is a maximum entropy 
state and hence contains the minimum of information. The early universe therefore 
contained very little information and the second law prohibits it from increasing. The 
way out of this dilemma is gravitation. Davies (:63) uses the example of a large gas 
cloud at uniform temperature which will remain in equilibrium unless it is large 
enough for gravitational forces to cause it to contract, ultimately forming stars. A star 
is a source of free energy or negative entropy. Gravitation leads to a decrease in the 
entropy of the system, so that the system can become more disordered than it already 
IS. The conclusion is that a system will not be in true equilibrium, even if its 
temperature and density are uniform, if gravitation is present. The early universe, 
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even if at uniform temperature and density, was therefore not in true equilibrium or 
the lowest state of entropy, and therefore could have contained information, as was 
clear later when galaxies formed which needed a huge amount of information to be 
described. As Davies (:64) puts it: 'a huge amount of information evidently lies 
secreted in the smooth gravitational field of a featureless, uniform gas . . . this 
information flows from the gravitational field to the matter. Part of this information 
ultimately ends up in the genomes of biological organisms as biological information.' 
Gravitational processes created a state low in entropy, which released energy as it 
moved to higher entropy states. This is the basic source of all free energy such as 
starlight and also the energy that all life thrives on. That is why Davies (2000:64) can 
say that 'the ultimate source of biological information and order is gravitation'. 
However, this still does not explain the origin of semantic or meaningful information, 
or the origin of complexity. To Davies (2000:65), the complexity caused by 
gravitation is an example of how it is possible that a form of complexity, in this case 
gravitational complexity, can emerge from a simple state. 
Since we are here considering the fundamentals of matter and energy, and the 
umverse as the ultimate context for meaningful infom1ation and the ultimate 
environment for life, this is a suitable stage at which to formulate possible 
com1ections between matter, energy and information. Davies (2000:66) frames 
quantum mechanics in information terms. The description of the wave-like aspects of 
matter, the wave filllction, contains all that is known about a system; it represents the 
information content of the system. A key feature of the wave function is that it is 
spread out over space. Two particles that have been 'entangled', e.g. two photons 
created in the same event, remain coupled to each other even if they are at opposite 
ends of the universe. The wave function with its information load is therefore a tnily 
global or non-local entity in contrast to a local quantities such as electric charge. 
The theory of relativity forbids the transmission of information faster than the speed 
of light. that is particles can travel faster than light provided they do not carry 
information! All the cause-and-effect paradoxes that can be caused by faster-than-
light information disappear if the information carmot be transmitted. A faster-than-
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light particle cannot carry information in itself -the context in which it constitutes a 
signal - so the information content is what causes the paradox. For example, a red 
particle means stop and a green particle means go. You can send the particle at 
hyperlight speed, but the signal ('red means stop, green means go') that will provide 
the context within which the detection of the particle has meaning has to travel at the 
speed of light. The particle that you see only becomes an information carrier if you 
know in what global context the particle was sent; the local measuring event is 
meaningless without the global context. 
Davies (2000:67) concludes that 'both quantum mechanics and relativity suggest that 
information is a global rather than a local physical quantity.' To Davies (:67), this 
suggests that the origin of biological information will not be traced 'to the operation of 
local physical forces and laws' and if life is indeed written into the laws of physics, 
that is only true if the laws are not of the normal local sort. The origin of biological 
information must therefore be sought in some sort of global context which may be 
simply the environment in which biogenesis occurs. Or, as he (:67) speculates, 'it 
may involve some non-local type of physical law, as yet unrecognised by science, that 
explicitly entangles the dynamics of information with the dynamics of matter'. 
4.3.4 From chemicals and energy to self-organisation 
We are now closer to the crncial gap between the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. The speculation about the bottom-up approach is informed by the debate 
on exactly what constitutes life. How do you decide what is living or non-living? As 
noted above, Davies works with a model in which the informational properties of life 
are paramount and thus the key step to life is the creation of an information-
processing system that uses what he calls 'software control'. 
As an aside, we could bring in here the anthropic principle and ask: Why does carbon, 
the versatile element on which life depends, exist at all? The answer could be that the 
laws of physics were fine-tuned to produce carbon. It could be said that the universe 
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was designed via the laws of physics together with the precise values of physical 
constants needed to produce life 12 • 
The starting point is organised complexity since that seems to be the bare minimum 
for a first step on the road to life. The exact nature of such boot-strapped complexity 
also needs to be investigated. 
One approach is to simply invoke 'chance' in the leap from molecules to complex life 
as we now know it. Davies has shown the tremendous odds against such an 
eventuality since there are simply not enough stars in the universe and there has not 
been enough time for even one simple molecule of life (e.g. a protein) to assemble 
spontaneously. We can arrive at amino acids in the laboratory via the famous 
'primordial soup' experiments of Urey and Miller (Davies 2000:86), but a small 
protein (JOO amino acids of20 different varieties) has 10130 different arrangements of 
the amino acids, of which only a few will be biologically active, and this number is 
much larger than the number of atoms in the observable universe (Davies 2000:91, 
2 78). If we consider that life as we see it now is based on hundreds of thousands of 
... , 
specialist proteins, then the odds of producing such a system of proteins (not even to 
1 ~ Barrow and Tipler wrote a book, The Anthropic Cos1nological Principle, that contains a collection of 
evidence for the anthropic principle that the universe must have properties that n1ake life possible. 
There are three distinct versions of the anthropic principle (Barrow & Tipler 1986:16-23): 
The Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): The observed values of all physical and cosmological 
quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist 
sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it 
to have already done so. 
Tire Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP): The Universe must have those properties which allow life to 
develop within it at some stage in its history. 
Tire Final Anthropic Principle (FAP): Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in 
the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out. 
The \veak anthropic principle has found a measure of acceptance, \vhile the strong version, \Vhich they 
admit is speculative, has elicited controversy. The FAP, Barrow and Tipler's own creation, is even 
more speculative and has been called the completely ridiculous anthropic principle (CRAP) by Martin 
Gardner, the Scientific American columnist (Siegfried 2000:159). 
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mention DNA and RNA) are truly mind-boggling, 1040 000 to 1 (Davies 2000:95). The 
implication is that we are truly and utterly alone in the universe, since life is 
extremely unlikely to have started twice. 
It seems very likely that chance is not enough, we need chance + some unknown 
entity or law. So then we must return to boot-strapping ... 
The end-result must be organised complexity and not just disorganised complexity as 
exhibited by many non-living systems such as coastlines, turbulent flow, etc. 
Examples of organised complexity are the galaxies and rainbows (Davies 2000: 138). 
The next question is whether self-organised complexity is possible in non-living 
systems. The simplest example of self-organisation that is always mentioned is that 
of the formation of ordered hexagonal-shaped convection cells in a layer of liquid 
which is hot at the bottom and cold at the top 13 (: 139). 
The new science of complexity has made promising starts towards a theory of self-
organisation via the chemical phenomenon of autocatalysis (Gregersen 2000:35-38, 
Davies 2000:139-142, Kauffman 1996). In catalysis, a catalyst is involved that 
participates in molecular reactions by reducing the energy barriers for the reacting 
molecules, while not being altered itself. When a catalyst molecule catalyses a 
reaction sequence that leads to the production of molecules identical to itself, this is 
termed autocatalysis. Thus a cyclical series of reactions is set up that forms a self-
reinforcing web ofreactions, a network (Davies 2000:140). When the diversity of the 
molecules in this network increases above a certain level, the network crosses a 
critical threshold. Kauffinan predicts the abrupt formation of a huge autocatalytic 
cycle which is a simple form of metabolism, the organised chemical processes in 
living beings (:140). As Davies points out, the underlying principle seems universal. 
Computer models have shown that 'any network with enough components and 
interactions will tend to flip spontaneously into a state of organised complexity' and 'it 
may be that life is a consequence, not of special organic chemistry, but of universal 
mathematical rules that govern the behaviour of all complex systems, regardless of 
13 This is called the Benard phenomenon, and is also mentioned in the discussion in Subsection 5.6.4: 
Active h~forn1ation. 
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what they are made of' (: 140). Kauffman (1996:48) goes as far as to say: 'The secret 
oflife, the wellspring ofreproduction, is not to be found in the beauty of the Watson-
Crick pairing [RNA and DNA], but in the achievement of collective catalytic closure.' 
Here we have the basis of a bold claim that life emerged as whole life-systems, as 
geneless reactions, without a hierarchy of genes and proteins, and that life is thus 
simply a collective property of systems of interacting molecules (Gregersen 2000: 
37). 
Davies (2000:140-141) sees two major problems with the self-organisation theory 
spelled out here as an explanation of the origin of life: 
• Convincing, 'real' experiments, i.e. not just computer simulations, are lacking. 
• There is the deeper conceptual problem that life is an example of specified 
organisation rather than just self-organisation. 
Specified refers to the fact that the genes of a living organism direct the organisation 
of the organism. In computer terminology, the DNA codes are read and the 
instructions contained in the codes are executed to build the organism. Davies (: 141) 
calls this internal control. By contrast, the order of a convection cell is the result of 
external control by the boundary conditions, the environment. 
Ian Stewart agrees with Davies that there is more than just self-organisation. To 
Stewart there are two secrets of life, namely: 
• the mathematics of non-linear processes which form part of the laws driving 
matter towards increased complexity 
• the highly specified information of the RNA-DNA-protein system (Gregersen 
2000:36). 
Davies (2000:141) concludes: 'The theory of self-organisation as yet gives no clue 
how the transition is to be made between spontaneous, or self-induced, organisation -
which in even the most elaborate non-biological examples still involves relatively 
simple structures - and the highly complex, information-based, genetic organisation of 
Ii ving things ... we need to know how the very concept of software control was 
discovered by nature'. Kauffman would probably not agree with this statement. 
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Davies (2000:142) also points out that a fundamental distinction must be made 
between order and organisation. The concept of order refers to simple patterns such 
as are found in crystals for example, and ordered structures cannot store much 
infomrntion. Life is encoded via highly random structures that can store large 
amounts of information. Davies feels that the examples of self-organisation involve 
spontaneous ordering rather than the organised randomness that is required for life's 
density of information. Davies (:142) requires the existence of'some new principle of 
self-organisation that induces the production of algorithmic complexity' to fill the gap 
of the biogenesis riddle. 
In the end, Davies' verdict is that the bottom-up approaches are problematic, leaving 
the mystery of life unsolved. 
So here we are at the end of the bottom-up approach (according to Davies) and the 
gap is still there - the leap of complexity ... the lacunae in our understanding. 
4.3.5 From self-organisation to life (replication) 
We now make the leap to living entities and the shift to the top-down approach. We 
have already mentioned some of the conclusions that Davies reached via his top-down 
approach to distilling the essence of life. Here we just give a brief overview since 
some of this material has already been covered by Gitt. 
At this point we need to ask ourselves: Just what is life? How will we recognise it? 
What do we acknowledge as being living? 
Davies (2000:33-36) lists the characteristics of life and the ones relevant to 
information are: 
• Reproduction - replicating the means of replication as well (the genes) 
• Metabolism and nutrition - a continuous flow of matter and energy, but energy 
alone is not enough, useful energy is needed. 
• Organisation - organised complexity, co-operation between the components of 
an organism. 
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• Growth and development - replication combined with variation, leading to 
Darwinian evolution. If it evolves, it lives. 
• Information content - The information needed to replicate an organism is 
carried by genes from parent to child. Information alone is not enough, 
however, it must have meaning to the system that receives it and it must have 
context, be specified. Davies (:35) asks: 'Where does this context come from, 
and how does a meaningful specification arise spontaneously in nature?' 
• Hardware/software entanglement - nucleic acids store 'life's software' and 
proteins are 'the real workers and constitute the hardware' ( :36). There is a 
communication channel between these two entities and a code, the genetic 
code. The channel and the code entangle 'the hardware and software aspects 
oflife in a baffling and almost paradoxical manner' (:36). 
• Permanence and change - the problem of being versus becoming. Genes 
replicate to conserve, but variation is needed in order to be able to adapt ... 
adapt or die . . . Life exists precisely because of this creative tension between 
the two conflicting demands. 
Davies (2000:36) summanses the crucial factors of life as metabolism and 
reproduction (replication). 
For Davies (2000:36), it is appropriate that there is no simple defining quality for life, 
since science shows the natural world to be a unity and any clear separation between 
living and non-living could cause bias towards the belief that life is 'magical or 
mystical, rather than something entirely natural.' The reductionist approach simply 
does not work. There are no living molecules, only collective systems of processes 
involving molecules that are alive. 
Whereas people such as Behe and Gitt flatly deny that science will ever explain the 
overall organisation of life, Davies (:99) believes that science will, 'eventually, give a 
convincing explanation for the origin of life, but only if the problem is tackled at two 
levels', namely: 
• the molecular level (an insufficient explanation since the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts) 
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• the organisation level, the organism level, 'where co-operation is at a global 
level that cannot be captured in the study of the components alone'. 
The basis of life is reproduction and reproduction is based on molecular replication. 
Here we again encounter the DNA story since the key molecular replicator is DNA. 
We are also moving from the molecular level to the organisation level. 
Davies (2000:103-104) discusses the role of DNA as the earner of genetic 
infom1ation. The four bases (A,G,C, T) can be described as a four-letter alphabet 
which can be used to spell out a message consisting of long strings of bases, which 
fom1 what we call the genes. As Davies (:104) puts it: 'Viewed like this, life is just a 
string of four-letter words'!! 
However, DNA cannot survive on its own. A whole organism is needed to replicate 
the genome, the full set of genes. This requires proteins, which are both the raw 
material of the organism as well as the enzymes that catalyse chemical reactions, thus 
providing energy to drive the metabolism of the cell. 
The key issue is that DNA in fact stores the instructions to make the proteins. As 
mentioned before (see Section 4.2 on Gitt), messenger RNA reads the code that 
specifies the sequence of amino acids, the protein 'factories'. The ribosomes read the 
messenger RNA and construct the protein as an amino acid chain via the use of 
transfer RNA (each with an attached amino acid) which bonds to the messenger RNA. 
Davies (2000: 107) makes the point that 'the molecular traffic within the cell is 
essentially chaotic, driven by chemical attraction and repulsion and continually 
agitated by thermal energy. Yet out of this blind chaos order emerges spontaneously.' 
So far we have discussed the molecular level only. In order to understand life, we 
have to move to the organisation level, start considering the organism's hierarchy of 
levels and start separating structure and function. Davies (: 108) now makes the 
crucial point: 'The organisational power of living things requires co-operative 
processes that encompass many molecules and integrate their behaviour into a 
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coherent unity'. The question now is: What can integrate the blind chaos of molecular 
activity? 
To Davies, the real secret of life lies in the dual function of biological molecules. 
A gene is a biopolymer but it is also an instmction, the so-called genetic code. The 
genetic code is the code formed by triplets of bases for the different amino acids, as 
explained previously". 
Here we have introduced the language of software. We now have two levels of 
description, two hierarchies, namely hardware and software, with the genes as the 
carrier of the software instmctions. 
The genetic code is tmly universal and is found with very minor variations in all types 
of life. This fact leads to many questions and, as we have seen, the existence of this 
code has been used by Gitt to invoke divine design. 
Davies (2000: 110) agrees that the particular coding arrangement of three bases with 
four types of bases coding for 20 amino acids may be a good compromise between the 
benefits of having a large variety of amino acids versus reducing the translation risk. 
He does not ascribe the specific coding arrangement to divine design as Gitt does, but 
suggests that it evolved to satisfy chemical reasons at some early stage of life and 
became 'frozen in' as the only configuration. This does remain speculation, however. 
Davies views the origin of the specific coding assignments for the amino acids as a 
more difficult problem. Is it just an accident frozen in or are there good reasons why 
this code is optimal and why it evolved? The problem is: Just how can a code evolve 
if even one change in the code can destroy the system? As Davies (:111) says: 'To 
have accurate translation, the cell must first translate accurately'. 
Speculative suggestions have been made that a rough code and an inaccurate 
translation process evolved together to form the complex system we have today. The 
system would have started off as very inefficient and tolerant of translation errors, 
gradually evolving into a more robust scheme. 
1 ~ Please refer to Section 4.2 on Gitt. 
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Davies (2000: 112) reports speculation that there may be a deep connection between 
atomic physics and the genetic code. Peter Jarvis of the University of Tasmania has 
made claims that the genetic code 'conceals abstract sequences similar to the energy 
levels of atomic nuclei, and might even involve a subtle property of subatomic 
particles, called supersymmetry'. 
Returning to the information perspective, Davies (2000:112-113) makes the following 
key point [my italics]: 
The conceptual point that goes right to the heart of the mystery of life is: Any 
coded input is merely a jumble of useless data unless an interpreter or a key is 
available. A coded message is only as good as the context in which it is put to 
use. 
This goes back to the fundamentals of what distinguishes data from information - data 
becomes information only when a context is added. Only within the right context 
does something have meaning. By itself, genetic data are mere syntax and only 
become semantic data (data with meaning) because the system in a cell can interpret 
the information contained in the string of bases in DNA to form specific strings of 
amino acids (proteins) that are biologically active. As Davies (2000:112-113) points 
out: 
Genes and proteins require exceedingly high degrees of specificity in their 
strncture ... Living organisms are mysterious not for their complexity per se, 
but for their tightly specified complexity. To comprehend fully how life arose 
from non-life, we need to know not only how biological information was 
concentrated, but also how biologically useful infomrntion came to be 
specified, given that the milieu from which the first organism emerged was 
presumably just a random mix of molecular building blocks. 
So, basically, we need to be able to show how a random jumble of hardware can give 
rise to encoded software (:113, 115). Life is 'more than mere complexity, it is 
informed or instructed complexity' (:114). We are not talking about simply an 
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increase in complexity or a 'husbanding of information', but a 'fundamental change of 
concept' moving to information-controlled systems, going 'digital' (: 115). 
In order to clarify the concepts of complexity and biological information, Davies 
draws on the theory of computation since he has shown the key role that information 
processing plays in life. Cells and computers have the same logical structure. For 
example, you can view DNA as the floppy disk with encoded infomrntion from which 
the instrnctions for the proteins of life are loaded. 
The algorithmic or computer program definition of randomness (as developed by 
Chaitin), is very relevant to understanding the nature of DNA as an information 
carrier (2000: 116-119). A random sequence is defined as a sequence that cannot be 
described by any shorter sequence of instrnctions as to how to produce it (an 
algorithm, for example '11111111111111111111' is not random because it can be 
replaced by 'print '1' 20 times'). The information contained in a random sequence of a 
particular length cannot be compressed or reduced any further, it contains the 
' 
maximum amount of information possible in a sequence of symbols of that length). 
So, in order to contain the maximum amount of information, a DNA sequence should 
be nearly totally random. In fact this is mostly true of DNA. However, only a very 
small percentage of all the possible random sequences of DNA bases are biologically 
active (contain biologically relevant information), which is why we have stressed the 
highly specific nature of DNA's complexity. Genomes are highly random (in order to 
contain a large amount of information) and highly specific (in order for the 
infonnation to be biologically relevant). 
The idea of a law of nature can also be expressed in tenns of algorithmic randomness 
as an algorithm that can be used to predict the behaviour of a system (Davies 
2000: 117-118). The data describing a system's behaviour can be compressed into an 
algorithm, the law of nature. As soon as patterns appear in the data, the data can be 
compressed by generating them via a series of instructions, the algorithm or law. 
Davies (2000: 120) asks the crucial question: 'How did a functional random and 
specific genome come to exist?'. Chance alone will produce randomness and law can 
produce 'a specific, predictable end-product', but how can chance and law 'co-operate 
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to yield a specific random structure?' (:120). How can a highly specific type of 
information be produced by a non-living environment? Davies' answer is that no 
known law of physics and chemistry could yield specific randomness out of nothing, 
which he views as a fact of the deepest significance (see the next section for Davies' 
view on what can happen once a genome exists). 
Davies (2000: 121) feels that not only are we dealing here with technical issues, but 
also that at this point the fundamental changes in concepts lead us into the arena of 
philosophical problems too. It is dangerous simply to treat informational concepts in 
the same way as concepts coming from the natural scientist's description of the world. 
As Davies (:121-122) says: 'Unfortunately, "meaning" sounds perilously close to 
purpose, an utterly taboo subject in biology. So we are left with the contradiction that 
we need to apply concepts derived from purposeful human activities (communication, 
meaning, context, semantics) to biological processes that certainly appear purposeful, 
but are in fact not (or are not supposed to be)'. 
So, whereas Gitt embraces these notions of purpose in order to involve God, Davies 
warns against confusion between the two worlds. This is due to the difference in their 
root assumptions as to the purposefulness of the world. 
Davies (2000: 122) does ask whether ultimately, since humans are products of nature, 
and if humans have purpose, we cannot argue that somehow this purposefulness must 
have originated out of nature, and hence must be intrinsic to nature. The question 
then becomes: At what level of nature is purpose present, right down to the molecular 
level? Again, an 'outside' source of purpose is not postulated. 
For now, we can depict the gap between non-living and living as follows: 
LIVING: Hardware + Software Information control Specific randomness 
t t t 
NON-LIVING: Hardware Chance and chaos Randomness 
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4.3.6 From the first living thing to microbes 
We have now made the leap to the existence of some form of carrier of genetic codes, 
a genome. Two questions remain: 
• What did the first genome look like? 
• How did it increase in complexity to the level of microbes? 
In the previous section, we mentioned the problems regarding a code evolving if a 
single change can destroy the very system by which it must be replicated. If there are 
no changes, then no adaptation can occur. A certain number of errors are therefore 
needed. Manfred Eigen coined the phrase the 'error catastrophe' for the critical error 
rate above which errors accumulate to the point that replication is affected and 
reproduction ceases (Davies 2000:57). The error rate will be optimal just below the 
error catastrophe if we assume that we want the maximum scope for adaptation. 
Davies (:59) quantifies this by examining the number of bits of information in an 
organism and seeing how many errors can be tolerated. Eigen has found that the more 
genes an organism has, the lower the error rate must be to avoid the error catastrophe 
(:59). Davies (:59) equates a hundred thousand genes (typical of higher organisms) to 
a hundred million bits of information stored. Human cells need to cut the error rate to 
about one in a 1 000 million by using complex error-correction mechanisms. Bacteria 
survive with an error rate of about one in a million. 
This leads to a very important paradox. If we assume that the genomes of the first 
organisms were not supported by fancy error-correction mechanisms, then, if a 
genome is short enough to evade the error catastrophe, it may be actually be too short 
to contain enough information to be able to build the replication machinery (e.g. 
ribosomes). Eigen, for one, believes that this is indeed the case, that building the 
simplest replication machinery does, indeed, require more information than the error-
catastrophe-limited genome can carry (:59). Davies (:60) calls this yet another 
instance of the chicken-and-egg paradox: Which came first, the genome or the 
replication machinery? 
As Davies (2000:124) says:' There seems to be an enigmatic circularity to life, a type 
of irreducible complexity that some people regard as utterly mysterious' (Michael 
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Behe for example). Davies (:124) makes the very important point that 'complex 
systems can get themselves irreversibly into cycles of dependence' so that although it 
is possible that the system could have evolved in many different ways from simple 
beginnings, 'once a cycle of dependence is established it rapidly becomes refined' and 
few traces of its simple origins survive. This is a very important issue in the overall 
debate between the designers and the evolutionists. The top-down approach, i.e. 
delving back to the possible origins of today's complex systems, is quite difficult. It is 
easier just to point out the complexity of the existing systems as the arguments for 
design normally do. 
So, nobody expects DNA, proteins and their structures to have appeared out of the 
blue. One can postulate that simpler systems arose first and grew in complexity via 
feedback loops and Darwinian selection. Just what these simpler systems could be is 
highly uncertain. Davies (2000: 125-137) mentions three possible scenarios, namely: 
• RNA came first (then DNA) (the RNA world theory) 
• Proteins came first and nucleic acids (RNA, DNA) later 
• Clay crystals came first, acting as software, followed by organic molecules. 
RNA can act as a weak catalyst and can catalyse its own replication, thus leading to a 
'molecular evolution' scenario in which replication, variation and selection take place. 
According to some people's definition of life, this means that a self-replicating RNA 
molecule is a living entity (: 128). This is in principle what could have happened. 
However, Davies (:128) points out that the experiments are specially designed, with 
custom-made replication enzymes for example, and thus do not reflect the natural 
conditions of a young Earth. Therefore truly spontaneous replication of even short 
lengths of nucleic acid bases in a primordial soup have not been demonstrated. RNA 
molecules are also fragile and need protection from attack by water. This, amongst 
other reasons, is why he (:131) concludes that 'without a trained organic chemist on 
hand to supervise, nature would be struggling to make RNA from a dilute soup under 
any plausible pre-biotic conditions'. 
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Even attempts to build smaller and simpler replicator molecules than RNA, although 
they have demonstrated some success in the laboratory, have failed to show that these 
replicators will form spontaneously in pre-biotic conditions (: 133 ). 
The other two theories are even more speculative. The clay theory is particularly 
interesting from an information point of view, since its point of departure is that 
nucleic acids function primarily as software and that therefore the specific chemical 
fonn, the specific nature of the information carrier, is irrelevant - all that matters is 
the ability to store information (Davies 2000: 136). Clay can in fact store information 
in the different layers of the clay crystal, each layer with its own irregular 
arrangement of clay particles 'infused with metallic ions' (: 136). Organic molecules 
could have become involved with the clay crystals to promote crystal growth in some 
fashion, and if some of these organics were self-replicating, then they could have 
taken over from the clay as the main replicator(: 13 7). 
The basic issue remains that somehow a simpler precursor to nucleic acid replicators 
must have started since the DNA-RNA-protein system is too complex. However, 
even a simpler precursor must be part of a fairly complex system, which brings 
Davies (2000:138) back to the issue of how the minimum complexity got started, and 
this is where the self-organisation debate kicks off. We have now again seen yet 
another gap, the gap between the basic replicators and the complexity of the 
replicating system of any sort of life. 
Davies (2000: 137-138) makes it clear that all the speculations about life's origin.share 
the assumption that as soon as life of 'some sort had established itself, the rest was 
plain sailing, because Darwinian evolution could then take over'. 
This then brings us to our second question: How did the first 'genome' increase in 
complexity? 
4.3. 7 Increasing the complexity of the genome via evolution 
Davies (2000: 120) casts the evolution of the genome in information terms. As soon 
as a genome and its support systems exist, Darwinian evolution, in the form of 
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random mutations coupled with natural selection, can generate biological information 
by adding the bases to the random genome and thus adding information (:120). The 
randomness added by the mutations is sifted, selected out to be the specific, 
beneficent randomness of biologically active randomness or biologically meaningful 
information. The source of this information is the environment (the source of 
mutations and of selective pressure), but selection is the filter that turns it into 
meaningful information. 
In terms of the theory of communication we can state that mutations on their own 
would be equivalent to simply adding noise to the messages in the communications 
channel and, in fact, the entropy will increase and the information content will 
decrease. When we add in the effect of the environment, which selects amongst the 
noise, this results in adding information to the genetic message (DNA) (:57). 
This could be formulated in a different way. If we examine the basic definition of 
information as per the theory of communication, then information is just the exclusion 
(or non-selection) of possibilities and the more possibilities there are, the more 
information we have gained when we discover the actual state (Davies 2000:277). In 
effect, the action of natural selection is to let only certain genomes survive from 
amongst the huge range of genomes (organisms) that exist at that time. Since the 
other possible genomes have been excluded, since they cease to exist in future 
generations, information has been added to the surviving genomes (:277). 
Gitt (1997:127) says that mutations can only cause 'changes in existing information'". 
His basic argument against demonstrations of the effect of selection (as in the 
computer monkeys ending up with the pre-determined target sentence via mutation 
and selection mechanisms) is that the software program contained the information, the 
target sentence, and that therefore no new information was being generated. As we 
have seen above, new information does flow from the environment into the genome 
due to selection even though a pre-determined target does not exist! We can perhaps 
say that a 'fitness landscape', rather than a specific target genome, does in effect exist 
15 See also Subsection 4.2.6.1: Ciunulative selection in the discussion of Gitt's \Vork. 
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for the particular environment. Certain types of adaptations will survive in an certain 
environment, e.g. those with higher heat tolerance will survive in a desert. 
We have now dealt with the two questions in very general terms. But in which entity 
did the first complex genome appear? The top-down approach can, in fact, only take 
us a limited distance back to the origins. We truly do not know what the first living 
thing was, but we do know that it seems that we had a universal ancestor and that 
there must have been a long evolutionary history between the first living thing and our 
universal ancestor (Davies 2000:78-79, 183). 
We can, however, speculate on what the universal ancestor was. According to Davies 
(2000:183), the record of the genes suggests that the universal ancestor was living 
deep beneath the surface, at a high temperature (> 100°C), used sulphur as the energy 
source and was already sophisticated enough to have 'software-controlled' protein 
synthesis. 
In broad terms, we can sketch how far we have progressed up to now: 
Self-organisation -> low-tech precursor replicator -> first cell-like structure -> nucleic acid-based 
replicators-> microbe? 
4.3.8 From microbes to us 
The short answer to the question as to where human beings came from is commonly 
held to be evolution (as we have discussed in the previous section). The issue of how 
consciousness arose does, however, stand in the way of any 'easy' explanations 
(Davies 2000: 184-186). 
4.3.9 The riddle of biogenesis 
As an aside Davies does raise the intriguing possibility that life never did start at all. 
Life may, in fact, always have existed. Fundamentally, there is no reason why it is 
not possible that the universe has always existed (Davies 2000: 248). Fred Hoyle has 
long been a proponent of this view. The most interesting implication of this theory is 
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that if life has existed forever, then incredibly ancient and incredibly advanced life 
forms may exist that could have taken control over the entire universe, thus resulting 
in nature and technology being indistinguishable from each other, intelligence then 
being co-extensive with the universe (:249). This raises the interesting question of 
whether this is then indeed a possible concept of God - the classic pantheism view. 
If we do assume that life did start somewhere, then we have to take a stand regarding 
the relative roles of chance and law. Due to the overwhelming odds against life 
arising as a result of pure chance, if that was indeed the case, it is extremely unlikely 
to have happened twice and therefore we would truly be alone in the universe. If life 
is discovered elsewhere in the universe which did not originate from Earth (or vice 
versa!), then the pure chance scenario will be ruled out. 
The predominant view amongst scientists seems to be that we are not alone ... and 
therefore they do not accept that pure chance alone led to life. So, laws must 
necessarily have played a role. Life should be plentiful. If the laws of nature led to 
life on ·Earth, then they must lead to life on other, similar, planets as well. This view 
is called biological determinism or predestination (Davies 2000:252). It is quite 
illuminating that Davies ( :252) feels that this view is 'widespread among astronomers, 
chemists, and physicists, but much rarer among biologists' who view chance as the 
major factor. This is in line with Davies' comments earlier in the book to the effect 
that that biologists are very averse to notions of purpose. 
If one accepts that bio-friendly laws exist, then the next question is: What is the nature 
of these laws? Will the normal laws of physics suffice or do we need special laws? 
Again, Davies' view is that 'few biologists today believe there are laws of life in quite 
the same way as there as laws of physics', the reason being that the idea of special 
laws to 'guide the development of matter towards life' is 'too mystical, too reminiscent 
of vitalism' ( :252). 
This then leaves the option that the laws of physics are all that is needed, for example 
the interatomic forces that result in the peptide bonds between amino acids may be 
able to discriminate between different sequences of amino acids, thus resulting in 
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biologically active sequences being more likely to form out of the multitude of 
possible combinations. Some scientists have tried to defend this view, e.g. Sidney 
Fox who concluded that 'amino acids determine their own order in condensation', thus 
resulting in non-random macromolecules containing crucial biological information 
(Davies 2000:253). 
Davies' position is that it would be really astounding if atomic processes had a built-in 
bias towards forming organisms since this would mean that a link exists between the 
basic atomic forces and the end -product, a complex organism. What is the nature of 
this link? 
Davies' objection is that the laws of physics are simple (algorithmically simple) and 
general (2000:254). He therefore does not see how these laws, on their own, can lead 
to highly complex and highly specific entities. As we have seen, a highly random and 
specific sequence of nucleotide bases contains a great deal of biological information. 
However, no simple law can generate a highly random sequence - laws generate 
patterns, laws compress data or reduce information. As Davies (:254) says: 'Ordinary 
laws just transform input data into output data. They can shuffle information around 
but they can't create it'. Davies (:255) does not believe that life can be 'written into' 
the presently known laws of physics. To put the argument in another way, if the 
genome is both random and highly specific (information-rich), then it does not make 
sense to try to use non-random processes. Any combination of amino acid sequences 
must be possible in order to be 'chosen'. 
Davies makes the point that life is not controlled by inherent tendencies, it is 
controlled by software that organises it to follow own reaction pathways. The secret 
of life lies not in the medium, but in the message, the 'logical and informational rules 
it exploits' ( :256). 
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However, it is not possible to prove randomness, we cannot prove that there is some 
fantastically complex formula that generates the random sequence''. If this is true, 
then life may actually be simple, as, for example, fractals have demonstrated that 
complex-looking systems can be generated by a simple formula. Davies (2000:257) 
also makes the point that only the very first living thing would need to be generated in 
this way, since thereafter Darwinian evolution would add 'irreducible' complexity. 
Davies (:257) does not believe this, since it seems too 'contrived', a 'code within the 
code' is 'just too far-fetched'. 
Even if we accept weaker forms of biological determinism, as in chance 'tempered by 
various physical constraints' that impose an overall directionality to life (Duve), or 
Kauffman's 'propensity for organised complexity to emerge under suitable conditions', 
Davies feels that the mystery of the origin of biological information remains 
(2000:258). How can random complexity and specificity be generated together in a 
law-like manner? 
Davies (2000:258) sees two fields of inquiry that offer 'tantalising clues', namely the 
emergent laws of complexity and quantum mechanics. 
The study of complex systems has revealed universal mathematical principles, 'laws' 
that derive from the logical structure of the system. A self-organising physical 
process may be able to bootstrap itself to a level of complexity at which the 
'complexity laws' could kick in, leading to jumps in self-organisation and complexity 
that, 'ratchet the system up the complexity ladder', perhaps towards life (:259). 
In contrast to the simple laws of physics, such laws might create new information, or 
'at least wrest it from the environment and etch it onto a material strncture' ( :259). 
"' Davies (2000:256) points out that this result is related to Godel's incompleteness theorem in 
n1athematics. Kurt GQdel proved that no system of mathematics that is as at least as complicated as 
ordinary arithmetic, could be both internally consistent and complete (Siegfried 2000:53). There are 
thus true statements in such as system that cannot be proven to be tnte. 
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Instead of regarding information as a derivative concept, this would mean regarding it 
as a physical quantity that can be traded by 'informational forces' in the same way that 
matter can be moved around by physical forces. Complexity must also be accepted as 
a physical variable with causal efficacy. Davies (2000:259) believes that software 
control, the genetic code, could only have arisen through the action of an 
'informational law.' This view, that a law can create infomiation, is also shared by 
people such as Manfred Eigen. Ultimately, Davies ( :260) postulates that 'a blend of 
molecular Darwinism and laws of organisational complexity' offers an explanatory 
scenario, in which small replicator molecules form by chance, evolve further by 
Darwninian evolution, but at the same time, organisational principles are at work, 
which 'confer specificity and information' and 'amplify the selectivity of the 
evolutionary process'. Eigen talks of hypercycles amplifying the selectivity of the 
system (Davies 2000:290). 
Davies' second line of inquiry is based on quantum mechanics, especially the issue of 
wave/particle duality (2000:260-262). When we describe an atom as a wave, we are 
really conveying information about a system. We are talking about the software. 
When we describe an atom as a particle, this corresponds to a hardware level of 
description. Davies ( :261) describes a quantum measurement in information terms: 
During the measurement the wave changes suddenly, it 'collapses', and this is due to 
the fact that the knowledge of the system has changed. Since the particle's behaviour 
has also been altered, this is 'a sort of hardware-software entanglement', showing that 
information (knowledge) actually does have 'downward causative power' (:261). 
Davies ( :261) now goes on to ask whether 'some sort of quantum-organising process 
be (is) just what is needed to explain the origin of infom1ational macromolecules?'. 
After all, the forces acting to form the molecules bond-by-bond are quantum-
mechanical. 
Davies (2000:261) finds support in Schrodinger's idea of 'aperiodic' crystals being the 
unit of heredity due to the fact that they are stable enough to retain their form and 
complex enough to hold a lot of information. DNA is stable enough and has an 
aperiodic, mostly random, sequence of bases. Quasi-crystals are another type of 
aperiodic crystal, with five-fold symmetry. Five-fold symmetry does not allow a 
simple repetitive pattern. For example, to tile a wall, two differently shaped tiles with 
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five-fold symmetry are required, the Penrose tiling pattern. The major implication is 
that, in order for a quasi-crystal to grow, some form of long-range organisation must 
be active, which might be quantum mechanical in nature. 
Davies (2000:262) speculates that the study of the quasi-crystal, which stores an 
unlimited amount of information in 'its linear aperiodic sequence', may show how 
quantum mechanics can organise the formation of such complex stmctures which can 
store huge amounts of information. Davies (:262-263) thinks that 'a computationally 
impossible object', such as an algorithmically random genome, might be producible 
by quantum processes as hinted at by the study of quantum computation. 
The idea that the laws of nature may be slanted towards life 'offends the spirit of 
Darwinism' and for many scientists biological determinism is 'tantamount to a miracle 
in nature's clothing' (:263). Davies (:263) recognises that the shift to a bio-friendly 
Lmiverse would be a major one away from the reductionist, materialist, meaningless 
universe. The issue of purpose is always present. Are we dealing with a random walk 
in evolution or a directed process toward intellii;ent beings? Should we equate 
direction with purpose or not necessarily? The general assumption is that evolution 
will not end up at the same point if the process is repeated from scratch. The only 
way to prove this would be to actually repeat the process of evolution or if we meet 
aliens that look like us! 
4.3.10 An appraisal of Davies' approach 
Gitt states that a code is a convention ... Davies asks: How did the code originate? 
Can the laws of nature produce codes? A law is a simple way to describe and predict 
complicated behaviour. Where do laws come from? 
Davies does not duck the issue of purpose or try to simplify it as Dawkins does with 
statements to the effect that memes try to spread. 
Davies' states that science rejects miracles (2000: 81 ). We can ask who is doing the 
rejecting here, 'Science' or the people doing science? Davies' view of the scientific 
method comes out clearly here: 'Although biogenesis strikes many as virtually 
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miraculous, the starting point of any scientific investigation must be the assumption 
that life emerged naturally, via a sequence of normal physical processes. In our 
present state of ignorance all we can hope for are a few pointers to the key chemical 
steps that may have been involved. We might be able to answer the question of just 
how likely or unlikely the spontaneous generation of life may be' ( :81-82). 
Davies' position relative to a spectrum of positions regarding acceptance of the notion 
of purpose, is: 
Approach Chance+ Chance+ Directed processes 
simple laws complex laws (A designer God) 
(mutations+ natural (laws of complexity) 
selection) 
Proponent Most biologists, e.g. Some scientists Gitt, Dembski 
Mo nod Davies 
To Davies, it is acceptable to introduce purpose ifit is packaged into a law (a complex 
law, not a simple law). Gitt is much more explicit in making purpose/design into a 
law of nature. 
Michael Behe has formulated the essence of the intelligent design argument in terms 
of information and his formulation makes the difference between his standpoint and 
that of Davies clear. The simplest possible design scenario is, according to Behe 
(1998:231), that there was single cell formed billions of years ago that 'already 
contained all information to produce descendant organisms.' This cell is the 
irreducibly complex system that was designed. We can test if the cell can contain 
enough DNA to code this mass of information. Behe ( :231) holds out the option that 
the necessary information for designed systems could also have been added just 
before the system became operational, instead of lying unused, but ready, in the DNA. 
Unlike Gitt, Behe does not believe that all living things were created in just six days, 
but he does believe in a designer adding information at cmcial points to systems over 
time. Davies postulates that complex laws may add the infonnation from the inside as 
it were, that the laws plus the enviromnent within which they act actually create 
information. 
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Behe (1999) has written a review of Davies' book in which he concludes that Davies' 
point of departure that specific design and a designer cannot be involved leads him 
into contradictions. Since Davies acknowledges that ordinary laws are 'information-
poor' and that life is 'information-rich', he has to propose a new type of law, an 
information-generating law. However, one of the candidates for such a law, 
Kauffman's laws of complexity, dealing with self-organising systems, comes up 
against the problem that, as Davies points out, life is specified organisation, not just 
self-organised. Behe (1999:45) feels that Davies does not counter his own objections 
since he has to stay within his '(semi-) naturalistic framework'. Behe does not address 
Davies' attempts to speculate how such laws might create new information, or 'at least 
wrest it from the environment and etch it onto a material stmcture' (Davies 2000: 
259). This is an area of research that will grow in importance and relevant results 
from research into artificial life" are discussed at a later stage in this dissertation. 
\Ve have mentioned that life is specified organisation. The person we discuss next, 
William Dembski, has investigated this property of life in detail. 
4.4 William Dembski - Intelligent Design 
4.4.1 Introduction 
William A. Dembski, with PhDs in mathematics and philosophy and a Master's 
Degree in Theology from Princeton Theological Seminary, is one of the leading 
members of the Intelligent Design movement (Goode 1999). He is currently a senior 
fellow of the Discovery Institute Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture, a 
think tank located in Seattle. Other prominent members are UC Berkeley Law 
Professor Phillip Johnson and Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe. Phillip 
Johnson, the author of Darwin on trial, is the de facto leader of the movement 
(Dembski 1999:20). Behe's 1996 book, Darwin's black box, which makes the case for 
the irreducible complexity of biochemical systems, is hugely influential and is used as 
an important resource for the intelligent design movement (Dembski 1999:20). 
17 See Subsection:S.6.7.5: Cellular autouiata. 
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Goode (1999) traces the origins of the movement back to 1984 with the publication of 
chemist Charles Thaxton's book, The Mystery of Life's Origin, a book on chemical 
evolution which was co-authored with two other scientists. The book highlighted 
flaws in Darwinism and proposed the case for intelligent design in nature. The 
movement became more visible around 1992 and the first Intelligent Design 
conference was held at Biola University, in La Mirada, California, in 1996. Dembski 
edited the anthology, Mere Creation, that was produced after the conference". Many 
conferences on this topic have been held since. A seminar on "Detecting Design in 
Nature" was held at the annual gathering of the American Scientific Affiliation in July 
1999. A recent large conference was an invitation-only Intelligent Design Conference 
for intelligent design scholars, entitled: "A New Science for a New Millennium" held 
at Biola University from 2 to 5 December 1999. 
The Intelligent Design Movement has its own professional journal, Origins & Design, 
and a quarterly magazine, Cosmic Pursuit, which is aimed at the general public. As 
mentioned above, a think tank has also been created, the Center for the Renewal of 
Science and Culture at the Discovery Institute (Goode 1999). 
Robert Pennock, a Philosophy Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, 
attributes the interest the Design movement has attracted to the fact that: 'Unlike their 
earlier counterparts [known as Creationists], Intelligent Design scholars carry 
advanced degrees from major institutions, often hold positions in higher education, 
and are typically more knowledgeable, more articulate, and far more savvyn9 Due to 
the prominence of the movement, considered responses have been made, of which 
Pennock's book, the Tower of Babel, published in 1999 by MIT Press, is an example'°. 
Dembski (1999:13) has given a concise definition of what intelligent design is: 
18 From the website of the Intelligent Design Conference of 1999, called "After Materialism" 
(Available from URL: htto://wi.vw.biola.edu/academics/torrev/calendar/desiu.n.cfn1, [Accessed 26 
November 2001]) 
19 As quoted on the website referred to in the previous footnote. 
20 Pennock's book is discussed ln Subsection4.4.9.2: The critique ofnaturalis111. 
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• a scientific research program that investigates the effects of intelligent causes 
• an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy 
• a way of understanding divine action. 
Intelligent design therefore operates at the intersection between science and theology 
(: 13). 
Dembski (1999:13) acknowledges that 'many scientists remam sceptical about its 
merits', since they think it 'makes for bad science (that it's just creationism in 
disguise), whereas many theologians think it makes for bad theology (that it 
misunderstands divine action).' 
The main lines of argument of the intelligent design movement have been around the 
issues of: Where did the information contained in DNA come from? and How did the 
'irreducibly' complex biochemical structures inside the cell come to be? Dembski has 
made important contributions to the fundamental information-based argument for 
design. His book, The Design Inference, explicated his argument that we can 
recognise design in specified complexity in mathematical terms, and Intelligent 
Design, published in 1999, presents the argument to the general reader. Bebe has 
called Dembski's arguments the theoretical foundation on which judgments about 
design and contingency will be based in the future (Dembski 1999: 12). The 
movement has always been concerned to be very scientific and Dembski's arguments 
have been seen as being able to provide a firm scientific foundation. The dust jacket 
of Intelligent Design quotes Rob Koons, who goes as far as to call Dembski the 'Isaac 
Newton of information theory'. In the discussion that follows, we will be focusing on 
this argument as presented in Intelligent Design. 
4.4.2 Dembski's Intelligent Design argument 
Dembski's goal is ambitious. He wants to 'show how detecting design within the 
universe, and especially against the backdrop of biology and biochemistry, unseats 
naturalism' (Dembski 1999:14). He foresees that Enlightenment rationalism and 
scientific naturalism are 'on the way out because they 'lack resources for making sense 
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of an information age whose primary entity is information and whose only coherent 
account of information is design' (:14-15). 
Dembski views intelligent design as 'a two-pronged approach to eliminating 
naturalism' (1999:120). The two prongs are a 'scientific and philosophical critique of 
naturalism' and a 'positive scientific research program'(: 120). 
4.4.2.1 The critique of naturalism 
Dembski's motivation to attack naturalism is based on his conviction that 'for those 
who cannot discern God's action in the world, the world is a self-contained, 
self-sufficient, self-explanatory, self-ordering system' and as a consequence people 
will see themselves as being autonomous and the 'world as independent of God' 
( 1999:99). The world is thus severed from God, which Dembski views as the 'essence 
of humanity's fall' from grace, replacing worship of God with idolatry, namely the 
worship of nature, investing it with significance it does not have (:99, I 01). 
It is important for Dembski to show that naturalism is not just a scientific standpoint, 
it is a world-view. He says that 'although viewing the world as nature is typically 
seen as a scientific move, we need to realise that it is a profoundly religious move' 
(Dembski 1999: 100). Either you believe that the order we see in the world was 
created or you believe that it is intrinsic to nature. He does not believe that science 
can demonstrate that order is intrinsic, since 'this is not a scientific question but a 
metaphysical, yes, even religious question' (:100)". Dembski's sees 'scientific 
naturalism', as holding 'the pretense that science has established naturalism once and 
for all', while science 'provides no evidence for naturalism one way or another '(:101). 
Scientific naturalism is the location of 'the self-sufficiency of nature in the natural 
laws of science' (:103). Naturalism, as well as commitment to divine creation, is a 
'deep philosophical and religious commitment' (:101). Naturalism in Western culture 
'affirms not so much that God is dead so much as that God is absent' and therefore 
intellectual honesty demands that we study nature without invoking God (:103). The 
21 To my mind, Dembski ultimately does \Vant to expand science to be able to answer this question. 
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premise that science must be limited strictly to the study of undirected natural 
processes is called methodological naturalism (:119). 
In order to defeat naturalism, Dembski attacks the self-sufficiency of nature which is 
located in the natural laws of science (1999:103). Dembski is of the opinion that we 
must show that the world is not self-sufficient, that God created the world as well as 
the laws of nature and that God 'upholds the world moment by moment' (:104). 
Evidence of God's interaction with the world must be produced since, if God's 
interaction is hidden, God's existence can even be affirmed by scientific naturalists, 
but this God will be 'a superfluous rider on top of a self-contained account of the 
world (:104). Dembski is a theist, not a deist. It is not enough to argue on a 
philosophical level that the 'world and its laws are not self-explanatory and therefore 
point to a transcendent source' or to hold this position as a matter of faith. Dembski 
wants to 'assert that empirical evidence supports God's interaction with the world, 
rendering God's interaction empirically detectable' (:104). This is a job for science. 
Dembski wants to meet the naturalist on his home ground as it were, on the empirical 
playing field. However, the rules of the game of science must be redefined as well. 
Dembski wants to break out of the naturalist's prescription that science deals only 
with natural causes and wants to include the study ofintelligent causes as well (:105). 
The argument is that if 'we permit science to investigate intelligent causes (as many 
special sciences already do, e.g. forensic science and artificial intelligence), then 
God's interaction with the world, insofar as it manifests the characteristic features of 
intelligent causation, becomes a legitimate domain for scientific investigation' (: 105). 
Note that the search for legitimacy, specifically scientific legitimacy, becomes 
prominent here. The search for extra-terrestrial intelligence, cryptography and 
archaeology are also mentioned as studies of intelligent causes (: 106). 
Dembski wants to replace the current terminology of 'natural and supernatural' with 
'natural versus intelligent' causes. The definition of intelligent causes is that 
'meaningful arrangements' result like Scrabble pieces on a table forming words 
( 1999: 105). This begs the question as to how meaning arises Why does one 
arrangement of the pieces constitute words with meaning whereas another 
arrangement is 'meaningless'. To ask whether an intelligent cause works within or 
outside nature is a separate question to Dembski (:105). 
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It is Dembski's contention that this distinction between intelligent and natural causes 
'has underlain the design arguments of past centuries' (I 999: 105). What is interesting 
is that Dembski makes the point that the design argument has been re-awakened due 
to scientists 'beginning to realise that design can be rigorously formulated as a 
scientific theory' (:106). Design is back in the scientific mainstream due to the 
presence now of a method that can distinguish between intelligently caused objects 
and unintelligently caused objects (:106). Note that earlier Dembski was trying to 
make the case that the study of intelligent causes is part of science in any case. 
Intelligent design is regarded as a new scientific research programme. 
It is important to note that intelligent design does not speculate about what the 
intelligence is, it simply detects the working of intelligence (I 999: 107). This is due to 
the fact that the underlying entity that is found when intelligent causes are detected is 
information(: 106). Intelligent design is a theory for detecting information, and is not 
the study of intelligent causes, 'but of the informational pathways induced by 
intelligent causes' (: 107). 
The scientific nature of intelligent design stands or falls by the empirical detectability 
of intelligent causes which is 'a fully scientific theory' and thus makes it different from 
traditional natural theology (1999:107). Whereas natural theology 'reasons from the 
data of nature directly to the existence and attributes of God', intelligent design only 
'infers an intelligence responsible' for the data of nature (: 107). Therefore intelligent 
design is 'at once more modest and more powerful than natural theology' (:107). It is 
more powerful since it is based on empirical and scientific claims and is more modest 
since it does not infer details about God - which task is left to theology. Dembski 
claims that one of the strengths of intelligent design is that it distinguishes between 
design and purpose (:107). 
4.4.2.2 Intelligent design is a research programme 
The main issue here is that intelligent design still asks the normal How? question of 
science and tries to understand how a designed object was made by trying to reverse 
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engineer22 what the designer did (Dembski 1999: 108-109). Intelligent design enriches 
and extends science by adding new tools such as a new set of questions - What is the 
purpose? Is it optimal?, etc., as well as adding to science's conceptual categories (e.g. 
by adding design) (:151). 
It is also a research programme in the sense that it has a methodology for the detection 
of intelligent causes. 
4.4.3 Intelligent design in the context of the creation-evolution debate 
In the area of biology, Dembski sees intelligent design as 'a theory of biological 
origins and development' which claims that 'intelligent causes are necessary to explain 
the complex, information-rich structures of biology and that these causes are 
empirically detectable' (1999: 106). Due to the modest claim that only the existence of 
an intelligent cause can be shown, intelligent design is compatible with everything: 
from God intervening at every point, to 'far-ranging evolution' with God 'seamlessly 
melding all organisms together in one great tree of life' (: 109). Having said that, 
Dembski takes care not to support the theistic interpretation of evolution or 'fully 
gifted evolution' since he sees it as being the same as atheistic evolution (:110). 
Dembski does not believe that God hides his tracks"- On the issues of whether it is 
beyond our abilities to discern God's actions, or the aesthetic criterion that a worthy 
God would not do it that way, Dembski feels that, instead of speculating, it is better 
just to investigate the world (:111). The theism in theistic evolution is actually 
superfluous to Darwinism, whereas design theorists partly reject evolution since their 
view is that the neo-Darwinian synthesis of evolutionary theory has failed (: 111-112). 
Dembski's contention is that the creation-evolution debate is more than just a debate 
about our scientific facts, it is about 'competing world-views and incompatible 
metaphysical systems' (1999: 114). The battle is against a 'naturalistic metaphysic that 
22 The concept of reverse engineering is used to describe the process of trying to find out how 
son1ething was designed and manufacrured. This is usually done in order to be able to make copies of 
the relevant object. 
23 Just how well God's tracks should be hidden is a source of debate. Murray ( 1994:69-71) argues that 
God must limit general revelation in order to limit epistemic coercion. 
80 
shapes and controls what theories of biological origins are permitted on the playing 
field in advance of any discussion or weighing of evidence' (: 114). Naturalists would 
obviously say the same, accusing creationists of trying to prove the Bible right. 
What then is the solution? Dembski offers intelligent design as the sword that will cut 
this Gordian knot! He defines the substance of the creation-evolution debate as being 
about whether life shows the marks of undirected natural causes, or whether life 
shows the clear marks of a designer (Demsbki 1999: 116). The key question is thus 
whether naturalistic evolution or intelligent design is correct. All other issues then 
become irrelevant and only empirical tests remain. Dembski rejects the position that 
intelligent design addresses a 'religious' question and that therefore his question is not 
legitimate (: 117). The reason that intelligent design is regarded as a religious question 
is because 'the Darwinian establishment, by definition, excludes everything except the 
material and the natural', and hence 'all talk of purpose, design and intelligence' is 
mled to be outside science (: 117). Dembski's counter is that both intelligent design 
and naturalistic evolution 'inquire into definite matters of fact' (:ll8). So, Dembski 
asks us to 'dump methodological naturalism' and thus to let the two theories fight it 
out on the empirical battleground without any prior assumptions about what is 
scientific or not and without metaphysical naturalism (: 119). 
4.4.4 How do we detect design? 
Dembski (1999: 127) uses design in three different senses: 
• 'to denote the scientific theory that distinguishes intelligent agency from 
natural causes' (design theory or intelligent design) 
• 'to denote what it is about intelligently produced objects that enables us to tell 
that they are intelligently produced and not simply the result of natural causes' 
(finding the vestiges or footprints left by intelligence) 
• 'to denote intelligent agency itself (an intelligence caused it). 
Dembski's measure is the complexity-specification criterion, which he has also called 
a 'specification/small probability' criterion in his book The Design Inference 
(1998b:l27, 290). In order to infer design, three characteristics must be established 
(Dembski 1999: 128): 
• Contingency - the object is not the result of an automatic process 
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• Complexity - the object is too complex to be able to be explained by chance 
alone 
• Specification - the object exhibits the type of pattern characteristic of 
intelligence. 
An object is contingent if it can be established that it could be produced by natural 
processes which permit any number of alternatives, but it is not required that this 
particular option be realised, i.e. the object cannot be attributed to 'any underlying 
physical necessity' (:128-129). Dembski gives the example of Scrabble pieces on a 
game board that are 'irreducible' to the laws of motion (: 129). In other words, if you 
throw Scrabble pieces at a game board, they might land in a particular configuration, 
but the laws of nature do not proscribe what configuration will occur. 
Complexity is tied to probability. A complex arrangement of Scrabble pieces is 
unlikely to happen, it has a low probability of occurring. Complexity is inversely 
related to probability. However, as Dembski acknowledges, complexity alone is not 
enough ( 1999: 130). The operation of chance alone can also generate complexity as in 
the particular sequence of heads and tails you establish when tossing a coin a 1 000 
times (: 130). 
This is where the issue of specification comes to the fore. A certain type of pattern 
needs to be present in order to be able to infer design. Dembski has been criticised for 
calling design 'that which is left when chance and regularity have been eliminated' 
(Holder 2000:180). Hence the whole issue of what is meant by specification is very 
important. 
Dembski (1999:132-133) divides patterns into two types, namely specifications, the 
non-ad hoc patterns that in the presence of complexity warrant a design inference, and 
fabrications, ad hoc patterns that despite the presence of complexity, do not warrant a 
design inference. 
At this point three elements need to be distinguished which are essential for inferring 
design (:131): 
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• A reference class of possible events (flips of a coin for example) 
• A pattern that restricts the reference class of events (7 tails followed by 3 
heads, 3 tails, 3 heads?) 
• The precise event that has occurred (the actual series of flips of the coin). 
A design inference links the reference class to the event via the pattern (: 131 ). 
A pattern can be identified before an event, for example in designing experiments, or 
after the event, as in deciphering an unknown code (Dembski 1999: 132). The 
important issue is that the pattern must be independent of the particular event it 
describes (:133). Dembski (:133) calls this relation of independence detachability and 
such patterns are said to be detachable. If we are given an event and a pattern 
describing it, then a detachable pattern is one that can still be constructed from the 
range of possible events without knowing which of these possible events actually 
happened (:133). 
How do we construct this pattern? Dembski introduces the notion of the need to use 
additional side information in order to eliminate chance (: 138). To illustrate this he 
(: 135-138) uses the example of an event E, consisting of a sequence of 100 heads (H) 
and tails (T): 
THTTTHHTHHTTTTTHTHTTHHHTTHTHHHTHHHTTTTTTT ... 
Statistical tests show that it is random: there are 50 alterations between heads and 
tails, there are 49 heads and 51 tails, there is a sequence of seven tails in a row, which 
can be expected statistically, etc. The sequence of heads and tails is now transformed 
into a sequence of l's and O's, called pattern D: 
01000110110000010100111001011101110000000 ... 
This pattern D is not detachable (yet!), it was simply read off from the particular event 
E. However, pattern D can be generated without referring to E at all, simply by 
rewriting D as: 
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0 (binary) 
1 
00 
01 
10 
11 (I x 2 1 + Ix 2°) 
000 
001 
010 
011 
100 
101 
110 
111 
0000 
etc. 
0 (in decimal) 
1 
0 
1 
2 
3 (3 x 10°) {Remember that x0 "'. 1, therefore 2° ~ 1 and 10° ~1) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
We recogmse that this is a sequence generated by writing binary numbers in 
ascending order, moving from one-digit to two-digit to three-digit numbers, each time 
starting at 0. Hence E is a pseudo-random sequence and D is the non-random pattern 
describing it. The probability of sequence E occurring is 1 in 2100 . In order to 
eliminate chance, the additional side information that has to be used is the knowledge 
of binary arithmetic, which detaches the pattern D from the event E and thus makes D 
a specification (Demsbki 1999:138). 
In order to avoid the contention that side information is ad hoc, Dembski (:138-139) 
places two conditions on side information, namely: 
• conditional independence 
• tractability ('do-ability'). 
Conditional _independence, a concept from probability theory, is epistemic 
independence, i.e. knowledge of the side information must not affect the knowledge 
of the occurrence of event E. This means that the probability of an event must not 
change if we take the side information into account. In the example given, this is true 
since knowledge of the binary number system cannot affect the probability of a 
sequence of coin tosses. 
The tractability condition requires that the side information enables the construction 
of the pattern D to which E conforms. The meaning of 'enables' is described by 
complexity theory, a generalisation of computational or algorithmic complexity 
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theory, which 'assesses the difficulty of tasks given the resources available for 
accomplishing those tasks' (Dembski 1999:138, see also Davies 2000:116-120). 
These two conditions are a means of ensuring that the pattern is constructed from an 
event without 'recourse to the actual event' (Dembski 1999: 139). Specifications are 
then these non-ad hoc detachable patterns. Dembski uses these conditions, it seems, 
to guard against allegations that an event can be interpreted in an ad hoc fashion to 
suit one's purposes (as in attributing intelligent design'). 
4.4.5 The complexity-specification criterion in action 
The way to assess the reliability of a criterion is to investigate the proportion of false 
positives and false negatives in relation to the number of correct identifications. 
In the case of the complexity-specification criterion, a false negative occurs when the 
criterion does not detect design in an object that was designed. Dembski (1999:140) 
says this difficulty is 'endemic to detecting intelligent causes' since 'intelligent causes 
can mimic necessity and chance, thereby rendering their actions indistinguishable 
from such unintelligent causes'. A young boy's room often testifies to this - it looks 
chaotic, but an intelligent cause was behind it all! An intelligent agent can also act 
intentionally to hide its actions (e.g. via encryption of data) or we might not know 
enough to enable to detect the design (the side information is lacking!). Dembski's 
contention is that false negatives do not invalidate the complexity-specification 
criterion since it will detect intelligent causes that do intend making their handiwork 
known (:141). 
Bearing Dembski's intention in mind, it is clear that the issue of false positives is more 
important to him. One does not want to attribute design to something that was not 
designed. The criterion must reliably detect design even at the cost of actually 
rejecting some designed things, otherwise it is worthless (:141). Dembski (:142-146) 
advances two arguments for the reliability of the criterion with regard to false 
positives, namely an inductive argument and an argument about the special qualities 
intelligent agents have that make them detectable. 
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The inductive argument simply says that 'in every instance where the complexity-
specification criterion attributes design and where the underlying causal story is 
known, it turns out design actually is present; therefore design actually is present 
whenever the complexity-specification criterion attributes design' (: 142). Dembski 
dismisses the naturalist argument that extrapolation of design beyond the artefacts of 
human designers is not possible, since this is based on circular reasoning which 
already assumes that naturalism is true. 
At this point Dembski addresses the issue of just how we can distinguish between 
chance coincidences and design? The filter that Dembski proposes is that the 
probability must be small enough, less than his so-called 'universal probability 
bound'" of 10-150 (1999:143). The issue of just how one determines the probability of 
an event is contentious, as we will discuss later. In any case, inductive arguments can 
never constitute absolute proof - there may just be black swans out there even if the 
probability is very small! (The full argument is: 'All the swans I've seen are white, 
therefore all swans are white'.). 
Dembski's second argument about the special nature of intelligent agents revolves 
around the identification of the principal characteristic of intelligent agency as being 
the choosing between alternative possibilities" (:144). Dembski argues that the 
complexity-specification criterion fits in with our general scheme for recognising 
intelligent agency, namely that one out of several competing possibilities was 
actualised and the possibility actualised could be specified beforehand as being 
appropriate (: 145). The example Dembski uses is a rat learning to navigate a maze 
(:145). The psychologist specifies beforehand which selection of right turns and left 
turns will get the rat out of the maze. If the rat has learned how to get out quickly, it 
will make this selection amongst all the possible choices of routes and this behaviour 
will be recognised as being intelligent instead of constituting just random wanderings. 
24 10" ~ 1/10, or 0.1, so 10-150 ~ 1110150 which is very close to O! Dembski contends that anything that 
is less probable than this cannot be attributed to chance. The universal probability bound is proposed in 
Section 6.5 of his book, The Design Inference (Dembski 1998b). 
~ 5 This can be linked to the mathematical definition of information as being related to the exclusion of 
possibilities: the more possibilities excluded, the higher the information content is. 
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The catch with this example is that a robot can also learn to navigate a maze and thus 
also be judged to be intelligent, since it possesses 'machine intelligence' as we 
normally call it. Dembski does add that the maze must be complex so that many 
possibilities exist and it will be unlikely that chance alone could result in the correct 
choice. This does not change the argument that machine or artificial intelligence will 
pass this test and that it is not necessarily an intelligent causal agent. Searle's 
"Chinese room" argument" is along the same lines as well. You can translate Chinese 
without knowing it, you can appear to be intelligent without being truly intelligent. 
This impinges on just what sort of intelligent agent it is that this complexity-
specification criterion can detect. 
To conclude the second argument: Dembski contends that this generic method for 
recognising intelligent agency contains all the elements (actualisation, selection, and 
specification) that are present in the complexity-specification criterion (:146). Hence 
the criterion merely formalises the normal method for recognising intelligent agency. 
Dembski contends that his criterion 'detects design strictly from observational features 
of the world' and that it is based on probability and complexity theory and not on 
metaphysics and theology (1999:149). He admits that his criterion does not 'achieve 
logical demonstration', but states that it 'does achieve statistical justification so 
compelling as to demand assent' (:149). The compelling nature is the result of the 
'" John Searle has developed the Chinese room argument which tries to show that people understand 
what they do whereas computers do not (Siegfried 2000:127-129). The thought experiment involves 
putting a person who does not know Chinese into an empty room that has only one channel to the 
outside \Vorld. The person has a stack of cards that contain Chinese symbols and a book of instructions 
in a language that the person can understand, e.g. English. The instructions (like a computer program) 
tell the person \vhat syn1bols to send out in response to Chinese messages conllng in via the channel. 
VVhen the person receives a Chinese message, he or she consults the book of instn1ctions and passes 
back a card v.rith a Chinese symbol as the instructions dictated. To an outside observer, the person 
would appear to be responding appropriately to questions posed in Chinese symbols (provided the 
instructions were adequate) even though the person \vould have no idea of what had been 
communicated. To Searle. this illustrates the instruction-based input-output system of a con1puter and 
demonstrates that the computer does not understand what it does (:128). This example has been the 
subject of inany debates and the issue of \vhat is understanding has not been resolved. Cilliers 
(1998:48-57) provides a good overview. See also Subsection 5.6.7.8: Co111putational neuroscience. 
87 
sheer magnitude of the odds against chance and law (Dembski's 'universal probability 
bound' of 1 o-tso ). 
4.4.6 The connection with irreducible complexity 
According to Dembski, Michael Behe's notion of irreducible complexity as explicated 
in his book Darwin's Black Box, satisfies his complexity-specification criterion (:149). 
Behe's biological systems are complex due to the interrelatedness of the parts of the 
system, which therefore have to be selected carefully, otherwise the system will not 
work (:147). Dembski states that 'in virtue of their function these systems embody 
patterns independent of the actual living systems' and therefore these systems are also 
specified (: 149). 
Dembski has also formulated intelligent design in terms of information and we will 
now discuss his view. 
4.4. 7 Intelligent design and information 
Dembski (1999:156) uses the mathematical theory of information and follows 
Shannon by defining the measure of information in an event of probability p as -
log2p, which is always positive or zero". This is a measure of complexity that is 
measured in bits, namely the number of bits needed to identify an event of probability 
p. In other words, the more members there are of the set of possible events, the larger 
the information complexity. This measure says nothing at all about the possibilities of 
patterns in the set of events. 
If an event A has a probability of occurring given by P(A), then the amount of 
information in event A, I(A), is given by I(A) = log2 P(A). I(A)is the measure of the 
number of bits associated with P(A). The probability of an event occurring can 
therefore be quantified in bits28 • 
27 Shannon's forn1ula is discussed in Subsection 2.1.1: Sha1111011's inf'or111ation tlreo1y. 
28 The concept of a bit is also discussed in Subsection 2.1.1. 
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The conditional information of B, given A, is defined as !(BIA). It is the amount of 
information contained in event B once event A is taken into account. The conditional 
information contained in B, given A, is the unique information in B that is not in A 
Hence !(BIA) = I(A&B) - I(A), where I(A&B) stands for the information that is in A 
and B and I(A) is the information in A 
The linkage with Dembski's previous definition of complexity is via the probability of 
an occurrence of an event. Previously Dembski (1999:129) used the example of 
Scrabble pieces: a complex arrangement of Scrabble pieces is unlikely to happen; it 
has a low probability of occurring and hence complexity is inversely related to 
probability. 
Specifications are non-ad hoc detachable patterns of events and information is 
transmitted through events (: 159). Events can be specified or unspecified and so 
information can also be specified or unspecified. Finally, we get to what Dembski 
calls complex specified information or CSI, information that is both complex (contains 
many bits) and specified (: 159). 
To Dembski CSI is the underlying information concept of many endeavours to 
understand nature's complexity, such as the fine-tuning of the universe, the movement 
of information (CS!) between the organism's enviro11111ent and the genome, and the 
irreducible complexity of Bebe's biochemical machines (1999:159). Particularly 
important in the context of complexity theories is the contention that it is CSI 'that 
within the Kolmogorov-Chaitin theory of algorithmic information identifies the highly 
compressible non-random strings of digits'" (:159). Random events are represented 
by non-compressible strings of bits, whereas non-random events (patterns) can be 
expressed by an algorithm (:292). The algorithmic complexity of CSI is therefore low 
due to the presence of pattern. 
Information theory and design are connected simply via the fact that 'to infer design 
by means of the complexity-specification criterion is equivalent to detecting complex 
specified information' (:160). The elements of the criterion, the contingency, 
"See also Subsection 2.1.3: The different formulations of information, and 
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complexity and the specification of an event, are mirrored in the CSI of an event. 
Contingency results from an event being one of a set of possible events, which is 
described by a probability, which in tum can be expressed as information. 
4.4.8 Where does information come from? 
Dembski asks the same question that Gitt and Davies ask. The naturalist position is 
that the combination of law and chance produces information. Dembski attacks law 
and chance on their own and then the combination of them acting together. 
4.4.8.J Laws and algorithms 
Dembski advances a mathematical argument, using the concept of CSI, to show that 
algorithms and natural laws cannot originate information (1999:160-165). 
Mathematically, laws and algorithms are functions. Functions are relations between 
two sets. Functions map a member of a set (called the domain) to a unique member of 
another set (called the range). For example, the function f could map each element x 
in the domain to element (x2) in the range. In the case of algorithms, the domain is 
the input data and the range is the output data. A natural law's domain is the initial 
conditions and boundary conditions, and the range is the physical states at subsequent 
times. We can say that a natural law maps initial conditions to later conditions. 
Dembski (1999:161) now asks us to consider informationj. which is CSI information, 
and a function f (law or algorithm) that led to the origin of the information j. Some 
element i, in the domain off, was then mapped to j by f, in mathematical terminology 
j{i)=j. Dembski makes two points: 
• Where does i come from? The problem of infinite regression looms, so 
ultimately there must be a source of information. 
• The functional relationship between i and j will never add information, 
although it may keep intact what information is already there or degrade it. If 
i was complex specified information, then j must have been at least as 
complex and specified. 
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In terms of the conditional information theorems explained in the previous section, the 
last point can be formulated as follows (:161): 
• l(i&j) = I(i) + I(ili) 
The information that is in i and./ is equal to the information in i added to the unique 
information inj that is not in i, the conditional information. Furthermore: 
• l(ili) = 0 There is no unique information inj that is not in i; it can be less or 
equal to that of i. 
• Therefore I(i&j) = I(i) No information has been added. 
The issue of whether the function itself can contain information is also addressed 
(: 162). If we look at my simple example of j{x) = x2, then x2 will contain more bits 
and hence more information as per our definition of information. This information is 
already contained in the function and the amount of information has not been 
increased: 
the information contained in function fix)+ the domain, the set ofx's 
is equal to 
the information contained infix)+ the range, the set ofx2's. 
Dembski (1999: 165) concludes that the basic issue is that laws and algorithms are 
'deterministic and thus cannot yield contingency, without which there can be no 
infonnation'. Information flows and degrades but does not increase. 
Note that Davies (2000:64) agrees with this overall line of argument. The simple laws 
of physics, such as gravitation, can transform a uniform gas into galaxies that need a 
large amount of information to describe, but the information was 'secreted' in the 
gravitation field, in other words, the law or function already contained the information 
(:64). We are here talking about information at the statistical level, the information 
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theory level. Davies ( :254) also holds the view that 'ordinary laws' simply shuffle 
information around and do not create information. He does believe in the possibility 
of 'complexity laws' that might create new information ( :259), but more on this later. 
4.4.8.2 Chance on its own 
Dembski's position is that chance can generate 'complex unspecified information and 
'non complex specified information', but not complex specified information 
(1999: 165). All of this comes from the definition of what complex specified 
information is. Dembski (:165-166) uses the random typing analogy by way of 
illustration: although a random document may be complex, it is highly probable that a 
particular sequence of characters will be repeated if the document is long enough and 
the sequence is also unspecified. Short sequences of characters that make sense may 
be present (e.g. 'god'), which is non-complex specified information formed by chance, 
but longer sequences are too improbable. Dembski's cut-off for attributing to chance 
is his 'universal probability bound' of 10·150 which is equivalent to 500 bits of 
infonnation (: 143, 166). For events with probabilities lower than this, 'chance is 
eliminated and design implicated' (: 166). Complex specified information (CSI) is 
now defined as 'any specified information whose complexity exceeds 500 bits of 
infomrntion' and hence chance is excluded (or made extremely unlikely) by this 
definition (: 166). 
As Dembski points out, biologists in general and Richard Dawkins in particular reject 
pure chance as an adequate explanation for complexity (: 166-167). 
4.4.8.3 Law combined with chance 
By now it is clear that Dembski will not give (law+ chance) a chance to succeed! His 
argument is simply that a two-stage process, with chance operating first followed by 
law, cannot generate CSI since chance does not generate CSI and neither does law - it 
merely shuffles existing information ( 1999: 168-169). Hence Dembski concludes that 
all stochastic (random) processes, such as genetic algorithms, neural nets, Darwinian 
mutation and selection, are incapable of creating CSL However, the issue of the role 
of the environment remains and we will now consider this. 
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4.4.8.4 Law and chance interacting with the environment 
As Dembski (1999: 173) acknowledges, evolutionists argue that the CSI of an 
organism increases from generation to generation due to the Darwinian mutation and 
selection mechanisms bringing in additional CSI from the environment. Davies' 
complexity laws would conceptually 'wrest it [information] from the environment and 
etch it onto a material structure' (Davies 2000:259). 
This raises the whole issue of open versus closed systems. Dembski (1999:170) 
formulates a law of conservation of information (LCI): 'Natural causes are incapable 
of generating CSI'. Peter Medawar has also used this concept to illustrate that 
deterministic laws cannot produce new information (:170). Gitt's 23•d information 
theorem also takes this stance (see Appendix A and Gitt 1997:79) 
The implications of this 'law' for closed systems are (: 170): 
• 'The CSI in a closed system of natural causes remains constant or decreases.' 
• 'CS! cannot be generated spontaneously, originate endogenously or organise 
itself.' 
• 'The CSI in a closed system of natural causes either has been in the system 
eternally or was at some point added exogenously (implying that the system, 
though now closed, was not always closed).' 
• 'In particular any closed system of natural causes that is also of finite duration 
received whatever CSI it contains before it became a closed system.' 
Intelligent design adherents differ as to whether CSI was always present or was 
inserted from time to time, with Dembski being in the latter camp (:171). 
The major thrust behind the law of conservation of information is that CSI cannot be 
explained reductively, by moving from the complex to the simple (: 171 ). A closed 
system moves from the complex to the just as complex. 
With respect to the possibility of open systems, Dembski feels that the crucial aspect 
of CS! is that it is holistic in that if individual items of information are added together, 
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they do not form a new item of CSI (1999:173). The parts of the whole must not 
simply be added together, but must be arranged in the correct relations. Only if a top-
down specification is given (as in a target sentence, for example for a set of 
characters) can the parts be arranged to form CSL This is another form of the popular 
argument for purpose that is used against Darwinian evolution. Dembski (:174) says 
'selection and mutation operate with no memory of the past or knowledge of the 
fLrture' and hence the CSI that it creates must be generated in a single generation. The 
reason this constraint is needed is that mutation and selection cannot sustain a 
specification (a target pattern) over the many generations needed to achieve the 
specified adaptation. This argument presumes that a specification, a target that needs 
to be 'remembered', must exist for complexity to arise. 
Dembski (1999: 174) asks whether mutation and selection can generate CSI in one 
generation. My impression is that here a straw horse type of argument is being 
created that will be refuted. 
If we take the position that CSI cannot be generated by natural causes, the question 
remains whether natural causes can use pre-existing CSI and include them in the first 
Ii ving organism (Dembski 1999: 175). Furthermore, how can the combination of CSI 
in the environment and the organism be translated into further organisms with greater 
complexity? The flow ofCSI into and out of biological systems is the issue. 
Dembski's answer is that the CSI received at the birth of an organism comes from 
inheritance with modification. During its life, the organism acquires CSI via selection 
and infusion. 
Modification includes mutations as in random genetic errors, plus the combination of 
DNA from both parents in sexual reproduction, etc. 'Infusion' here means transfer of 
CSI between living organisms as, for example, via the interchange of pieces of 
generic information between bacteria(: 176). 
Which of these increases the CSI? Inheritance is merely the transmission of existing 
information from generation to generation (in the form of DNA). Modification, 
including mutations of DNA, is viewed to be the operation of chance, which by itself 
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cannot mcrease CSL This leaves selection. Selection, in Dembski's words, 
'introduces new information' by 'seizing on advantageous modifications' (1999:177). 
Note that the word generate is not used. Dembski again brings in Behe's argument for 
irreducible complexity, with the example of the flagellum of a bacterium (: 177-178). 
How can the target be reached if selection is without purpose? Dembski (: 178) says: 
'The environment contains no blueprint of the flagellum which selection can extract 
and then transmit to an organism'. Selection can only build on partial function, but 
incomplete irreducibly complex systems will not function at all, and therefore full 
function has to be reached in one generation. The CS! of a flagellum is more than 500 
bits and hence is extremely unlikely to be produced by chance in one go! (:178). 
Again the question is whether in fact a random walk of partial improvements can 
actually get you to a complex, but not predetermined end-point? 
Finally, let us discuss infusion. Dembski (1999:179) distinguishes between biotic and 
ahiotic infi1sion and correspondingly between endogenous and exogenous 
information. Biotic infusion is the infusion of information from one organism to 
another, whereas abiotic infusion comes from non-biotic sources. Endogenous 
information is biotically infused information and exogenous information is abiotically 
infused infom1ation. If we trace back in time, then somewhere the first living 
organisms must have occurred and at that time abiotic infusion must have taken place, 
creating exogenous information. This is again a reframing of the question: What is 
the source of biological information? This question also fascinates Davies. 
4.4.8.5 Evolutionary biology from an information perspective 
The aim of evolutionary biology is to understand the genesis and development of life 
and to Dembski the key feature of life is the presence of CSI (1999:180). Dembski 
(: 180) sees a limited role for Darwinian mutation and selection as a mechanism for 
'conserving, adapting and honing already existing biological structures'. This is the 
so-called micro-evolution role. Dembski denies that Darwinian evolution has the 
information resources to produce irreducibly complex biological structures. The 
major issue is to understand where the exogenous information that was originally 
infused abiotically comes from. In simpler words, how did information come to 
reside inside living things? 
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In essence, Dembski sets up a chain of questions tracing back to the origins of 
information. How is abiotically infused CSI transmitted to an organism, and where 
did this information come from? If this information resides in a non-biological 
system, how did it get there? This quest can end in several different ways. We might 
find that we cannot get beyond biological organisms, stopping dead at an irreducibly 
complex biological system. We could get stuck at an abiotic source of exogenous 
infonnation; Dembski (:181) mentions the clay-template theory of Cairns-Smith30 • 
Again Dembski asks: Where did the information in the clay-template come from? We 
could trace the information all the way to the Big Bang as Davies did, but we would 
still have to show how information was created and transformed along the way. The 
creationist would stop at the direct intervention of God as the source of information. 
Dembski (: 182) views this as 'scientifically sterile' unless you can show that biological 
information could not have come from anywhere else, and even then the how question 
remains - How did God do it? 
Dembski (1999:182) demands that an evolutionary biology reconceph1alised in 
information-theoretical terms must trace information pathways in explicit detail, with 
rigor, based on empirical evidence, and they need to conform to biological reality. 
The last point is aimed at the 'nebulous informational pathways sketched by Stuart 
Kauffinan' which reside in a computer (:182). These criteria favour the CS! theory of 
course. Dembski feels that information theory is flexible enough to be able to handle 
all the evolutionary mechanisms that have been proposed and will, in fact, show 
clearly the information-theoretical constraints that they are subject to. Dembski has 
done this for the Darwinian mechanism. Dembski's main issue is that: 
all reductionist attempts to explain information in terms of something other 
than information will have to go by the board. Information is sui generis. 
Only information begets information. 
(Dembski 1999:183) 
~0 This theory is discussed in Subsection 4.3.6: Fron1 the first living thing to 1nicrobes. 
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4.4.9 An appraisal ofDembski's approach 
4.4.9.J Introduction 
Using Barbour's terminology' 1, Dembski follows a 'natural theology' approach rather 
than the 'theology of nature' approach that is popular currently. 
To what extent do Dembski's intelligent design arguments succeed as a two-pronged 
attack against naturalism? The two prongs are a 'scientific and philosophical critique 
of naturalism' and a 'positive scientific research program' (Dembski 1999: 120). 
4.4. 9.2 The critique of naturalism 
Is Dembski's approach the right way to attack naturalism? Pennock (2000:183) sees 
his approach as a continuance of a classic creationist argument in which the question 
is formulated as if there were only two mutually exclusive options, in this case either 
scientific naturalism or intelligent design. The next step is then to argue that scientific 
naturalism has many failings and that therefore intelligent design, as the only 
alternative, must be correct. This is one reason for the strong attack launched by 
Dembski on theistic evolution, since it undermines this either/or dichotomy. Howard 
van Till, a theistic evolutionist, as quoted by Pennock (:183), is against those who 
'preach the gospel of either/or-manship'. Pennock (:183) suggests that 'this new dual 
model approach misunderstands the nature of the scientific issue in as fundamental a 
manner as did the old version'. Pennock (:190-191) distinguishes between ontological 
or metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism. Ontological naturalism 
makes claims about what nature consists of, while methodological naturalism 
commits to a set of methods as being the way to discover how the world works (: 190-
191 ). As we have discussed, Dembski (1999: 103) talks of scientific naturalism, 
which is the location of 'the self-sufficiency of nature in the natural laws of science'. 
This corresponds to ontological naturalism. Dembski (: 119) sees methodological 
naturalism as the premise that science must be limited strictly to the study of 
1mdirected natural processes. Pennock (2000: 191) makes the point that new evidence 
31 Please refer to Subsection 6.2.1 where a 'theology of nature' approach is discussed as part of the 
'Integration' category of Barbour1s four-fold typology of the relationship bet\:veen science and religion. 
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will cause the methodological naturalist to revise both method and any substantive 
claims, if 'doing so would provide better evidential warrant'. Dembski wants to revise 
the method by breaking out of the naturalist's prescription that science deals only with 
natural causes and wants to include the study of intelligent causes as well (:I 05). 
Dembski does want to provide 'better evidential warrant' via the notion of CS! as 
empirical evidence of design. 
Pennock (2000: 192) makes the point that the creationist's reasoning seems to be that 
'because naturalism rejects continuing divine intervention, it does implicitly deny 
God's existence, but this conclusion follows only if one has a particular conception of 
divine power'. As Pennock (:192) argues, many concepts of God such as deism, the 
view that we cannot know the nature of God, the view that God only intervenes on the 
spiritual level, are compatible with both ontological and methodological naturalism. 
I would add that certain varieties of theism are also compatible with naturalism. One 
does not necessarily have to perceive of God as absent if one agrees with naturalism. 
Dembski's critique against naturalism is thus intimately tied to his concept of God. 
Therefore his objective is that evidence of God's interaction with the world must be 
produced since, if God's interaction is hidden, God's existence may even be affirmed 
by scientific naturalists, but this God will be 'a superfluous rider on top of a 
self-contained account of the world'(: 104). 
Therefore it seems to me that, in reality, Dembski's two-pronged attack only has one 
prong. He is playing by science's rules, using science's methods to try to provide 
empirical, scientific evidence for intelligent design. 
Finally, Pennock (2000:210-213) argues that Philip Johnson, in his attack on scientific 
naturalism, is following a post-modem approach. Pennock ( :212) sees Johnson's 
book, Defeating Darwinism, as a creationist manifesto that 'incites believers to 
[quoting from Johnson's book J "step off the reservation" and escape the "oppression" 
and "domination" of the materialist rules" to which the Darwinian "intellectual elite" 
have forced them to "submit"'. The contention is that science is seen as the only 
source of objective knowledge simply because of the power of the scientific 
establishment which defines what knowledge is. This is a post-modem claim that 
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human knowledge is relative. Dembski (:118) follows Johnson's line in that he agrees 
with Johnson that 'science is the only universally valid form of knowledge in our 
culture'. However, as Pennock (:212-213) says, creationists go beyond 
post-modernists and assert that while 'human reason by itself is impotent' ... 'God's 
divine revelation saves us from relativism by providing us with absolute truth in 
Scripture'. So Johnson uses post-modem language to attack the position of power of 
the scientific narrative, but then goes on to talk of 'Truth with a capital T' (Pennock 
2000:213). It seems that creationists find it acceptable to use post-modernism against 
their opponents, but not against their own position. One can also ask what kind of 
truth is being used here. Is the biblical message seen as final, absolute truth or as 
redemptive truth? 
4.4.9.3 The scientific attack on evolution science 
Dembski's approach in this prong of the attack is that Darwinian evolution must be 
attacked as, first and foremost, an empirically inadequate scientific theory and not 
because of its supposed incompatibility with some system of religious belief 
(Dembski 1999:112). Dembski (:111-112) rejects 'theistic evolution' as an approach 
since it does not command any respect from atheists because the theism part of 
'theistic evolution' is superfluous. To him the presence of 'evolution' in 'theistic 
evolution' is objectionable since it needs to be attacked and not acknowledged as the 
full scientific picture of the biological world. 
Robert Russell (1998:192) agrees that theistic evolution, if based on chance as 
epistemic ignorance, either means nothing, since natural law explains everything in 
effect, or, one is driven to an interventionist position in which God must intervene, 
causing a gap in the closed causal order. However, he disagrees fundamentally with 
the attack on Darwinism as a scientific theory. Russell (1998: 192-193) regards this 
approach as: 
playing directly into the hands of the atheist, since they implicitly agree that it 
is Darwinism, and not its atheistic interpretation, which must be attacked. In 
doing so they ignore the fact that theistic evolution offers the real attack on 
atheism by successfully giving a Christian interpretation to science - thus 
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undermining the very assumption they share with atheists, namely, that a 
Darwinian account of biological evolution is inherently atheistic. Not only 
does this abandon vast realms of biology to the atheistic camp, it implicitly 
undercuts the integrity of those Christians who faithfully pursue research in 
mainstream biology, as well as the vast number of Christians who, while not 
being biologists as such, accept it and give it a Christian interpretation. How 
much better would it be if those promoting "creation science" and "intelligent 
design" would attack atheism instead of evolutionary biology! 
Dembski attacks not only the adequacy of the Darwinian mechanism, but the whole of 
science. It appears that he wants to expand the boundaries of science. Dembski 
(l 999: 105) wants to break out of the closed causal system, to replace the terminology 
of natural versus supernatural with natural versus intelligent causes. Science must 
admit the existence of intelligent causes on an empirical level. Dembski's contention 
is that the distinction between intelligent and natural causes 'has underlain the design 
arguments of past centuries' (: 105). To ask whether an intelligent cause works within 
or outside nature is a separate question to Dembski (:I 05). However, he does not 
answer this question! 
In order to try to address one of Russell's concerns, namely that intelligent design 
leaves biology to the atheists, Dembski stresses again and again the empirical basis of 
his argument, so that it forms part of science. 
With regard to intelligent design's search for legitimacy, it can be stated that science 
provides it! The battle is being fought on science's terms, empirical grounds, because 
'science is the only valid form of knowledge in our culture (Dembski 1999:118). 
Is Dembski's own approach not also reductionist since all laws of complexity are 
thrown out and only simple laws can be used? Davies and Dembski (1999:171) 
would agree that reductive explanations are not sufficient, but Davies will not replace 
them by inferring design and hence intelligent agents. Davies would probably move to 
laws of complexity. 
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In general, Dembski acknowledges that his argument cannot lead directly to the God 
of the Bible. Even an agnostic stance is compatible with his argument. His 
empirically based argument cannot provide strong support for theism. 
4.4.9.4 A critique on a scientific level 
Holder (2000: 181 ), as a Bayesian, is dissatisfied with Dembski's approach since it 
does not confirm his hypothesis, it simply eliminates others. According to Holder, 
Bayesianism 'directly compares the probability of competing hypotheses, given E [an 
event], in terms of their (mathematically well-defined) explanatory power and prior 
probability'. 
On another level, probabilities are relevant as well. If one starts with the complex 
end-product and reasons back in a step-by-step fashion to the humble beginnings, then 
the probability of each step seems manageable by simple laws plus chance. It does 
not look as improbable as when Dembski demands that the leap must be made in one 
generation against impossible odds. Dembski would obviously reply that the simple 
laws have no direction, no end-goal or purpose, and hence would not arrive at the 
complex system. If the argument is that the issue is just how to arrive at any complex 
destination rather than a particular one, then the issue of irreducible complexity will 
be brought up again. Dembski's argument is that one could never arrive at an 
irreducibly complex system since the systems along the way are not functional. This 
argument has, however, been vigorously contested since small advances could confer 
an incremental advantage in the context of the battle for survival in nature. 
4.4. 9. 5 The limited nature of Dembski's model of design 
As stated previously, Dembski has been criticised for defining design as that which is 
left when chance and regularity have been eliminated (Holder 2000: 180). This 
criticism comes from Holder's review of Dembski's book, The Design Inference. 
Holder quotes Dembski as saying that design 'asserts what an event is not, not what it 
is' and therefore design is preliminary to attributing intelligent agency and makes it 
plausible. In Intelligent Design, Dembski (1999: 133) presents his complexity-
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specification criterion as a flowchart with three decision nodes and calls it an 
'explanatory filter'. The questions are, in sequence: 
Is an event, or an object: 
• Contingent? (if not, then the explanation for the occurrence of the event is 
necessity) 
• Complex? (if not, then the explanation is chance) 
• Specified ?(if not, then the explanation is chance) 
If all these explanations have failed, the only remaining explanation is design. 
Pennock (2000:95) points out that natural law and chance are not mutually exclusive 
since there are 'statistical and deterministic laws'. Law and design are also not 
mutually exclusive since we can explain via the laws as well as in terms of the 
specific intentions of the designer, as evidenced by the natural theology of the 
clockwork universe (:95). So intentional design can be a viable option even ifthe first 
two filters have not been passed. Pennock's position is 'that we cannot identify design 
by a two-step process of elimination but rather must have positive evidence for it, 
based for example, on knowledge of specific design intentions and the possibility of 
their having operated through some causal intervention in the situation under 
consideration' ( :95-96). This seems quite a high hurdle to jump in terms of the 'extra' 
knowledge required and the possibility of causal intervention is always there if 
statistical laws operate. Pennock does mention the issue of specification as part and 
parcel of design and this is quite an interesting issue. 
By 'specified', Dembski (1999:132-133) means that a certain type of pattern enables 
one to infer design in the presence of complexity. This pattern is not ad hoc and must 
be independent of the particular event it describes. Dembski (: 133) calls this relation 
of independence detachability and such patterns are said to be detachable. If we are 
given an event and a pattern describing it, then a detachable pattern is one that can 
still be constructed from the range of possible events without knowing which of these 
possible events actually happened (:133). In order to construct this pattern Dembski 
(: 138) introduces the notion of the need to use additional side information in order to 
eliminate chance and to detach the pattern from the event, thus making the pattern a 
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specification. To avoid the contention that side information is ad hoc, Dembski (:138-
139) places two conditions on side information, namely: conditional independence 
and tractability ('do-ability'). 
Conditional independence, a concept from probability theory, is epistemic 
independence, i.e. knowledge of the side information must not affect the knowledge 
of the occurrence of event E. This means that the probability of an event must not 
change if we take the side information into account. 
The tractability condition requires that the side information enable the constrnction of 
the pattern D to which E conforms. The meaning of 'enables' is described by 
complexity theory, a generalisation of computational or algorithmic complexity 
theory, which 'assesses the difficulty of tasks given the resources available for 
accomplishing those tasks' (:138, see also Davies 2000:116-120). 
These two conditions are a means of ensuring that the pattern is constructed from an 
event without 'recourse to the actual event' (Dembski 1999:139). Specifications are 
then these non-ad hoc detachable patterns. Dembski uses these conditions, it seems, 
to guard against allegations that an event can be interpreted in an ad hoc fashion to 
suit one's purposes (as in attributing intelligent design!). 
Chaitin's work32 shows that we will not detect all the patterns that are non-random 
since we cannot prove that a pattern is random. This is fine since avoiding false 
negatives is not what Dembski's problem is, rather it is false positives that are a 
problem. Are these two conditions sufficient to distinguish ad hoc from non-ad hoc? 
Where does the side information come from? The problem is that an intelligent agent 
could simply project an inappropriate pattern onto the data. The person observing the 
data could be the source of the side information. Chaitin's work comes in here as well, 
in the sense that a pattern of events may look highly random, but may not actually be 
32 As discussed in Subsection 4.2-4.1: Syntax, Chaitin has shown that it is in fact theoretically 
impossible to determine whether a sequence is random, because there is no algoritlun that can do this 
(Gitt 1997:126). 
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so. A pattern that appears to be intractable could have been caused by an unknown 
law. If we do not know the action of the law, the pattern of events may look highly 
improbable, but actually the law was in action. Dembski would say that the 
Darwinian mechanism is too simple to be this kind of law. 
We can look at the explanatory filter from the other side, from the bottom-up as it 
were, and ask what things would look like if design was present? This is then in 
terms of Dembski's claim that intelligent design is a research programme investigating 
how the designer went about it and how the design works. Side information enables 
us to detach the pattern and create a specification. So, only when we have certain 
knowledge can we understand the cause of the pattern. Dembski admits that the 
naturalist's critique is that all this knowledge comes from the human domain. 
Dembski states that we detect intelligent agency by examining the choices that have 
been made, specifying one out of many possibilities (1999:145). Although Dembski 
contends that intelligent design says nothing about the nature of the designer 
(transcendent or not), we do have to consider criticisms of the overall pattern of 
design. Eldredge (2000:144-145) proposes a test ofa different kind, namely: Does the 
design history of human objects 'reveal a simple nested pattern of similarity, as 
evolution has produced in the biological realm?' His answer is no, it does not and 
therefore biology does not point to a human designer. Eldredge (:144) points out that 
the creationist's response is that the Creator was 'merely efficient in using the same 
blueprint for the separately created basic kinds'. Eldredge (:146), as a designer, would 
rather have used the same good design idea anywhere and not have restricted it to 
'what someone in retrospect might be tempted to identify as separate lineages'. 
Pennock (2000: 146) puts forward a similar type of argument in which he examines 
the nature of explicitly designed languages such as Esperanto versus the (presumably) 
evolved languages that exist today. Esperanto is structured in a regular way with 
simple rules, whereas natural language is a 'jerry-built' jumble (:146). His conclusion 
is that natural languages 'are not formal constructions imposed from on high' but 
'developed into and from one another over time, through piecemeal constructions and 
unplanned transformations' (:146). This tells us something about the nature of 
unintentional human designs vs intentional human designs. God could intend to 
design this way, so all these arguments cannot prove that God did not design, it can 
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only show that the end-results are like those produced by unintentional processes. 
Pennock (:246-249) analyses the creationist response to what he calls the 
'imperfection argument' against intelligent design made by evolutionists such as 
Gould. The argument is basically that 'odd arrangements and makeshift adaptations' 
are positive evidence for evolution since these are to be expected due to the 
constraints of having to work with what you already have ( :24 7). Pennock 
distinguishes between using this pattern as a positive argument for evolution and 
using it as a negative argument against intelligent design by stating that a designer 
God would not have designed this way. He agrees with creationists that this is a 
breach of methodological naturalism, since you cannot test 'what would or would not 
be sensible from God's point of view' (:247). Pennock (:248) quotes Michael Behe: 
'Another problem with the argument from imperfection is that it critically depends on 
a psychoanalysis of the unidentified designer. Yet the reasons that a designer would 
or would not do anything are virtually impossible to know unless the designer tells 
you specifically what those reasons are.' Pennock (:249) agrees with this argument, 
since 'we are in no position to psychoanalyse God or any other supernatural 
intelligence' but the sting in the tail is that this insulates the design argument against 
the imperfection argument, but does not attack the positive argument for evolution. It 
remains a negative type of argument, rather than offering positive evidence, and 
Pennock ( :249) calls the design inference 'just another form of the God of the gaps 
argument'. Dembski would disagree, but the point is that it is not that easy to remain 
at the level that Dembski proposes, the empirical level of CSI as evidenced in 
systems. The grand sweep of cross-comparing these systems, tracking their 
relationships and common characteristics, leads one to questions about what type of 
design practice it is that we see here. Therefore, the positive evidence offered by the 
design inference seems thin and the argumentation tends to become negative. 
A more direct attack would be against the fundan1ental notion of complexity and 
specified purpose. Dembski's argument would fail if complex" systems could be seen 
to be achieving some purpose. Pennock (2000:106-107, 262-263) mentions artificial 
life environments in which 'digital organisms' evolve that show signs of 'intelligence', 
JJ SystenlS less probable than Dembski's 'universal probability bound' of 10- 150 (as discussed in 
Subsection 4.4.5) 
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purpose and behaviour that were not designed in the normal sense. Cellular automata, 
which are also capable of complex and purposeful behaviour, are discussed in the next 
Chapter34 • These systems are becoming more complex and it cannot be ruled out that 
Dembski's probability bound could be exceeded in the near future. 
We have now covered the different approaches of Gitt, Davies and Dembski to the 
new arena of the divine action debate, namely biological information. In the next 
Chapter we step back and survey the many different ways that information concepts 
have been used in science, in theology and in the interfaces between various contexts. 
·"in Subsection 5.6.7.5 
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5 The many different uses of information concepts and theories 
5.1 l11troductio11 
An interesting overview of the uses of information in science and theology is 
presented by the Third European Conference on Science and Theology, held in 1990 
(Wassem1ann 1992). The theme of the conference was 'Information and Knowledge 
in Science and Theology'. The broad themes that can be distilled from the large 
variety of papers presented are used to structure this discussion. 
The concept of information is being used in many diverse contexts, ranging from the 
physical sciences, life sciences and the modem information sciences, to the 
humanities and the 'meta'-sciences such as theology and philosophy (Wassermann 
1992:2). Information is used not only in different contexts, but also in the interface 
between different contexts. So we find information in the interfaces between contexts 
as diverse as theology/science, physical/life science, physics/philosophy, 
sociology/communication science and linguistics/education (:2). 
Along the same lines, we can note that the theory of communication also deals with 
what happens in the interface between two contexts, that of the sender and that of the 
receiver, with information being transmitted via the communications channel between 
the two contexts. The problems associated with the interpretation of the message are 
also well known, and are studied, for example, in the field of hermeneutics. 
Another broad area of interest is the role that information plays in connecting the 
hierarchy of organisational levels that stretch from the fundamental entities of matter, 
energy and information, to the level of communities using language. The reach is 
thus from the quantum world to the human world and the spiritual world. Along the 
way, several crucial interfaces are crossed or 'jumps' are made, e.g. the jump between 
non-living and living, animal and human consciousness, etc. 
On a more specific level, communication and infomrntion theories and concepts have 
been used to: 
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• bridge the gap between science and theology (by developing a common 
language and by extending the reach of science) 
• enrich our concept of God 
• clarify our concept of what life is 
• clarify our concept of what being human is 
• link the hierarchy of organisational levels 
• understand God's interaction with the world. 
Each of these areas will now be discussed, but the main focus will be on the issue of 
bridging the gap. Along the way, the broader issues will be touched on as well. 
5.2 Bridging the gap between science and theology 
5.2.1 An approach to developing a common language 
At this point we need to introduce some thinking about the fundamental differences 
between science and religion, as well as the surprising commonalities. The 
assumption that can serve as the basis for bridging the gap is that there is only one 
reality and that ultimately science and religion are both ways of trying to understand 
the very same reality. Although the methods may differ and the subjects may seem 
quite different, at some point as each "delves" deeper and deeper, science approaches 
the limit questions and religion has to deal with the mysteries of the reality that 
science has uncovered. The limits oflanguage are then close at hand and, as McGrath 
(1998:34) formulates it, science and religion find themselves facing the 'issues of 
representation and conceptualisation', and, in trying to tackle these issues, similar 
approaches are followed to try and find answers. We use language to try to 
understand the world, so the issue is perhaps not so much the search for a common 
language, but the fact that language is what both scientists and theologians have in 
common. McGrath (:34) uses this as his point of departure, namely the way in which 
reality is 'apprehended, investigated and represented' by religion and science. 
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Mary Hesse follows a slightly different route" but in the end the central issues remain 
the same: How can we talk about the world? How can we use words to refer to 
something that is beyond all words? Then we can place information concepts in 
perspective (possibly in the centre!) as the way in which we describe order in the 
complexity of the world. McGrath (1998:35) asks: Why is the world intelligible? We 
can phrase this as: Why does order that can be interpreted into information exist in the 
world? 
Why would we specifically use the concept of information and not other scientific 
concepts? Information has been regarded as a 'hinge category' between science and 
theology since it plays a role in both science and theology (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 
1992:85). Our discussions of Gitt, Dembski and Davies' work has covered some of 
the ways in which information concepts are used. In a more cynical mode, we can say 
that the concept of information has many interpretations and uses and is therefore 
ideally suited to metaphysical and theological speculations! 
Myth, model and metaphor play a central role in developing and expressmg our 
understanding of the world and of religious matters. In the dialogue between science 
and religion, these issues have a long history and we will discuss them later". 
Before we address the interface between science and theology, we take a look at the 
use of information concepts at the interface between two scientific contexts. In this 
case the aim is to try to understand the nature of reality, specifically in our focus area 
of evolutionary biology. 
5.2.2 The biological use of information concepts from physics 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
John Ma)11ard Smith (2000a,b) has written what he calls a 'natural history of the 
concept of information in biology'. He has done this because information is a central 
15 See Subsection 5.2.3: Myths, Models and Metaphors. 
"'Subsection 5.2.3. 
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idea in contemporary biology, and indeed to such an extent that 'developmental 
biology can be seen as the study of how information in the genome is translated into 
adult structure, and evolutionary biology as how the information came to be there in 
the first place' (: 177). 
5.2.2.2 The analogical use of information concepts 
Smith (2000: 178-181) discusses the analogical use of information concepts. He 
makes the point that biologists use informational terms, such as transcription, 
translation, code, redundancy, editing, messenger and proofreading, as technical terms 
all the time. The similarities between the meanings as applied to human 
communication and genetic transcription are close, and that is why these terms are 
used by biologists. Smith (:178) distinguishes between two uses of analogies in 
science: 
• To describe a formal and exact isomorphism between two different physical 
systems 
o An example is the building of an electrical circuit that models exactly 
the behaviour of the modes of vibration ofa mechanical system. 
• To describe a qualitative similarity between two systems in order to provide 
insight into an unfamiliar system by comparison with a familiar system. 
o For example, Harvey's recognition that the heart can be viewed as a 
pump. 
Smith(: 179) does warn that a qualitative analogy can 'mislead as well as illuminate'. 
To Smith it is not surprising that analogies from information theory should have been 
used by biologists since scientists need to get their ideas from somewhere, and during 
the twentieth century the information sciences have been prevalent. 
With respect to criticism that the analogy does not hold in the case of genetic 
transcription (see below), Smith's position is that not only does the analogy with the 
transmission and encoding of information hold, but also a formal isomorphism holds 
(:181). 
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Words, encoder, message in Morse code, transmitter __.... Channel-+ Receiver, decoder, message in 
words 
Channel-+ Ribosome as decoder, protein as 
Words, DNA, message in messenger RNA 
--+ (chemical message 
process) 
The question, as he sees it, is: Where did the information in the DNA come from? 
The analogy that exists here is between the human who converts meaning into words 
that can be encoded further and natural selection which produced the sequence of 
bases in the DNA that specify a protein that carries 'meaning' for the organism in 
being functional. Smith (2000:181) says: 'Where an engineer sees design, a biologist 
sees natural selection'. The issue is therefore not the analogy with respect to the 
transmission of information, but the analogy with meaningful information. We have 
seen that this is a consistent criticism, since information theory (in Shannon's 
formulation) does not deal with meaning but with the quantity of information, or with 
'what you could say rather than what you do say' (to paraphrase Shannon as quoted by 
Smith 2000: 181 ). Hoffmeyer" (1997) says that biologists and physicists are talking 
about different things when they use the word information, since biological 
information always serves a purpose and is not the same as mathematical information. 
Furthermore, biological information is inseparable from context. For example, DNA 
has to be interpreted by a fertilised egg, it cannot interpret itself. In biological terms, 
Smith (2000: 181) formulates the 'What do you say?' question as: 'How does genetic 
information specify form and function?'. So there are questions regarding meaning at 
both ends of the communication process. 
5.2. 2. 3 Using information in a quantitative sense 
In terms of the quantification of information, Smith (2000:185-187) makes the 
interesting assertion that information theory can be used to quantify evolution at the 
genetic, selective and morphological levels. 
:1
7 This article was accessed via the Internet and a page reference is not available. 
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At the genetic level the capacity of the information carrier, DNA, is approximately 
two bits per base, but it is reduced somewhat by the presence of so-called 'redundant' 
or repetitive DNA38• 
At the selective level the question becomes: How much selection is needed if you start 
with a totally random sequence of bases? If selection is between the two halves of a 
population, which corresponds to there being two choices which is equivalent to one 
bit, then two bits of selection are needed to program each DNA base. Leaving aside 
questions of purpose and the fact that evolution does not normally start from a random 
sequence, a crude estimate of the amount of selection needed to program an existing 
genome can be developed. Smith estimates that the quantity of information in the 
human genome could easily have been programmed by selection ten times over in 5 
000 million years, due to the fact that we can allow for 20 generations per year since 
for most of that time our ancestors were quickly replicating microbes. This estimate 
would probably be affected by the newly discovered fact that the human genome 
contains only approximately 30 000 genes as opposed to the 100 000 plus genes as 
thought previously. There are, of course, people who would dispute this argument, 
especially Dembski with his cut-off for attributing to chance, or his 'universal 
probability bound'39 of10·150 which is equivalent to 500 bits of information or, in the 
case of the human genome, 1 000 bases. 
At the morphological level Smith's position is that the genome can contain enough 
information since it is a set of instructions, a recipe, on how to make the adult form 
and not a description, or blueprint, of the adult form (Smith 2000: 187). This leads to 
the issue of the use of information terms in developmental biology and specifically the 
question of whether the genome can be regarded as a developmental program. Here 
we move into the computer with its programs as the basic analogy, the genome being 
the program with its genetic code and the translating machinery of the cell being the 
computer. Smith (: 187-188) highlights the complexity of the developmental process 
with its complex hierarchy of genes regulating the activity of other genes, which is 
J~ Please refer to Section 4.2 on Gitt's \vork as well. Four different bases = four choices =two bits of 
information). 
39 See Subsections 4.4.5 and 4.4.8.2. 
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described as genes 'signalling' other genes. Signalling is the new central concept in 
developmental biology. 
5.2.2.4 Intentional causes and information as carrier of meaning 
Smith makes an important distinction between the types of information talked about in 
biology. This distinction originates with Dretsky's concept of information (Smith 
2000: 189). When two variables, say A and B, are correlated, then B is the carrier of 
information about A. For example, if rain occurs whenever black clouds appear, then 
the type of cloud indicates when it will rain. These correlations are dependent on the 
laws of physics and on the local environment (e.g. presence of mountains, etc. in this 
case). 
This ties in with the 'nature versus nurture' debate as well. Smith draws a distinction 
between two types of causal chain, namely genetic (nature) and environmental 
(nurture). Differences due to nature (genetic information) are likely to be inherited 
(transmitted), while those due to nurture will not be inherited. Informational language 
has been used to describe genetic causes and not environmental causes. Smith (: 189) 
argues that the reason behind this is that the concept of information is used in biology 
'only for causes that have the property of intentionality'. When a biologist says that B 
carries information about A, what is being implied is that B has a certain form 
because of the information it carries. The example that Smith uses is that a DNA 
molecule has a particular sequence of bases because it codes for a particular protein, 
whereas a cloud is not black because it predicts rain, but is intrinsically black due to 
the presence of a dense multitude of water drops. Note that here we again encounter 
the symbolic nature of the DNA code: the correspondence between a particular three-
base sequence and the amino acid it codes for is arbitrary. However, once the code 
has been established, the protein and the code are linked into a feedback loop. Smith 
(: 190) attributes this element of intentionality to natural selection. 
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In order to illustrate what is meant by intentionality in this context, Smith (2000: 190) 
uses the example of genetic algorithms'°. A software programmer, for instance, can 
take two approaches to write a program to play a game. Rules can be invented for the 
game and each rule can have one or more parameters that can be specified via a bit 
string. Weightings can be given to the different rules to allow the program to 
determine which rule determines the next move in the game. The programmer can 
now perform a genetic algorithm experiment in which the game is started off with a 
random selection of parameter strings, followed by play in which the most successful 
strings are retained and then randomly mutated before the next round of play. 
Ultimately, a successful program will evolve. Alternatively, the programmer could 
design successful strategies and rules and incorporate them into a program. With this 
type of program, we wonld have no problem in saying that it carries information in 
the form of its rules and expresses the intentions of the programmer. By analogy, the 
program created via genetic algorithms contains information in the bit strings 
representing the parameters that have been programmed by selection and not by the 
engineer. Smith (:190) states that the justification for this analogy is that 'presented 
with a bit string and the moves that it generated, it would be impossible to tell whether 
it had been designed by the engineer directly, or by selection between genetic 
algorithms'. 
Smith (2000:190) then draws the parallel with biological evolution in which the 
genome codes for proteins and results in a living organism which then is selected via 
survival and reproduction in a specific environment. To summarise, Smith (:190) 
says: 
this analogy justifies biologists in saying that DNA contains information that 
has been programmed by natural selection; that this information codes for the 
amino acid sequence of proteins; that, in a much less understood sense, the 
DNA and the proteins carry instructions, or a program, for the development of 
the organism; that natural selection of organisms alters the information in the 
genome; and finally, that genomic information is 'meaningful' in that it 
40 Please refer to Gitt's arguments in Subsection 4.2.6.2: Genetic algoritluns. See also Subsection 
5.6.7 .8: Con1putational neuroscience. 
114 
generates an organism able to survive in the environment in which selection 
has acted. 
Smith (2000: 190-192) admits that a weakness of the programming and biological 
models is that they do not indicate the origin of the rules. The programmer chooses 
the rules of the game and the laws of physics and chemistry determine what happens 
in nature. Higher-level rules exist as well, particularly in developmental biology, with 
regulatory genes controlling the parameters of these rules. 
We now redirect our attention to the problem of distinguishing between genetic and 
environmental causes; why informational language is used to describe genetic causes 
and not environmental causes. This is due to the fact that biologists see fluctuations in 
the environment as a source of noise41 in the system and not as information. The laws 
of physics and chemistry do not change but the environment can. An example of 
adaptation to environmental changes is. developing a suntan after exposure to the sun. 
One does not inherit the suntan itself, but the genetic mechanism that causes it to 
appear in response to sunlight. 
5.2.2.5 A summary of Smith's natural history of the use of information concepts 
Finally, Smith's position can be summed up as follows: 
• The word 'information' can be used with or without semantic or meanmg 
implications. 
• If used without semantic implications, information means simply covariance 
between two systems, between a signal and its source. 
• We can use the concept of intentionality to expand on what we mean by 
semantic implications. 
• The notion of information as used in biology is that of intentional information. 
~ 1 In Shannon's model a noise source refers to signal noise that can occur in the channel between sender 
and receiver, \.Vhich results in distortion of the message (see Subsection 2.2.3:Models o.f'co1n1nunication 
processes). 
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• Natural selection produces the intentional information that is captured in the 
genome. 
• The information in the genome has meaning, is intentional, since it generates 
an organism able to survive. 
• The genetic code is arbitrary or symbolic (according to semiology, signs are 
arbitrary!). 
• Genes and regulatory proteins can be said to carry information since there is 
an evolved receiver (the cell's translation machinery) of the message they 
carry. 
• A test for intentional or meaningful information is whether the concepts of 
communication error and of misrepresentation make sense. And, yes, this 
does make sense in biology since there is a sender and a receiver, as well as a 
message that can be misunderstood. 
The analogy between the use of information in evolutionary biology and in human 
communication is based on the fact that in human communication there are intelligent 
and intentional senders and receivers. Smith views the genome as having 
intentionality since millions of years of selection have produced a genome that causes 
the development of organisms able to survive in a certain environment. The 
intelligent sender can thus he viewed as the combination of the genome and the 
selection pressures forming a system that communicates to future generations. The 
message is: 'These qualities have worked in the past'. If you look at the infomrntion 
itself, Smith's position is that intelligent design and natural selection produce similar 
results (2000: 193-194). 
5.2.2.6 Responses to Smith's study of the use of information concepts in biology 
Several important issues come to light in the responses by biologists to Smith's so-
called natural history of the use of the concept of information in biology: 
1. Does the model of the communication of information that Smith uses hold for 
complex biological systems? 
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Smith assumes a sender (DNA) and a separate receiver (the cell's translation 
machinery). He also uses a program analogy but admits that it is not particularly 
helpful since the way in which genetic information 'is responsible for biological form 
is so different from the way in which a computer program works', although 'it is a lot 
nearer the truth than the idea that complex dynamic systems will generate biological 
forms "for free" ' (Smith 2000: 192). 
Connectionist models in cognitive science show that a system capable of generating 
complex outcomes need not necessarily divide into elements that carry information 
and elements that recognise and use that information. The brain is a good example". 
Connectionist architectures blur the distinction between data structures and programs 
that use the data" (Sterelny 2000:200). Smith's use of the programming analogy 
seems to endorse the split between data and programs since that is how normal 
programs work. However, genetic algorithms may blur the distinction as well since 
the program, or at least parts of the program, becomes data that is altered. 
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2000:203) responds to Smith's view that there are special 
processes in biology (in which genes participate) that have an arbitrary or symbolic 
nature, in which there is no necessary connection between the form of a causal factor 
and its effect. He makes the observation that it is difficult to distinguish between 
processes 'that involve an elaborate "interpretation" of a causal factor and those that 
do not', since 'all the causal factors within cells tend to connect to complex networks 
of processes, so when do these networks count as 'interpreters' and when do they not?' 
(:203). 
2. A more general question is whether information concepts and their framework 
continue to be of explanatory relevance in contemporary biology (Sarkar 2000:208). 
~2 The fact that there is no distinction between hardware and software in the brain is discussed in 
Subsection 5.6.7.7: The brain. 
" Cellular automata have a connectionist architecrure (see Subsection 5.6.7.5). The ability of cellular 
automata to produce programs, is discussed in Subsection 5.6.7.8: Computational neuroscience. A 
general introduction to connectionist models or neural net\vorks is given by Paul Cilliers in Chapter 2 
of his book Complexity and postrnodernism (Cilliers 1998:25-36). 
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Sarkar (2000:209) distinguishes between the heuristic and substantive uses of a 
concept or framework. His definition is that 'if something plays a role in the 
construction of some scientific entity, that role is heuristic, if it explicitly occurs in 
that entity, that role is substantive' (:209). Sarkar agrees that information concepts 
played a heuristic role in genetics in the past, but denies that they play a substantive 
role. In addition, three different concepts of information have been used in genetics, 
namely cybernetic, communication-theoretical, and semantic" (:209). Cybernetic 
information is what we would call feedback in self-regulating systems and is a 
functional definition of information - information is defined by what it does and there 
are no structural restrictions placed on the information carrier. Semantic information 
is presented by Sarkar as having to do with specificity and semioticity (how x can 
contain information about y). Communication-theoretical (Shannon) information and 
semantic information concepts both impose some structural constraints. Sarkar's view 
is that cybernetic information is of little relevance to developmental biology (:209). 
While the communication-theoretical or information theory concept of information 
has some relevance in the context of the sequencing of the genome, Sarkar's claim is 
that the important concept in biology is semantic information as used in this context, 
i.e. when we say that DNA contains 'information' for producing proteins and 
organ1s1ns. 
In order to get to the issue of how information concepts can be used to explain, we 
have to follow Sarkar through his breakdown of what semantic information is. He 
(:210-211) presents what he calls two locutions: 
• 's contains information for a' (A DNA sequence contains information for a 
protein.) 
·H These information concepts map onto the five main points of view of the communication process 
(Fauconnier 1987:89): 
• a psycho-philosophical view of the relation symbol-meaning-communication 
• a cybernetic systems-theoretical view 
• a socio-psychological view 
• a pragmatic vie\v 
• a symbolic-interactionist view. 
(Refer to Subsection 2.2.3: Models of Communication Processes for more inforniation.) 
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• 'only s contains information for a' (Only DNA contains biological information 
- DNA is a program for creating organisms.) 
In order for 's contains information for er' to hold, Sarkar contends that two criteria 
must be satisfied, namely differential specificity and semioticity: 
• The differential specificity criterion is: ifs is different from s', then cr must be 
different from cr'. Although this criterion does not quite hold due to the 
redundancy of DNA and our ignorance of the role played by the 'non-coding' 
regions of DNA, we can say that parts of the genome carry information in this 
sense. 
• In terms of semioticity, s can be interpreted as a sign for cr' in the sense that the 
theory that provides the mechanisms by which s produces cr allows that an s' 
different from s could have been the sign for cr' (Sarkar 2000:210). Smith 
referred to the 'arbitrary or symbolic nature' of the genetic code for proteins. 
This criterion 'seems to deny even the mild determinism' invoked by the 
differential specificity criterion (:210). The issue here is that we need to 
understand how s is a sign for cr, how it can be possible that mistakes can 
occur. Sarkar feels that it is unnecessary for Smith to adopt the additional 
criterion of intentionality, since semioticity captures the sense in which s is 
about o. Smith's response is that 'if signals are to be adaptive for the 
organism, than [sic) there must be an evolved receptor of the signal as well as 
an evolved sender' and 'symbolic signals' . . . 'acquire their meanings from 
natural selection' (Smith 2000:215). Remember that Smith views the genome 
as having intentionality since selection has produced a genome that causes the 
development of organisms able to survive in a certain environment. The signs 
are apt for a certain environment. The question that needs to asked is: Which 
concept of semiotics are you working with here - De Saussure's structural 
linguistics or Peirce's theory of signs"? 
"See Section 2.3: The biological roots of information - from biosphere to semiosphere. 
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In order for the second locution, 'only s contains information for a', to hold, Sarkar 
( :211) requires an additional criterion to be satisfied, namely reverse differential 
specificity. 
The reverse differential specificity criterion is 'if a is different from a, then s must be 
different from s'. If the DNA is different, the protein must be different. According to 
Sarkar, this criterion is routinely violated in eukaryotic genetics, for instance when 
'alternate splicing allows the generation of two different proteins from a single DNA 
sequence' (:211). 
Sarkar's conclusion is that 'we cannot maintain both that there is a conceptually 
respectable concept of information in genetics and that the genomic DNA is the sole 
purveyor of information' (:211). Sarkar (and Godfrey-Smith - see below) is inclined 
to abandon the latter option. Sarkar (:211) would support the weaker claim 'that DNA 
sequences specify protein sequences in a way that the latter do not specify the former.' 
Godfrey-Smith (2000:206) suggests that the difficulties associated with using the 
concept of information can be addressed in two ways: use a single, specially devised 
concept of biological information by combining a number of distinctions about types 
and uses of information (Smith's choice), or take the approach that 'semantic and 
informational concepts have come to serve a number of distinct theoretical roles in 
biology'. Each role can then be assessed and the limits of its application defined. For 
example, Godfrey-Smith ( :206) would limit the concept of coding to the explanation 
of protein synthesis alone and not expand it to genes encoding the structure of whole 
orgamsms. 
Where does this discussion leave us? It indicates the complexity of the issues 
involved in applying information concepts to biology. There are differences of 
opinion as to the implications of the scientific results, as well as disputes about the 
applicability and reach of the information concepts. Clarification of the informational 
concepts is also required: What type of information are you talking about? 
Tnfonnation as a quantity or as a carrier of meaning? What is the communication 
model that is being used? What do you understand by the concept of signification? 
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The development of a common language when talking abo,ut information concepts 
used in biology such as, meaning, intention and communication, is not trivial at all. 
Yes, we have seen that a case can be made for semantic information having 
explanatory relevance in biology, but just what that relevance is, is open to many 
different interpretations. 
We have examined some of the complexities of using the concept of information in 
two scientific contexts (physics and evolutionary biology). The complexity increases 
immeasureably when we move on to the interface between science and theology. We 
now spell out some of the underlying issues within the framework of myths, models 
and metaphors. 
5.2.3 Myths, models and metaphors 
5.2.3.1 The roles of myths, models and metaphors in religion and science 
The representation and conceptualisation issues mentioned in the introductory section, 
5.2.1, are addressed by Mary Hesse (1998:120-135) in terms of a discussion of the 
roles of myths, models and metaphors in religion and science"'. 
The question of what is religion is a very complex one. Hesse (1998: 128) says that 
'almost every recorded society has had a socially established system of myths, beliefs, 
values, social rituals and practices, usually symbolic, using heightened "poetic" forms 
of language, often calling on some extra-natural reality, God or gods'. Hesse (:128) 
stresses that these systems have important social functions such as 'creating coherence 
within groups', and serving as 'interpretations for every individual of their place in the 
world, both natural and supernatural.' At first glance, religion thus has characteristics 
that seem to be the antithesis of those of science, particularly the assumption of an 
extra-natural reality and the language of myth and symbolism that has to be used to 
talk about it. Hesse (:128) contends that as soon as religion tries to speak in the same 
terms as science, it loses its character and function as religion. The accusation against 
..ii, Ian Barbour has also addressed these issues in his book: Myths, Models, and Paradig1ns, published in 
1974. 
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religious assertions has been that they are merely 'mythical', where myth is 
misunderstood as being just a false story. To Hesse (: 129), the 'metaphorical and 
mythical language of religion is perhaps nowadays the most intractable stumbling 
block in the confrontation between science and religion'. 
Paradoxically, this very stumbling block can serve to bridge the gap between science 
and religion because, as Hesse says, 'science also has its myths and is pervaded by 
metaphorical language' [Hesse's italics J (: 129). According to McGrath ( 1998: 179), 
the language of modem science is permeated with metaphors. In fact, in recent 
writings on cosmology, a new God has been suggested, who is 'essentially the 
structure of the laws of nature itself, conceived as universal and eternal, independent 
of human knowledge, and encompassing all possible knowledge' (Hesse 1998:123). 
Paul Davies talks of the 'Mind of God' in his book with the same title. This structure 
of the laws is the new God created by science that allows discussion of the problems 
of the universe that have always been religion's domain, such as what is the 
significance of its orderliness and whether it was designed or not (:123). Hesse (:124) 
makes the point that certain scientists are more hesitant about the claims they make 
since some of these claims are based on extrapolation of physics beyond what we can 
test, as for example, what happened in the first few micro-seconds of time. In 
addition, Hesse (: 125) asks why science should be seen as the basis for ultimate 
understanding when: 
our most fundamental theories are never totally reliable and always subject to 
evolutionary change? Why are such temporary imaginative models of the 
world important for anything else than their function in natural science itself, 
which is to help us organise and make use of the low-level laws that we find 
solidly based in experiment? That function of science does not in any sense 
justify grand metaphysical claims for theories. 
Although this is an instrumentalist view of science, it rings true! Hesse (1998:125) 
also examines 'quasi-metaphysical' claims made about evolutionary biology. The 
theory of evolution has been used to support both the existence and non-existence of 
purpose in nature. Evolution has been seen as revealing an underlying purposive 
principle. 
122 
Hesse's point is that: 
theories taken beyond what is warranted by the experimental basis themselves 
take on the social functions of myth, and can be used to wield power. Like 
religions, these theories require metaphorical rather than literal language in 
order to express the unobservable. They are always interpretations of the 
observable in terms of some model of nature carrying its own metaphysical 
overtones. Think of Aristotle's closed world of turning spheres, with the Earth 
at the privileged centre, which had such influential intellectual and political 
effects in the geocentric disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
World models at the current frontiers of physics and cosmology are not 
different in principle: they fit the data into a simplified narrative, stretching the 
ordinary use oflanguage to suggest possible further developments ... 
(Hesse, 1998: 129) 
We can start building a diagram to assist in understanding all these concepts. 
WHY? 
HOW? Model ~ s s
Models are analogies for the world 
Theory determines what is observed 
~-~-~ 
Observables 
Abstracting: asnects of nature 
Nature 
As indicated in the diagram, models and theories can take on metaphysical overtones. 
Hesse (: 133) states that 'scientific models are analogous, not identical, with the 
observable world, but they cannot claim to capture the "essence" of reality'. This is 
indicated in the diagram by the fact that what is observed is just a fraction of reality. 
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In our day, the new metaphors of science, such as physical fields and information 
processing rather than a Newtonian mechanical view, can become myths if, as Hesse 
(1998:130) says, they are 'presented publicly as definitive answers to metaphysical 
and moral questions'. Hesse (:130) believes that: 
the correct religious response to these new myths is not ... to treat them as 
potential opponents of religion in their own terms, for example to announce 
that the mind and/or soul are nothing but organic information systems ... 
rather recognise that such metaphysical interpretations share some of the 
mythical functions of religion, and have to be judged accordingly. There are 
good and bad myths, and the decisions between them must depend on grounds 
of value and meaning which are out of reach of science itself. 
The grounds of value and meamng cannot be detached from 'some kind of 
metaphysical belief about human nature and the world, which religions and ideologies 
in general have always provided' (:131). Science can also be used to build 
metaphysical belief systems about the world, hence becoming an ideology. We can 
now add these entities to our diagram on the next page. 
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WHY? 
HOW? 
etaphysical beliefs 
~ Ideologies 
Value judgments 
Myth 
Model 
~ s s
Models are analogies for the world 
Theory determines what is observed 
--~--Observables 
Abstractin!l asoects of nature 
Nature 
We will now focus on the central role that metaphors play m our attempts to 
understand the world. 
5.2.3.2 Metaphors 
5.2.3.2.a What is a metaphor? 
The simple answer is that a metaphor is a figure of speech. The example that has 
been most frequently used is: 'man is a wolf. There are many definitions of 
metaphors. Harriet Crabtree (1991: 12) ascribes this to the impression she has that 
'metaphor currently seems to be the leading candidate for the naming of almost every 
symbolic structure in theology'. The definitions range from the extremes of 'metaphor 
as a sort of elliptical simile ("this is like that" with the "like" knocked out) to 
metaphor as a tensive conflation or juxtaposition of two words or sets of terminology 
in such a way that an entirely new piece of knowledge is produced in the mind that is 
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obliged to hold together the improbable partners'. Crabtree (:11) follows Soskice in 
stressing the verbal or written aspect of a metaphor since a metaphor is a figure of 
speech, hence her definition: 'I use the term "metaphor" to refer to instances of writing 
or speaking about one area in terms commonly described to another.' Soskice's 
formulation is: 'metaphor is that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in 
terms which are seen to be suggestive of another' (Soskice 1985:15). 
5.2.3.2.b Theories of metaphor 
Soskice (1985:24-53) grouped theories of metaphor according to their visions of what 
metaphors achieve. She created three groups, namely (:24): 
• substitution theories - 'those that see metaphor as a decorative way of saying 
what could be said literally' 
• emotive theories - 'those that see metaphor as original not in what it says but in 
the affective impact it has' 
• incremental theories - 'those that see metaphor as a unique cognitive vehicle 
enabling one to say things that can be said in no other way'. 
Max Black talks of a 'comparison theory' as a special case of the substitution theory, 
in which the view is that 'the metaphorical statement might be replaced by an 
equivalent literal comparison' (Soskice 1985:26). There is common agreement today 
that this view of metaphor fails to do justice to the impact of metaphors. Metaphors do 
more than just compare 'two antecendently similar entities, but enables one to see 
similarities in what previously had been regarded as dissimilars' ( :26). 
The emotive theory of metaphor denies that metaphor has any cognitive content and 
assigns an affective impact to it, an extra emotive content (:26-27). Thus the metaphor 
'a sharp wind' has no meaningful content, since a wind cannot be sharp, but the 
emotive import (e.g. fear of sharp objects) of the adjective 'sharp' is enhanced (:26). 
The denial of cognitive content is problematic since there must be some cognitive 
features to cause the emotive response. 
126 
Finally, we get to incremental theories that hold the view that 'what is said by the 
metaphor can be expressed adequately in no other way, that the combination of parts 
in a metaphor can produce new and unique agents of meaning' (Soskice 1985 :31 ). 
There are many theories of metaphor that try to explain just how this new meaning is 
produced. A view that underlies many other theories is the 'intuitionist' theory' of 
metaphor that the metaphor 'involves a complete transformation, a destruction of the 
standard senses of the terms', and the 'unique significance of metaphor is the product 
of an intuitive act which follows on this destruction of literal meanings' ( :31 ). Soskice 
(:31) points out that calling something 'an act of intuition' does not explain anything 
and that a complete destruction of the literal meanings would lead to the possibility of 
any reading of a metaphor being acceptable, thus rendering it meaningless. There 
must be some constraints or guidance being placed on the interpretation of the 
metaphor by the literal meanings of the terms used. 
Formalist theories that discount the non-linguistic setting, such as the context and the 
speaker's intention, are fundamentally limited (Soskice 1985:35,36). Soskice's 
position is that 'A metaphor is only a metaphor because someone, speaker or hearer 
and ideally both, regards it as such' (:36). Her objections are against the thesis that 
metaphor is a matter of conflict of word meaning arising within the 'meaning-
structure' of language itself, thereby excluding the pragmatic factors of context and 
speaker's intention (:38). 
Max Black's interaction theory of metaphor addresses some of these concerns. 
Black's work builds on the work of I A Richards who highlighted the principle of 
metaphor as being the use of 'two thoughts of different things active together and 
supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their 
interaction' (as quoted in Soskice 1985:39). The two thoughts are called the 'tenor' of 
the metaphor, or the underlying subject, and the 'vehicle', which is the mode in which 
it is expressed. Black's interpretation of this thinking was that the new context, the 
. whole sentence, which he called a frame, imposes 'extension of meaning' on the words 
used metaphorically, the 'focus' (:39). In order to explain how this extension or 
change of meaning is brought about, Black developed his interaction theory ( :40). 
The meaning that is being referred to here is not just word meaning, but meaning for 
the speaker and the hearer ( :40). 
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In Black's earlier view of interaction, the basic idea is that 'a metaphor has two distinct 
subjects, a principal and a subsidiary one, and that the distinctive cognitive content of 
the metaphor is the consequence of an interaction between these two subjects, or, 
more properly, between the two systems of implication to which these subjects give 
rise' (Soskice 1985:40). Thus in the example of 'man is a wolf, the principal subject, 
man, is seen in a new light, due to the fact that it is being seen in terms of the 
subsidiary subject, the wolf. Black suggests that a kind of 'filtering' or 'screening' is 
happening, where we see some features and obscure others as when we look through a 
glass filter with certain areas blacked-out (:40). The metaphor thus creates the 
similarity by obscuring the dissimilarities, and hence is more that just a one-to-one 
comparison of antecendently existing similarities (as in a simile). 
The principal and the subsidiary subjects each have their own 'systems' of 'associated 
commonplaces'; the metaphor relies on both the speaker and the hearer sharing some 
assumptions about the nature of wolves and men. Black makes it clear that the 
effectiveness of the metaphor does not depend on how accurate these assumptions are, 
but relies only on the shared nature of these assumptions. The interaction between the 
two subjects of the metaphor is therefore actually an interaction between the two 
systems of associated commonplaces in such a way as to produce a 'new, informative 
and irreplaceable unit of meaning' (Soskice 1985 :41 ). Black points out that in this 
interaction both subjects of the metaphor are altered; the wolf seems more human 
after having been used in the metaphor. 
Soskice (1985:41-43) discusses some criticisms of Black's theory, in particular the 
critique against the notion of 'filtering'. One filters out what was there in the first 
place, which conflicts with the idea of actually creating similarities. According to 
Soskice ( :43 ), the root cause of the failure of Black's theory is his insistence that each 
metaphor has two distinct subjects. The issue is that a "'two subjects" position 
invariably lapses into a comparison theory and ceases to merit the title "interactive'" 
(:43). 
Soskice (1985:44) develops an 'interanimation' theory of metaphor, based on 
Richards' work, with the objective of showing how 'metaphors can be cognitively 
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unique, that is, how without being mere comparison they can give us "two ideas for 
one"' - Richards's view is that the senses of an author's words are 'resultants which we 
arnve at only through the inte!Jllay of the inte!Jlretive possibilities of the whole 
utterance', what he called the complete 'interanimation of words' (as quoted in Soskice 
1985 :44-45). Meanings are therefore things determined by 'complete utterances and 
surrounding contexts, and not by the individual words in isolation'. Therefore it is not 
the case that some of the words in a sentence are used metaphorically, but that 
'metaphor is the consequence of the interanimation of words in the complete utterance' 
( :45). Richards contends that: 
when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active 
together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a 
resultant of their interaction. 
(as quoted by Soskice 1985:45) 
So, instead of two subjects being present as in Black's theory, we have two thoughts, 
and metaphor as an intercourse of thoughts. The interanimation of words is explained 
via the distinction between the tenor, or underlying subject, of the metaphor and the 
vehicle that presents it. Richards gives the following quotation: 
A stubborn and unconquerable flame 
Creeps in his veins and drinks the streams of life 
(as quoted by Soskice 1985:45) 
Here the 'tenor' is the idea of the fever that the man has and the 'vehicle' that presents 
it is the description of the flame. The fever is never explicitly mentioned and 
therefore the A is B formulation, where the focus is on words not followed; here we 
have thoughts that are active together. Soskice (1985:46) sees the advantage of 
Richards's formulation as allowing 'us to distinguish between the tenor and the vehicle 
of the metaphor without suggesting that the metaphor has two subjects'. In the 
metaphor above, the only subject is the fever. In addition, Richards's tenor/vehicle 
distinction leaves room for 'subsidiary vehicles' as in the quotation above, where the 
description of the flame is modified by language normally used of a beast of prey. 
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To Soskice (1985:47), the advantage of Richards's account is that the focus is on 
words and the interanimation of words, whereas Black moves away from words to 
things, to subjects interacting. Soskice (:47) says that 'it is only by seeing that a 
metaphor has one true subject which tenor and vehicle conjointly predict and illumine 
that a full, interactive, or interanimative, theory is possible'. The full meaning of the 
metaphor results from the 'complete unit of tenor and vehicle' and 'the metaphor and 
its meaning (it is artificial to separate them) are the unique product of the whole' (:48). 
To ask: 'What is X the metaphor for?' is to try to separate what cannot be separated, 
tenor and vehicle co-operate. The excellence of a metaphor is that the subject is 
accessible only through the metaphor and a metaphor is genuinely creative when it 
embodies new insight (:48). 
Soskice's definition of metaphor, namely, 'speaking about one thing in terms which 
are seen to be suggestive of another', can now be fleshed out (1985:15, 49). It 
contains elements of metaphor as a linguistic phenomenon, and the fact that two 
intertwined elements, namely the tenor and the vehicle, are present. The view of 
metaphor that Soskice (:49) wants to develop is that 'metaphor is a form of language 
use with a unity of subject-matter and which draws on two (or more) sets of 
associations, and does so, characteristically, by involving the consideration of a model 
or models'. Each metaphor involves 'at least two networks of associations', but these 
networks are 'not necessarily generated by two distinct subjects of a metaphor ... but 
can also be networks surrounding particular terms of a metaphor' [author's italics]( :49-
50). This allows the theory to be used with metaphors such as 'he examined his 
tattered scruples', where two subjects are not present, but there are interanimations 
between the associations of'tattered' and those of'scruples' (:50). 
In order to distinguish between just any combinations of tem1S and metaphorical 
combinations, Soskice (1985 :50), suggests that 'at a secondary level metaphorical 
construal is characterised by its reliance on an underlying model, or even on a number 
of models, and that metaphor and model are indeed, as Black has suggested, closely 
linked'. The models will not always be explicit, resulting in a freedom of 
interpretation, and therefore more than one model may form part of the associative 
network of a term. Soskice ( :50) considers the 'associative network of a term as its 
placement in a semantic field where the "value" of the term is fixed not simply by the 
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terms for which it might be exchanged, ... but also by the entities of which the term 
would customarily be predicated'. Even in the case of adjectival metaphors such as 
'tattered scruples', a latent model arises, for 'tattered' suggests a thing that could 
normally be called tattered, such as clothing. 
The linkage between model and metaphor is then: 'when we use a model we regard 
one thing or state of affairs in terms of another, and when we use a metaphor we 
speak of one thing or state of affairs in language suggestive of another'" ( :50-51 ). 
The construal of an odd conjunction of terms as a metaphor depends on the ability of 
the reader to 'see it as suggesting a model or models which enable him to go on 
extending the significance of what he has read or heard' (:51 ). 
We will now end off or discussion of the theory of metaphor by looking at it from 
more 'embodied' points of view, such as neuropsychology and cognitive linguistics. 
5.2.3.2.c 'Embodied' models of metaphor 
Danesi (1989:79), writing about neuropsychological research into the neurological 
programming of figurative language, puts forward a neurological model of metaphor. 
The model allows the location of the neurological co-ordinates of those features that 
distingnish between a metaphor and propositional speech acts. The features that 
distinguish between them are ( :79): 
• 'Metaphors make possible the interpretation and formulation of non-physical 
reality (concepts, beliefs, opinions, etc.) in terms of sensorial analogues. 
• Metaphors form a lexical bridge, so to speak, between iconic (imagistic) and 
symbolic (propositional) thought'. 
Danesi (:80) refers to the first feature as the 'sense-implication mechanism' and to the 
second as the 'iconicity mechanism'. Danesi (:80) explains: 
47 We discuss the link between model and metaphor more fully in the next section ~ Subsection 
5.2.3.2.4: Links between metaphors and models. 
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The sense-implication mechanism refers to the fact that the vehicle of a 
metaphor (=the part that makes a comment on the subject, or topic of the 
metaphor) implicates a sense modality in its content stmcture (=the so-called 
ground of a metaphor). The iconicity mechanism refers to the fact that novel 
metaphors normally elicit an image, or iconic Gestalt, of the content-stmcture. 
Danesi (:80) uses the example 'John is a gorilla' to explain these concepts. The 
vehicle gorilla 'implicates an iconic transformation of the topic John, whereby John 
actually appears to metamorphise into the implicated animal'. The sense-related 
modalities associated with the vehicle ('fierceness', etc) are transferred to the topic 
through 'some form of Gestalt mechanism'". The activation of such cognitive 
mechanisms is a right hemisphere (RH) function and only when the meaning of a 
metaphor is assimilated and stored by the verbal left hemisphere (LH) does the 
cognitive role of these RH functions decrease. Danesi (:80) sees the RH as 'the 
primary locus for the vehicle of the metaphor, while the ground, or content-stmcture, 
involves both the RH and the LH'. Metaphors are dependent on context and, in terms 
of this model, the LH processes the text of a metaphor, while the RH processes its 
appropriate context ( :81 ). The model 'posits a RH locus for the more "imaginative" 
and "creative" components of a metaphor - based on sensorial or bodily experiences -
and a LH locus for the transformation of such components into abstract principles of 
semantic organisation' (:81). Danesi (:81) points out that this links to the thinking of 
Lakoff and Johnson that 'metaphors are verbal tokens of the way in which the 
imagination links cognitive and bodily stmctures'. 
Liebenberg (2000:276), in the context of the science and religion dialogue, discusses 
the work of Lakoff and Johnson, amongst others, and stresses the importance of 'what 
cognitive linguistics has to say about the way in which we as embodied beings 
instantiate meaning - from the time that we simply "equate" affection with warmth as 
infants, to the time when we end up using primary, conventional and novel metaphors 
to structure our abstract thinking about the world'. Cognitive linguistics is a 
.Jx \Ve can ask the question: When we use information concepts in metaphors, just \vhat are the 
associated sense-related modalities? 
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fundamental rethinking of language that takes into account the details of just how the 
embodied mind stmctures experience via neural cognition, which forms the basis for 
what Lakoff and Johnson call 'an embodied physical realism' (:279). As humans we 
cannot but instantiate meaning as embodied creatures, i.e. we cannot go directly from 
linguistic symbols to an objective reality without passing through a physical entity 
called a human brain where meaning is attributed. 
In this framework metaphor plays a central role. Metaphor is not just deviant language 
use that obscures. This attitude is based on the assumption that metaphor is primarily 
a matter of linguistic expression and on the assumption that all meaning is literal, 
words are only trne if they correspond to the way things 'really' are (Liebenberg 
2000:283-284). Cognitive linguists have shown that 'metaphor is a matter of concepts 
- not words - and that metaphorical instantiation is a matter of thought much more 
than of linguistic expression' (:284). It is indeed almost impossible to talk about 
abstract concepts, whether in science or theology, without conceptual metaphor. The 
reasons that Lakoff and Johnson give are that '( a)bstract concepts have two parts: (1) 
an inherent, literal, non-metaphorical skeleton, which is simply not rich enough to 
serve as a full-fledged concept; and (2) a collection of stable, conventional 
metaphorical extensions that flesh out the conceptual skeleton in a variety of ways 
(often inconsistently with each other)' (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:128, as quoted by 
Liebenberg 2000:284). This collection of metaphorical extensions seems to be what 
Soskice calls 'networks of associations' (see earlier in this section). An example given 
is that of the metaphorical understanding of time as a spatial dimension, which allows 
the conceptualisation of what is normally called gravitational force metaphorically as 
curvature in space-time (:284). 
We now tum to a more detailed analysis of metaphor as seen by cognitive linguistics. 
Metaphor, as a matter of thought, not of language, is seen 'as a conceptual (not a 
linguistic) mapping between a source and a target domain' (Liebenberg 2000:291). In 
temlS of the example used earlier, 'man is a wolf, the source domain of the mapping is 
wolves and the target domain is man or, more precisely, the behaviour of certain men. 
Liebenberg (:291) mentions the example of a computer virus. Through continual 
usage, metaphors can structure our thoughts as well so that our thinking about these 
computer programs is affected by the fact that we refer to them as viruses and 
133 
therefore start talking about immunisation of computers, infections spreading, etc. It 
then happens that virus, when used in the computer domain, gets additional and 'more 
specific attributes not in the source or in the induction schema' and an evolution of 
meaning occurs (:292). Fauconnier mentions blending, motivated polysemy and 
divergence (Liebenberg 2000:292). The concept of blending is especially pertinent in 
the science and theology dialogue, where attempts are made to have the two domains 
blend into an integrated whole (:292). Liebenberg (:292) refers to the work of 
Fauconnier and Turner who see blending as the process in which 'strncture from two 
or more input mental spaces is projected to a separate "blended" space, which inherits 
partial strncture from the inputs, and has emergent structure of its own'. In most 
cases, as in science and theology, it is not just two concepts, but two complex 
theoretical systems, each in itself a system of metaphors and blends, that are being 
blended or related. In Fauconnier's model, the 'initial blend is enabled by a generic 
space or generic strncture that the two concepts are perceived to share' (:293). This is 
what allows one to link the two concepts. Once the blend has been created, it can 
actually take on a life of its own, 'enabling meaning instantiation which was not 
possible with reference to either of the two initial concepts in isolation' (:293). 
This agrees with Soskice's formulation, as we have discussed earlier, that the full 
meaning of a metaphor is the unique product of the complete unit of tenor and 
vehicle. Soskice stresses that this aspect of 'taking on a life of its own' depends on the 
reader's or hearer's ability to catch the suggestion of an underlying model or models, 
which is actually what enables one to extend the significance of the metaphor. 
As Liebenberg (2000:293-294) indicates, the blending process is what lies at the heart 
of attempts to relate science and theology. However, this is not unusual, it happens in 
our daily ordinary language use as well. 
Another aspect of metaphor that is very important when trying to relate science and 
theology is the links between metaphors and models. We are, after all, dealing with 
the use of information-based metaphors, which link scientific models of information 
to metaphor. 
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5.2.3.2.d Links between metaphors and models 
In the previous section we discussed Soskice's view of the linkage between metaphor 
and underlying model. She (1985 :49-50) talks of the metaphor drawing on sets of 
associations by involving the consideration of a model or models that will not always 
be explicit. The metaphor could develop or suggest a latent model that will enable the 
hearer of the metaphor to extend the significance of what was said. We will now 
investigate how models can enable this extension of significance. 
Broadly speaking, models are used to regard one thing in terms of terms of another, or 
to view one thing in terms of its resemblance to another object (Soskice 1985:101). 
The nature of this 'resemblance' can take on different forms. We will briefly discuss 
the different categories of models that Black, Barbour, McFague, Soskice and Yob 
developed. 
Black distinguished between scale, analogue and theoretical models (Van Besien 
1989:9). A scale model is a scaled-down or scaled-up model of something that is 
intended to be a representation with similarity of proportions. Analogue models can 
be used to understand how something works and often the medium of reproduction is 
changed. Examples are the use of hydraulic models for economic systems and the 
billiard ball model to explain the behaviour of gases. Theoretical models describe one 
thing in terms from another field of science, as for example the use of computer 
models for the brain. New terms (including their theory) are transferred to a new field 
of study. 
Barbour (1974:29-30) divides scientific models into four different kinds, namely 
experimental models (which include scale models and analogue models), 
mathematical models, logical models and theoretical models. We have two groupings 
here: physical replicas and mental models. Experimental models are physical 
replicas. A physical system is built to serve as a model of another physical system. 
The mental models of systems are the mathematical models, logical models and 
theoretical models. Barbour focuses mainly on theoretical models which he describes 
as 'imaginative mental constructs invented to account for observed phenomena' ( :30). 
These models are 'a symbolic representation of a physical system' intended 'to 
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represent the underlying structure of the world', and used 'to develop a theory which 
in some sense explains the phenomenon'. Theoretical models are what is involved 
when we talk of the linkage between metaphor and model. When Barbour (:30) 
compares scientific and religious models, he uses theoretical models in the 
companson. 
McFague (Yob 1992:481) also prefers theoretical models instead of what she calls 
structural and computer models, since 'they are, in essence, metaphors, but their 
distinguishing feature is the stress on similarity of structure between model and 
modelled'. This similarity of structure cannot lie simply in the physical similarity, 
since in that case scale models would actually have been the best choice. 
Soskice (1985:101) warns of the 'conflation of the categories of "model" and 
"metaphor" ', and accuses Black and Barbour of doing just that. Black's definition of 
a model is that it is 'a systematic analogy' (Yob 1992:481) and Barbour 'discusses 
models as "systematically developed metaphors", and treats the difference between 
the two as largely a matter of degree' (Soskice 1985: 101 ). Soskice warns that seeing 
models and metaphors as both proposing analogies leads to a comparison theory of 
metaphor. 
Soskice (:102-103) distinguishes between two mam types of model, namely 
homeomorphic and paramorphic models. In homeomorphic models, the subject 
(whatever the model represents) is also its source (whatever the model is based on). 
In paramorphic models, the source and the subject differ (as in the billiard ball model 
for gases). Homeomorphic models are 'models "of' a state of affairs' (Barbour's 
physical replicas), whereas paramorphic models are 'models "for" a state of affairs' 
that do not demonstrate clear parallels, but merely 'suggest(s) candidates for similarity 
and give form to deliberation on unfamiliar matters'(: I 03). 
Yob (1992:481) argues that Soskice, although recognising the dangers of conflating 
models and metaphors, nevertheless suggests that models and metaphors both propose 
analogies. Models function as comparison-makers in Soskice's analysis of the 
difference between homeomorphic and paramorphic models. Furthermore, if 
metaphorical thinking means thinking in models, as Soskice argues, 'the net result is a 
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lapse into a comparison theory of metaphor' (:481). The crux of the matter is that 
what Soskice calls the 'projective conventions', which permit a model to resemble its 
source, are not the same for all types of model. These projective conventions permit 
characteristics read off the model's source to be predicated of the subject of the model 
(Soskice 1985: 101). In the case of a scale model of a train, the projective conventions 
are not novel since a routine scaling operation has taken place. Goodman talks of 
'routine projection' which applies familiar labels to new things but not in novel ways 
(Yob 1992:482). When metaphor is involved, conflict develops, since, in some way, 
the application of the familiar label to the new thing defies an explicit or tacit prior 
denial that this label could be applied to the new thing. Yob wants to use the terms 
literal for routine projections and metaphorical for non-routine projections. The 
categories or characteristics of a scale model are projected onto the actual object quite 
literally. The schematic organisation of a homeomorphic model is applied to the 
object in a straightforward, literal manner. The schematic organisation of a 
paramorphic model is applied to the object in a novel, creative way. 
Just as Soskice talks of metaphors as speaking of one thing in terms suggestive of 
another, (which is not simply a matter of comparing characteristics but evokes 
conflict) so can we talk of models supplying a schematic organisation to a relatively 
unfamiliar domain to which it has previously been denied (Yob 1992:482-483). 
Models are then a way of seeing things in ways not yet imagined, thus evoking 
insight. Yob ( :483) wants to label certain models metaphorical, since it is an 
appropriate extension of the domain of meaning of metaphorical. 
Yob (1992:483) summarises her position by saying: 
genuine metaphors and many models function similarly in that they call to 
mind organizing schemata which are applied to new realms for novel insights. 
In the transfer of a network of associations, including both the literal and the 
figurative associations from its original setting to a new one, these metaphors 
and models guide the exploration of the new setting by proposing entities, 
structures and relationships by which it may be understood. Only under these 
conditions, are the labels 'metaphor' and 'model' interchangeable. However, 
some models do not function this way. Their organising schemata are simply 
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extended to a new realm by reading off correspondences without any sense of 
invasion or resistance. That is, genuine metaphors act as many models but not 
all models act metaphorically. 
These distinctions are important when we try to understand where the power of a 
metaphor comes from. It seems that a powerful metaphor needs a 'metaphorical' 
underlying model that will invite and guide exploration of the new setting to which it 
is applied. 
We have talked of models that act metaphorically. Soskice (1985:102) reminds us 
that the 'presentation of a model, its linguistic presentation, that is, can take the form 
of a metaphor as in the sentence, "The brain is a computer" ' [Soskice's italics]. 
Metaphors that propose a model in this way are called 'theory-constitutive 
metaphors'49 and should be distinguished from 'metaphors which are the linguistic 
projections of such a model; for example, the cybernetic model of the brain [as 
mentioned above] ... is developed by discussion of neural "programming", "output", 
and feedback" '. These terms are called 'metaphorically constituted theory terms' by 
Soskice (:I 02). 
We will now address the use of metaphors, starting with the basic question of the need 
for metaphors. 
5.2.3.2.e Why are metaphors necessary? 
In the preceding sections we have already touched on the value of metaphors. Let us 
now explore this aspect in more detail. Metaphors are a part of our interpretative 
frameworks. Our culture and the home language with which we have grown up teach 
us how to construe the world in terms of categories (Crabtree 1991 :2). Our 
conceptual system is 'fundamentally metaphorical in nature' (Lakoff & Johnson 
1980:3). The way we interpret reality is shaped by the extended metaphors or models 
that we use, like the metaphor of the world as a giant clockwork, or the metaphor of 
the world as 'a universal language' (Turbayne as quoted by Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 
'° Soskice ( 1985: 174) refers to 'theory-constitutive' metaphors as being Richard Boyd's terminology. 
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1991 :27), or use information which is the current metaphor of choice for the scientific 
world-view (Siegfried, 2000:45). 
Ortony has developed three arguments for the need for metaphors (as discussed in 
Woudstra 1989:50 and Van Besien 1989:7): 
1. The argument of compactness - you can convey a senes of attributes and 
relations in a few words. 
2. The argument of unnameability or inexpressibility - it is often impossible to 
translate complex and abstract notions into everyday language. Our 
experiences are continuous, which makes it impossible for our word meanings 
to have all the distinctions required to express all the detail. 
3. The argument of vividness - metaphors make a connection with something 
known from the concrete world, thus giving us the ability to visualise things. 
Van Besien (1989:6-11) has studied the use of metaphors in scientific texts and he 
distinguishes, on the basis of their different functions, between 'pedagogical' and 
'theory-constitutive' metaphors. The three arguments of Ortony support the 
pedagogical functions of metaphors. Although metaphors can lead to insight, there is 
also risk associated with the use of metaphor due to the lack of control over the 
receiver's interpretation. We have discussed theory-constitutive50 metaphors that 
propose a model. We have also speculated that a powerful metaphor needs a 
'metaphorical' underlying model that will invite and guide exploration of the new 
setting to which it is applied. To Soskice (1985 :51 ), the 'close association of model 
and metaphor is important ... for explaining why metaphors can be so useful'. 
5.2.3.2.f Religious metaphors 
In religious language figures of speech are 'the vessels of insight and the vehicles of 
cognition' (Soskice 1985:54). As we have seen in the previous section, metaphors 
shape our interpretation of reality. Religious metaphors 'are particularly powerful 
shapers because of their blend of cognitive, affective and emotional elements' 
50 As discussed in Subsection 5.2.3.2.4: Links between 1netaphors a11d 1nodels. 
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(Crabtree 1991 :3). A metaphor such as 'God is our Father' evokes a whole host of 
emotions and images. The power of religious metaphors is strengthened by their 
presence in the language we use in our rituals and devotions, as in the 'Our Father' 
prayer for example. Religious language 'affects the lives of its users because those 
earthly phenomena on which it draws in speaking of divine matters receive a reflected 
glory and power from the object on which they are projected' (Crabtree 1991:4). As 
Tillich has also discussed, religious symbols connect the infinite and the finite, and in 
the process the finite is also glorified to some extent, which could lead to dangerous 
dynamics, as in if God is Father, then fatherhood is consecrated as well, which may 
lead to 'if God be male, the male will be god' (Crabtree 1991 :4-5). 
Of course we must never forget that for all their power, religious symbols are 'to a 
high degree the product of the human imagination' and that humans have 'structured 
the language in which their import is elaborated' (Crabtree 1991:5-6). This is very 
explicitly true in our use of scientific concepts in religious metaphors. 
5.2.3.2.g The Good, the Bad, the Lively and the Dead 
With regard to deciding on the excellence of any particular metaphor, Soskice 
( 1985 :48) feels that a metaphor is excellent if the subject is accessible only through 
the metaphor and a metaphor is genuinely creative when it embodies new insight. 'It 
is the capacity of the lively metaphor to suggest models that enable us to "go on" 
which gives the clue to the richness of metaphorical description' (:51). We can also 
say that fecund models underlie lively metaphors. We have talked of the power of a 
metaphor that comes from a 'metaphorical' underlying model that will invite and guide 
exploration of the new setting to which it is applied". Sally McFague talks of the 
most 'fruitful' metaphors as being those with 'sufficiently complex grids to allow for 
extension of thought, structural expansion, suggestion beyond immediate linkages ... 
It is because some metaphors have structural possibilities that ... models can develop 
from them, for models are dominant metaphors with comprehensive organisational 
potential' (as quoted in Crabtree 1991:13). 
" See Subsection 5.2.3.2.4: Links between metaphors and models. 
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Dead metaphors do not invoke new insight anymore because we have become used to 
them and their meaning is too conventional. However, some metaphors do not die, 
even when their novelty has worn off. Ina Loewenburg sees 'dead' metaphors as those 
used without any sense of their origins as metaphors, 'Novel' metaphors are new, and 
'live' metaphors are neither clearly novel nor obviously dead, but are used as 
metaphors by some, while for others they are moribund (Crabtree 1991: 13). 
With regard to religious speech, Van Noppen (1992:145) says that the adequacy 
thereof 'is not to be assessed in empirical terms (because no testable predictions or 
inferences can be made), but with regard to their ability to "illuminate", i.e. their 
success in invoking insight in a particular situation and at a particular time'. The 
value of a metaphor can then be measured by 'the degree of social adhesion' to it 
(:145). So, if a metaphor has value to some community, they will keep it alive. 
Can we have good or bad models? Soskice ( 1985: 104) questions the 'not uncommon 
practice of lifting a particular model from its context in the physical sciences and 
transplanting it whole into theological ground, without giving sufficient account to the 
qualified, theoretical status that the model may have, even on its home ground'. 
In terms of looking at what makes for good or bad metaphors in talking about science, 
Ursula Goodenough has written a relevant article, which we will now discuss. 
Ursula Goodenough (2000) has made the case for the use of metaphors when trying to 
convey the results of science. Her view is that we are deeply anthropocentric and if 
we try to use scientific language to convey scientific concepts, we will lose the battle 
for human attention since we are used to hearing stories from our culture and religion 
that reaffirm our centricity. As she says: 'If the universe story is to compete with 
other stories for human attention, we need to offer human-friendly analogies for those 
who best understand scientific concepts through experiential referents' (:235). 
Goodenough gives the example of Brian Swimme using the metaphor 'Gravity is love' 
and how that resonates with some people who have been alienated from the scientific 
understanding of the universe. Of course, although this metaphor can help, it is also 
very wrong, in the sense that apart from the superficial similarity of possessing the 
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property of attraction, there are very few other commonalities between love and 
gravity (:235). 
So, if metaphors have a role to play, the question becomes: How should they be 
crafted? To Goodenough (:235), the problem is: Who is going to create these 
metaphors? She gives the example of the metaphor of God as intelligent designer, 
embedded into the sentence 'Evolution is the Work of an Intelligent Designer' (:235). 
In this case we not only have a metaphor, but also 'an implicit interpretation of the 
mechanism of evolution' (:235). This issue has been discussed here under the sections 
dealing with Dembski's work. The problem is that the metaphor of design leads us to 
think of a particular sort of design, intelligent design as practised by human designers, 
whereas the scientific notion of design arising out of random mutation and natural 
selection is counterintuitive and utterly foreign to our experience. Note how the word 
'intelligence' immediately makes one think of a person. We qualify intelligence with 
the term 'artificial' when referring to non-embodied intelligence - e.g. computer 
programs with Artificial Intelligence (AI). Goodenough therefore asks: How can one 
communicate counterintuitive concepts? Her response is to develop two rules of 
thumb (:235): 
• You must really understand the science and 'have the metaphor ring true with 
science'. 
• If a metaphor is valid - if it carries some core truth about an understanding -
then it should carry that core truth over to someone else. 
Goodenough ( :235) feels that the design metaphor 'intentionally misrepresents the 
science so as to make a doctrinal point'. In the case of Dembski's work, I do not quite 
agree with this accusation since the notion of Complex Specified Information and the 
whole argument about the shear improbability of complex entities arising by chance is 
an attempt to argue at the scientific level. We can debate the quality of the science, 
but the intention is at least there to make a scientific case without gross 
misrepresentation of the scientist's reasoning and models of evolution. What does it 
mean to have the 'metaphor ring true with science'? This is not an easy question to 
answer and Goodenough does not give any answers, just examples of bad metaphors 
such as feeling DNA's presence in a room or calling the sun 'generous'. Liebenberg 
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(2000:289, 295) talks of 'folk theories' in contrast to theories based on empirical 
studies. It seems that we should judge on the basis of the underlying theory and its 
models. 
With regard to the second rule of thumb, Goodenough (:236) rightly says that 
scientists use metaphors all the time when communicating with each other since it is 
easier to convey valid understanding of the science involved in analogical language. 
Hence the 'messenger RNA', 'genes that hitchhike', etc. According to Goodenough 
(:236), 'gravity is love' works as a metaphor since it conveys the core truth of the 
'inevitability, the inexorability, of gravitational attraction that many of us have best 
experienced in love'. 
In dealing with religious metaphors, Goodenough's position is that religious metaphor 
differs from scientific metaphor only in the manner in which the core truth is 
conveyed (:238). Scientific understanding can be conveyed via the 'crisp minty snap 
of empirical data or by metaphorical renderings of these data', whereas the core truths 
of a religious tradition are 'invariably articulated in metaphor' (:238). One could ask 
whether the empirical data is not also always interpreted via a theory, so that 'crisp 
and minty' lives more in the scientist's mental model rather than being inherent in the 
data. Goodenough (:239) feels that we should have the freedom to work with the 
metaphors of our religious tradition, translating the original texts as evocatively as we 
can, where the originals inform and constrain. 
How do we judge whether information is useful as a metaphor? We run into trouble 
when we use the concept of meaning information as a metaphor. The interesting issue 
is that information gives form to our understanding as the end-result of a process, and 
metaphors are also an integral part of that process, possibly at a higher level where 
information is integrated in some fashion (e.g. the line of thinking that a metaphor 
gives us two ideas for one without it being mere comparison"). Metaphors are 
carriers of information par excellence. Metaphors are information. The meaning of 
information is understood metaphorically. It is easier to understand the usefulness of 
counting information as a metaphor since there are underlying scientific models that 
5 ~ Please refer to Richard and Soskice1s work on theory of metaphor in Subsection 5.2.3.2.2. 
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can be applied to extend the meaning of the metaphor. An example would be the 
scientific model of information involving selection amongst possibilities. Shaping 
information is difficult to use as a metaphor because it is not clear what scientific 
model is relevant. In addition, as we asked in the previous section, when we use 
information concepts in metaphors, just what sense-related modalities would we 
associate with them? 
Crabtree (1991: 10) stresses the role of the visual component of our picturing of 
reality. The use of images in language is effective due to their pictorial nature which 
makes them convincing because vision is such a strong sense. Crabtree (:10) states: 
Good models in science may not have to be picturable, but picturability 
certainly seems important in the realm of metaphysics and religion; 
descriptions in this arena would appear to follow Marcus Hester's dictum53 that 
at least one of the two components of a metaphor must be "image-exciting". 
They catch the imagination and lodge more firmly in the memory. 
Information is quite difficult to picture. The best I can do is to depict streams of letters 
and words that float by or a semantic network picture in which one moves from 
concept node to concept node. Each concept is then defined by its relationships with 
other concepts in a network. This probably comes close to the idea that metaphors 
have underlying models that can supply a schematic organisation to a new domain". 
However, Crabtree (:11) quotes CS Lewis who argues that the visual aspect can be a 
positive hindrance in theological thinking, just as 'toys too elaborate and realistic spoil 
children's play'. 
53 See reference under Hester, M. 
54 As discussed in Subsection 5.2.3.2.4: Links between nzetaphors and ntodels. 
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5.2.4 Dippel's work as an example of the nse of metaphors 
5. 2.4.1 Introduction 
In order to introduce the use of metaphor in the science and religion context or 
interface, we use the work of the Dutch scientist Comelis Johannes Dippel who 
published many articles on the role of science and technology in society (Van Dijk 
1992: 91-96). Dippel used the concept of information as a metaphor for the 
theological concept of revelation (:91). He made the link between information and 
revelation by focusing on a specific meaning of information as that which increases 
the order when added into a system. The increase in order is linked to a decrease in 
uncertainty and diminishing interpretation possibilities. This is what happens to a 
believer, too, when professing acceptance of God's revelation, since uncertainty is 
removed and order is created in the mind of the believer. Revelation contains 
information and makes us aware of God's pattern of ordinance which is the result of 
God's intentions. When we adhere to God's laws (ordinances), we introduce order 
into our lives. God's order is seen by Dippel as being different from our human 
definition of order. God's order is 'the order of freedom, unconstraint and contingency 
in the sense of non-uniformity' (Dippel as quoted in Van Dijk 1992:92). 
Dippel has also suggested an analogy here. Just as the introduction of information 
into a system decreases uncertainties about the state of the system, so does the 
acceptance of God's revelation decrease the uncertainty of the believer and create 
order in the thinking of the believer. 
We can use the example of a dice with six sides, numbered 1 to 6 (Van der Lubbe & 
Laurent 1992:86). Before we throw the dice, we, the observers, do not know which of 
the six sides will be up. The throw removes our uncertainty and gives us 2.58 bits of 
infonnation''. In Dippel's analogy, we have the believer as the observer. One needs 
to be careful about the use of the concept of 'order'. The word 'system', as used by 
Dippel, does not automatically provide the picture that we are dealing with an 
observer as part of the system. One is inclined to think of a set of blocks being 
ordered when one hears the phrase 'increasing the order of a system'. The concept of 
55 (log 6)/(log 2)~ 2.58 
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order lies in the mind of the observer. In information terms, we may use less 
information to describe one series of events, e.g. three rows of the dice, resulting in 1, 
1, 1 or 1, 2, 3, and, whereas 1, 1, 1 would have a lower information content than 1, 2, 
3 where information is used as a measure of complexity. In terms of denseness of 
information, both sequences could be judged by an observer to be equally ordered. 
Although Dippel acknowledges that the believer must profess acceptance, the 
following step, which is phrased as creating order in the thinking of the believer, can 
leave the impression of a mechanical ordering operation: God rearranging our 
'jumbled' thoughts? This kind of picture denies the active role of the receiver of the 
information. 
Van der Lubbe and Laurent (1992:87) have criticised Dippel for putting forward a 
process of communication that is characterised by 'one-way traffic from God to man 
and world'. They emphasise the two-way aspects of communication as well as th,e 
role of the receiver (1992:87). The receiver determines what information is and 
information is always relative to the receiver. Communication from the receiver to 
the sender must also be considered. Therefore they see the relation between God and 
the world as dynamic, two-way communication". 
These criticisms are acknowledged, but Dippel does also talk of the problem that we 
associate obedience to God's information with necessity and lack of freedom (Van 
Dijk 1992:93). Freedom is only possible on the basis of obedience, for example, we 
can decide to walk somewhere, but our limbs must obey the commands. "'Possibility" 
responds to information, from which freedom develops' (:93). Dippel connects this 
idea of freedom with that of Karl Barth, who said that a person is only free if, in 
agreement with God's freedom, he/she makes a choice for it" (:93). In information 
terms, this idea translates into obeying divine information by accepting it, by letting 
:ih See also the discussion on Van der Lubbe and Laurent's view of God as the source of information in 
Section 5 .3: Enriching our concept of God. 
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'Frei lVird und ist er (der Mensch) in dem er sich selbst in Obereinstenunung mit der Freiheit Gottes 
H 1iihlt, entscheidet und entschliesst' (Man becomes free and is free, if he himself is in agreement with 
God's freedom, chooses it, decides for it and accepts it). (Karl Barth in (1953) Das Geschenk der 
Freiheit, Theologische Studien, 39, 9, as quoted by Van Dijk 1992:93). 
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oneself 'be polarised by the humble field of the information of God's Word' (:93). 
This combination of scientific concepts is, to my mind, not very helpful. How can a 
field be humble? It can have strength and directionality, but not humility. How can 
information produce a field? This metaphorical language does evoke a reaction, but 
the visual element, which is so powerful, as in the example we gave earlier of 
'examining tattered scruples', is missing. We can envisage a tattered garment, but who 
can easily envisage a field? My guess is that the attempt is to .indicate some kind of 
interaction at a distance between God and the believer, what would normally be called 
the work of the Holy Spirit. The underlying model is that of an electro-magnetic 
field. Van der Lubbe and Laurent (1992:87) use the formulation of 'an offer of 
possibilities by God', which does not carry all of the above scientific baggage. 
Dippel goes further to fan out the concept 'information' in a scale of significations in 
order to use it to bridge the gap between science and theology (Van Dijk 1992: 92). 
God, the creator, is the 'Informer' of matter and God's reality is the Word. Informed 
creation owes its existence to and is in information which we call the Word of God 
and God is the keeper of all information (:92). Here we have what we have called 
shaping information, where information is used to describe the action of giving form 
to something. This world obeys God's information (the laws of nature) and will 
disintegrate if God stops providing this information. The laws that we can discover 
via scientific methods are only what Dippel calls the 'outside of the building of 
creation', since we cannot see the 'secret of creation' via scientific methods (:92-93). 
Presumably this is why revelation is needed. 
Dippel talks of unique versus public information (Van Dijk 1992:94). Public 
information is that which you filter or decode out of the disordered flow of experience 
through the application of common sense. Unique information is contained in the 
unique experiences between God and humankind, as, for example, in the stories of the 
Bible, and it is decoded through faith with God participating in the decoding process 
through the 'self-activation' of the Holy Spirit (:94). Normally, Christians would talk 
about looking at the world through the lens of faith. Although religious information, 
as in the Bible stories, can be transferred, Dippel contends that unique information 
cannot be transferred without the intervention of God. God, through the Word and the 
Holy Spirit, creates 'canals' in our mind so that we can receive and decode unique 
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information (:94). Dippel linked this to the concept that information forms its own 
channels. The particular example used is that of the evolving cell, in which the 
receipt of information results in changes that can be attributed to the information 
itself, rather than to the cell. Van Dijk makes the connection here to Karl Barth's 
proposition that 'God's Word constructs its own channels and fonns its own points of 
contact' (:95). All of this ties up with the concept of information being 'active', which 
is Peacocke's formulation as well." 
With the concepts of public and unique information, the gap or difference between 
science and theology has been reinstated again. As van Dijk (1992:95) says: 'Unique 
information leads to faith and not to natural science. The gap between particularity 
and generality cannot be bridged'. This gap might be seen as being one created by the 
different methods followed to decode the information. The question does remain 
whether Dippel actually explains anything by calling faith an experience of unique 
information. Unique information seems to be just a label for the participation of God 
in the decoding process. 
Van Dijk (1992:96) thinks that Dippel's work has an impact on the fundamental issues 
about the nature of God and the nature of reality, and in the area of the religious 
language, where using the term 'information' instead of 'revelation' has certain 
advantages. 
5.2.4.2 Information, the nature of God and the nature of reality 
Van Dijk's (1992:96) interpretation is that Dippel shows: 
that we cannot think materially enough about God and at the same time not 
spiritually enough either. Perhaps this is why the term 'information' as a third 
concept, alongside matter and spirit, is so suitable for bridging the gap 
between experience and revelation, or between unique and public information. 
It points to a fundamental structure of reality, which presupposes matter and 
energy, but at the same time transcends them [my italics]. 
58 See the discussion in Subsection 5.6.5: Active inforrnation. 
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'Thinking materially' about God here is probably meant in the sense that God created 
and sustains the world through information inputs, and 'thinking spiritually' is possibly 
used in the sense of assisting the decoding of unique experiences (revelation) into 
unique information. Information is thus a bridging concept in the sense of showing us 
the two faces of reality, matter (=energy since matter is energy ... ) and information, 
as well as the two aspects of God, namely a God who acts on the material world 
through information in the form of laws and also 'acts' spiritually through (possibly) 
the fundamental informational nature of reality, opening our eyes to see a different 
reality that we call the experiences of faith. 
The question of how information transcends the concepts of matter and energy is a 
difficult one. One way of thinking about it in the context of information is that it does 
come back to the issue of meaning 'happening' in the mind of the receiver, i.e. 
information is only information if it understood by somebody, some conscious entity. 
This takes us back to the mind/matter duality problem as well as the problem of 
consciousness. David Chalmers has gone so far as to develop a theory of 
consciousness that posits the existence of information as a new fundamental property 
"(Horgan 1999:242). 
Another approach is to how the way we think and talk about the world has an impact 
on the mind/matter duality problem. Cognitive linguistics, which takes embodiment 
as being the foundation of human understanding, is important here, since it 'can 
provide us with a means of philosophising which is not dominated by a dualism 
between the mind and world (a view which alienates us from our bodily existence in 
the world), but perhaps is more in line with the way in which we as a species with a 
common phylogenetic past normally think and interact with the world' (Liebenberg 
2000:286). We, as embodied beings, create our sense of reality. 
59 For further discussion of this work by Chalmers, refer to Subsection 5.6.7: The interconnectedness of 
it all - recent developments in our understanding of reality. 
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If we examine information as a fundamental entity alongside energy and matter, then 
we must decide on what role the observer plays in creating reality by observing, as is 
being debated by quantum mechanical theorists. 
Understanding reality is not easy and using 'information' as a third concept does not 
make it any easier, but it does direct the quest for understanding along different 
routes, with a more reflexive tone, where the entity trying to do the understanding is 
central. 
A key problem is, as Van Dijk (1992:96) rightly suggests, that we need to be careful 
to avoid overloading the concept of information with so many meanings that it 
actually loses all meaning. As outlined above in our discussion of Dippel, his use of 
the word 'information' ranges from applying it to God's creativity in informing matter, 
to the laws of nature, to faith as the experience of unique information, and to the 
material and humankind-creating Word (:95-96). The 'bridging' concept may connect 
to so many webs of meaning that one would become totally lost in trying to cross the 
chasm by using it! 
5.2.4.3 Is using 'information' better than using 'revelation'? 
According to Van Dijk (1992:96), the term 'information' has the: 
fundamental advantage of not having the mythological, miraculous, and 
authoritarian undertone that the word 'revelation' brings to mind for many 
persons. The use of the term 'information' for publicly available experience as 
well as for religious experience prevents the mind from imagining that 'unique 
information' consists of all kinds of petty facts and details. And it reminds us 
that a religious person does not know more and other things than an 
unbeliever, but the same things in a different manner, under a different light, 
or from another perspective. 
I would agree that revelation has definite associations, which might be positive or 
negative, depending on one's beliefs and background. The concept of information 
carries its own baggage too. Information is a difficult concept to understand and has 
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many different meanings. In the discussion above we have run through the counting. 
meaning and shaping approaches to information. What we have called here different 
"meanings" are actually derived from the fact that we have here three different 
networks of associations and three different models for information'". When Dippel 
talks of revelation as information we have two underlying models at play: information 
as that which reduces uncertainty, information as counting information with its model 
of a communications channel between a sender and a receiver; and information as the 
imparting of knowledge, information as meaning information with the model of 
human communication. As Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991:3) indicated, we have 
here information as an objective quantity, measured in bits and bytes, and information 
as a subjective category, where information is always information/or someone, which 
cannot be quantified into bits and bytes". This brings in the subjective dimension 
which does resonate with the position that revelation needs to be accepted in the 
subject, but the uneasy clash with the quantitative connotation of the reduction of 
uncertainty remains. Can one quantify how uncertain a person is about God? It 
seems to me that the network of associations with 'objective' information can easily 
dominate. Indeed, at first glance, when people speak of information it does bring with 
it the impression of objectivity, of data in context, data that can be transmitted around 
the world to a TV or computer, the connection to the 'messy' world of language and 
interpretation is not all that evident. 
A subtle issue is that if we use a metaphor (e.g. 'information' for 'revelation'), we need 
to be aware that the metaphor can affect what we see and how we interpret it. In fact, 
metaphors can govern or direct the way we think about issues. This was shown by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their book Metaphors we live by. Vico, a proponent of 
a 'strong' metaphor theory, recognised that minds are formed by language and not 
language by minds" (Soskice 1984:76). Ifwe analyse the way that Dippel talks about 
infommtion and related issues, some of the underlying assumptions or models come 
out. When Dippel talks of order being created in the thinking of the believer who 
60 Part of Soskice's understanding of a metaphor is that the metaphor draws on two (or more) net\vorks 
of associations by involving the consideration of models (Soskicel 985:49). 
61 See Section 2.3: Biological roots of information. 
('2 James Edie's formulation. 
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accepts God's revelation, we are dealing with the folk metaphor of thoughts being 
objects that can be ordered and thought as being object manipulation (Liebenberg 
2000:295). Dippel talks of 'canals' being created in our minds by God, Word and 
Spirit, for us to understand the unique experiences of faith (Van Dijk 1992:94). We 
have also mentioned the connection made to Barth's proposition that Gods' Word 
constructs its own channels. The metaphoric understanding of the mind as a channel, 
or as 'something which is reachable by "some channel of revelation" ' has also been 
used by George Ellis (Liebenberg 2000:297). As quoted in this section, Van Dijk 
(1992:96) talks of a religious person knowing the same things from another 
perspective than a non-religious person. Here the link is to the metaphor of revelation 
or understanding being seeing what is hidden (Liebenberg 2000:297). Liebenberg's 
contention is that here we have a folk view of the mind that is not based on empirical 
study, but is dependent on the dualism between mind and matter ( :297). When we 
talk of thoughts as objects, we are using the conduit metaphor for communication, 
where we can pass these objects along the canal or channel into the mind/brain (:297). 
This 'folk theory of communication does not hold in the face of contemporary 
evidence for the way we instantiate meaning as embodied entities' ( :297). 
When we examine Dippel's linkage to the concept that infonnation forms its own 
charmels (van Dijk 1992:95), things get really interesting. Take Dippel's example of 
the evolving cell, in which the receipt of information results in changes that can be 
attributed to the information itself, rather than to the cell. Here we have the possibility 
of a radical acceptance of embodied understanding, realised in changes to the cell. 
There is no separation between data and structure. Lakoff and Johnson talk of three 
levels of embodiment of concepts, namely neural embodiment, the neural-level 
structures that characterise concepts and cognitive operations, the phenomenological 
level, which is all that we can be aware of - our bodies, our mental states, our 
environment - and the cognitive unconscious, which is all the mental operations that 
structure and make possible conscious experience, the understanding of language 
(Liebenberg 2000:280). So when the receipt of information results in changes to the 
cell, in this case the brain, we are talking of the neural embodiment of concepts. With 
regard to an underlying model, we should stress the two-way interaction aspect. The 
brain has neural structures with existing interconnections. If we want to think of 
information forming its own charmels, then we should rather talk in neural terms of 
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existing connections being strengthened (information as structure?). Thus we get 
back to an active interpretation role being played by the receiver, even at this level. 
The brain would filter the sensations coming in, in terms of existing structures. At the 
cognitive unconscious level, the mind/brain would· also be active, structuring the 
experience into language-based understanding (information as meaning). Perhaps we 
can say that the mind/brain forms 'its own channels' in response to incoming sense 
data since the process is not simply a matter of information on its own forming its 
own channels. 
\Ve now re-examine Dippel's concept of unique information, where God participates 
in the extraction of the unique experiences contained in the Bible through the 'self-
activation of His Spirit' as Van Dijk (:94) has formulated it. It seems tempting simply 
to formulate it as public information + God's action. The believer has another 
perspective, which, according to Dippel, God has played a role in developing. We 
have seen that our embodiment plays an active role in shaping the understanding of 
this information. Dippel does talk of our freedom to obey God's information by 
accepting it. This acceptance role is not passive, but active and interpretive. The 
question remains: What is God's role in this? Does this metaphor of information as 
revelation help? 
5.2.4.4 Summary of the evaluation of information as metaphor for revelation 
Cognitive linguistics talks of a conceptual blend, a conceptual mapping between the 
complex systems metaphors and blends of the source and the target domain. Lakoff 
and Johnson have shown that metaphors use a base domain, or a familiar domain, to 
allow us to be able to interpret and understand a new domain. Once we have 
understood that the concept of information has many meanings, it then becomes 
problematic to use it as a metaphor since it is difficult to decide which base domain 
the metaphor will be carrying in with it. This depends on the understanding that the 
hearer or listener has of the concept information. How familiar are we with the base 
domain of information? We are mapping from a complex domain consisting of 
counting, meaning and shaping information with various underlying metaphors and 
models of communication as well. Yes, new meaning does become instantiated, and 
it is very pliable and open-ended. The mystery of revelation is not reduced, but 
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enhanced, and this is a good result if you are not seeking explanation, which 1s 
probably an impossible task in any case. 
As we previously have discussed", metaphors are judged by their ability to 'embody 
new insight', to be 'lively' and 'to illuminate'. Information is lively enough when used 
metaphorically, if complexity is what you mean by liveliness. In the case of 
revelation, this complexity is appropriate. The new insight can also not be dissected 
without losing impact, although it seems that one can extend the insight evoked 
through the interactions of the web of meanings of the subjects of the metaphor. We 
have shown that the three meanings of information do provide these complex webs of 
meaning, and also asked whether they are too complex. When scientific concepts are 
involved, we have the problem of 'lifting a particular model from its context in the 
physical sciences and transplanting it whole into theological ground, without giving 
sufficient account to the qualified, theoretical status that the model may have, even on 
its home ground' (Soskice 1985:104). We have also discussed Ursula Goodenough's 
two rules of thumb (Goodenough 2000:235): 
• You must really understand the science and 'have the metaphor ring true with 
science' 
• If a metaphor is valid - if it carries some core truth about an understanding -
then it should carry that core truth over to someone else. 
Puddefoot ( 1992, 1996) has formulated the outlines of a model that ties together all 
the different meanings of information that we have discussed here. His interpretation 
is that counting information is the basic raw input that must give form to our minds, 
thus informing us in the sense of shaping information, in order to convey information 
(meaning) to us (Puddefoot 1992:15, Puddefoot 1996:312). Puddefoot has also 
discussed the role of God in revelation. His contention is that minds are necessary but 
not sufficient for the perception of meaning, 'what opens our eyes is the uncreated 
creative light of God's Word' and meaning is only there for 'minds engaged with the 
world in the process of becoming personal' (Puddefoot 1992: 15). If we accept this 
contention, then counting information is the only meaning of information that is 
clearly understood by science. The role that this aspect of information plays in the 
"' See Subsection 5.2.4.2.6: The Good, the Bad, the Lively and the Dead. 
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metaphorical use of information is limited. To me, the other aspects dominate - the 
shaping and meaning information. In both cases the science is problematic - do we 
understand shaping information? We have shown that meaning and metaphor are also 
closely intertwined and that cognitive linguistics is only scratching the surface of the 
complexities. In addition, our understanding of consciousness, the 'last frontier of 
science', is also involved. So meaning information is not well understood. We cannot 
answer the question: Does the metaphor ring true with science? In fact, almost any 
interpretation will ring true with some tentative scientific model that has been 
postulated. Is the metaphor valid, does it carry some core truth and provide some 
understanding? If one believes in revelation and that God plays a role in 'opening our 
eyes', then yes, the use of information, especially, meaning information, does carry 
with it the mystery of how embodied organisms make sense of information. The 
implicit model that one does need to assume is that God plays a role in making 
information make sense, what Dippel called 'unique information'. This model is not 
generally amenable to scientific study since human experience, consciousness, etc. all 
come into play and these are not easily accessible to the mostly reductionistic tools of 
science. 
Finally, we have to realise that we are in 'mythical' territory here. As we have 
discussed earlier", the new metaphors of science such as information processing can 
become myths if, as Hesse (1998:130) says, they are 'presented publicly as definitive 
answers to metaphysical and moral questions'. In Dippel's work do we have a 
religious myth appropriating a scientific myth? Or is this a religious person using a 
scientific myth to bolster a religious myth? We are dealing with metaphysical 
interpretations here. Hesse (:130) believes that 'there are good and bad myths, and the 
decisions between them must depend on grounds of value and meaning which are out 
ofreach of science itself.' 
Before we proceed with an example of the use of information concepts in theology 
that has a wider scope than Dippel's work, we discuss some of the general problems in 
relating science and religion. 
"'See Section 5.2.4:Myths, models and metaphors. 
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5.2.5 Problems in relating science and religion 
In trying to relate science and religion, Hesse (1998:131) contends that the 
sociological study of religion can act as a bridge between them. The approaches used 
in studying religions from the sociological perspective have been used to study 
science as a social phenomenon and have led to the understanding that science is also 
a social institution, with all that that implies in terms of social relations, such as power 
and authority relations (:132). 
Hesse (: 133) goes on to draw parallels between the way m which metaphysical 
models work in both scientific and religious discourse. 
Scientific models are analogous with the observable world and an ontological belief is 
held that there is a reality that constrains the outcomes of the experiments on which 
scientific theories are based. The metaphorical language of models is used to refer to 
reality, and can achieve predictive success without being an accurate representation of 
reality. To support this position, Hesse (: 133) refers to the fact that some scientific 
theories have been successful predictors, but have subsequently been rejected as being 
false. 
Similarly, religious models, such as models of God, refer to realities that are believed 
to exist. Religious models relate to observables such as 'religious formalities, 
institutions and experiences, to social-value systems and conditions of cohesion and 
survival ... which act as constraints on the adequacy' of the models (:133). In 
addition, religious models can be evaluated in terms of their social effects. 
The remaining problem that we need to deal with is the metaphysical questions. To 
Hesse (:133), 'the relation between the existence of God and social and individual 
religious experience cannot be exactly the same as that between, for example, 
physical experiments and the reality of atoms, because we cannot have merely 
empirical criteria for a religion ... religion involves metaphysics and value systems as 
well as "facts" '. 
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This highlights the difference in the methods of empirical science and religion, but 
when we compare an ideology such as scientific humanism with religion, then the 
metaphysics and value-systems questions are indeed shared. To press the point home, 
Hesse (:134) gives the following reasons as to why science (as empirical science) 
cannot be a new religion: 
• Science does not have any rational authority to make metaphysical claims 
about the origin, destiny, purpose or meaning of the universe. Science's 
rational authority rests only on the ability to predict empirical data in a limited 
domain of space and time (e.g. not before a certain time t after the Big Bang). 
• If science's models and metaphors are taken to be tmths, they become myths, 
which should be judged in the same way, using criteria outside science, as the 
myths ofreligions and ideologies in general. 
• These criteria include value judgments about the models of the world that 
science uses. Science's models are not value-neutral and have often led to a 
dehumanisation of the world, a devaluation of the significance of human 
history. 
• Religions have been the provider of frameworks for metaphysical and moral 
issues, hence providing social functions that have been ignored in modem 
societies due to the scepticism about any rational authority other than science. 
Science cannot provide these frameworks. 
• To restore the social functions of religions, we need to focus on questions of 
meaning and value that transcend empirical experience and hence literal 
language. Therefore metaphorical language needs to be revived together with 
myths. 
• The religious traditions promise much more understanding than the creed of 
scientific humanism that has an ultimate lack of anything realistic to hope for, 
and is an ideology close to stoicism. The understanding that our religious 
traditions can provide is at the level of providing answers to what we should 
do and what we can hope for, through the intimations of the sacred, things set 
apart which act as symbols of the sacred for the profane. 
In addition, we need to highlight the danger of circular reasoning when relating 
biblical and scientific ideas (Du Toit 2000:19). Scientific theories are used as a 
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hermeneutical guide to support theism and theism is used as a hermeneutical guide to 
interpret scientific theories. Since metaphors are the way in which we understand the 
world, we cannot escape 'the analogical and metaphoric nature of our reasoning' (:19). 
As an example of the use of the models of science in weaving together a world-view, 
a metaphysics and a theology, which also illustrates some of the issues discussed 
above, especially the issue of levels of explanation, we look at the work of John 
Haught. 
5.2.6 An example of the use of information-based analogies in theology 
Perhaps the most complete exposition of the usefulness of informational concepts to 
theology has been given recently by John Haught. 
Haught (2000:73) presents the 'explanatory relevance' of theology in informational 
terms by viewing God as 'the ultimate source of the novel informational patterns 
available to evolution'. His approach is that there are different levels of explanation, 
in this case a 'higher' informational level versus the lower level of mechanical causes. 
In evolutionary biology for example, a concept such as speciation is not accounted for 
in terms of biochemical causes. Therefore theologians should not seek 'to render the 
notions of teleology or divine action intelligible in the same terms that scientific kinds 
of explanation employ' (:74). The informational analogy for God, as used above, 
allows 'us to appreciate how the universe as a whole may have some overall meaning 
or "point" to it without this meaning or "point" needing to be displayed at the same 
level of investigation at which natural science functions' (:74). 
Haught's position 1s that some vers10n of hierarchy 'remains essential to any 
intelligible conception of cosmic meaning' (:74). The evolutionists insist that there is 
no hierarchy, that 'evolution pancakes the illusory sacred hierarchy down to the 
one-dimensional plane of impersonal natural processes' (:75). Haught (:75) proposes 
that studying how information works will let us grasp 'how a hierarchical shaping of 
meaning and purpose can become implanted in an evolving universe without having 
to be obvious at the level of scientific inquiry'. The key issue for Haught (:75) is that 
information 'works' by 'comprehensively integrating particulars . . . into coherent 
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wholes' and therefore 'any attempt to specify the comprehensive function of 
informational patterns in terms appropriate only to the comprehended particulars 
themselves is logically contradictory'. The origin of information and its integrating 
capacity is in another logical space to that of atomic details"' ( :76). Haught agrees 
that 'information is a mystery that science cannot comprehend through its atomising 
reductions' ( :76). To the charge that information is just a mental abstraction, Haught's 
answer is that information is 'the very real (though scientifically unspecifiable) 
foundation of anything being actual at all. Form or pattern, as philosophers from 
Aristotle to Whitehead have noted repeatedly, is a metaphysical aspect of things, one 
without which they would have no actuality at all' (:76). Information performs a 
patterning of the world, creating comprehensive wholes, but cannot be dissected by 
modem scientific thought in a mechanistic way. However, information is essential to 
science, which has to assume that nature is informed in such a way that our minds can 
understand some of nature's information. 
Haught (:76-80) turns to Taoism to try to show how information works. Tao, the 
ultimate reality, is passive energetically, but is active informationally, giving the 
world structure and function. This way of working is via wu wei or active inaction, 
non-interfering effectiveness (:78). Tao influences even though it is not a thing, it is 
non-being, just as the empty space of a container allows it to contain things. Haught 
( :79) suggests that 'information can pattern the universe, and even endow it with 
hierarchically distinct features, in a similarly non-invasive, utterly humble manner. 
And it may do all of this without interrupting in any way what from a purely scientific 
point of view must appear as an unbroken continuum of atomic elements or historical 
becoming'. The key issue now is that Taoism teaches that we will only understand the 
hierarchical patterning of the world if we have 'undergone a personal transformation' 
and 'learned the wisdom of wu wei', moving away from a 'controlling way of 
understanding' to a sensitive and humble way of understanding (:79). Haught (:79) 
points out that Christian faith also intuits that God creates and acts via 'the manner of 
humble self-restraint rather than crude intervention'. 
<'
5 Note that we can conceptually describe even the so-called atomic details in terms of information as 
well, refer to Subsection 5.6.7: The universe as a con1puter. 
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Haught's conclusion is that we need not agree that 'evolution logically rules out a 
hierarchical metaphysics' and that we can 'embrace consistently both a religious vision 
- including a sense of cosmic meaning - and the carefully established results of 
evolutionary biology' (:80). 
In terms of our question: Can information bridge the gap between science and 
theology?, Haught's answer is that you need to change your metaphysics first, your 
way of understanding the world, before information can be used as a concept that can 
describe the hierarchical patterns and the atomic details. The gap can only be closed 
if you agree that there are two different explanatory levels. Again the concept of 
information actually being active, creating patterns and structured wholes, comes to 
the fore. We have referred to this as shaping information". The concept of 
information on its own, even by means of its many and varied definitions, cannot 
carry the load of bridging the gap. A whole system of thinking about the world, about 
God and about God's interaction with the world, is required, within which the concept 
of information can then be used as part of the language of the system. 
We have discussed the issue of the development of a common language as possibly 
being able to help bridge the gap between science and theology. John Haught's work 
has expanded the issue to that of levels of explanation, metaphysics and world-views. 
In the process, he clarifies the domain of application of theology. This brings us to 
another way of bridging the gap, namely through the redescription or 
re-understanding of just what theology or science should be concerning itself with. 
The most common approach has been to expand the reach of science. 
5.2. 7 Bridging the gap by expanding the reach of science 
The work of Davies and Dembski is relevant here. As we have seen in our 
discussions of their work", Davies and Dembski agree that there is a deep mystery 
that science has not explained, namely the origin of life. This mystery can be cast in 
infornmtion terms as the problem of how highly complex and highly specified entities 
()(i The concept of active information is discussed in Subsection 5.6.4. 
''
7 Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
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anse. Dembski has cast this into the notion of complex specified information. 
Dembski and Davies (2000:254) agree that the current laws of physics are simple and 
general and cannot lead to highly complex and highly specific entities. The ordinary 
laws cannot create information. From this point onwards their paths diverge. Both 
want to expand the reach of science, but in different ways. 
Davies (2000:259) wants to propose a new type of law, an information-generating 
law, a 'complexity law' that will kick in at a certain level of complexity, leading to 
jumps in self-organisation and complexity, and perhaps towards life. 
Dembski (1999:105) denies that any type of law will ever generate information, 
especially complex specified information, and wants to expand the reach of science 
beyond natural causes to intelligent causes as well. The rationale behind this is 
Dembski's aim of proving that a designer exists who is the source of the complex 
specified information. Dembski's theological approach comes into it as well. His 
contention is that God's interaction with the world is detectable, and to go even 
further, is empirically detectable by the methods of science (:105). Behind this 
approach lies his apologetic intention as he makes clear as well. He chooses this route 
since science is regarded as the only valid form of knowledge in our culture, the only 
commonly accepted way to make cognitive claims (:118). To Dembski, then, this is 
the way to bridge the gap between science and theology, as claimed in the title and 
subtitle of his book, Intelligent design: The bridge between science and theology. 
So, when confronted by the mystery of the origin of biological information, Davies 
the scientist advances a tentative and vague extension of the laws of science, staying 
within a (slightly extended?) naturalistic framework, whereas Dembski, driven by his 
theological agenda, makes a bold claim of certainty that we can use the methods of 
science to prove that a designer is the cause, that science is incomplete as an 
explanatory system. 
Dembski's approach can be seen as yet another variant of a God-of-the-gaps approach. 
Dembski claims that he has raised the barrier too high, that science will never explain 
complex specified information since there are no information-producing laws and the 
probability is too low, ruling out chance. To my mind, Dembski does not want to 
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seriously consider the science of complexity since he does not want to be proven 
wrong, he wants to confirm his hypothesis and does not want to consider seriously 
possible alternative explanations. A true scientific approach is more tentative, 
acknowledging that we know very little. 
We have now concluded our general discussion on how information concepts can be 
used to bridge the gap between science and theology. We move on to the first in our 
list of specific areas in which information concepts have been used, namely in 
enriching our understanding of God. 
5.3 Enriching our concept of God 
The Dutch scientist Dippel was one of the earliest users of information concepts in 
theology and he considered God as the 'sublime "Informaticus", the ultimate 
information source which creates order out of chaos', the God who is Word and is 
Information (Van der Lubbe and Laurent 1992:87). This concept of God as the source 
of all information is quite popular. Gitt uses it as well, as we have seen in our 
discussion of his work. Two models are normally used here: the model of information 
as the result of an ordering process (which is assumed to be the result of intelligence) 
and the notion of a communication process, in which a sender and a receiver are 
involved. Barbour (2000: 150) has noted that the theological models of God in the 
Bible includes the model of God as a communicator 'expressing meaning and rational 
structure through the divine Word"'. In the science and theology dialogue, the model 
of God as communicator of information who does not clash with scientific laws, has 
been proposed by Polkinghome and a few others (:61). Apart from a brief mention of 
Gitt and Dembski, our focus will be on the innovative use of information concepts in 
work based on process theology. 
Gitt works extensively with the model of sender - channel - recipient and brings in the 
issue of volition as well. God's Will is the cause of the information that led to all of 
creation (Gitt 1997:48, 137, 162-3). 
68 The logos concept is discussed in Subsection 5.6.5. 
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Dembski focuses more on the issue of information as evidence of intelligent design, 
thus pointing towards a designer. This does not introduce a new concept of God, but 
does highlight the nature or mode of operation as being design. This mode of 
operation is linked by Dembski to the logos concept and he gives a full exposition of 
it. However, one needs to be careful in using this approach to try to prove the 
existence of God. Pennock (2000:303) has criticised the creationist approach since it 
reduces God to 'a scientific object'. 
The Latin root of the word information, informare (meaning g1vmg form to, 
informing) can also be used here to extend understanding of the way this source of 
information operates (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 1992:87). We have referred to this 
type of information as being shaping information. Van der Lubbe and Laurent (:86-
88) have extended this thinking by taking a process-oriented view of the world and 
developing ideas corresponding to process theology. 
There is a linkage between scientific developments, the nature of our societies, our 
world-view and our concept of God (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 1992:84). We can 
divide our history into the Matter Age, the Energy Age and the Information Age (:84). 
The world-view has changed accordingly from a mechanistic view to an information 
and information process-based view. The concept of God in the Matter Age was 
resonant with the prevailing world-view and a mechanistic view of 'God the 
clockmaker' could be postulated. In our time, God's image is much more hidden and 
the close relation between world-view and view of God has been broken ( :84). The 
information-based world-view does provide new scope and context for a new view of 
God. The move has been from an object-oriented mechanistic world-view to a more 
dynamic information process view, with a focus on events rather than on objects, and 
this leads to the possibilities of a 'more dynamic idea of God' ( :85). 
Van der Lubbe and Laurent present their information-based world-view as a world 
'built up from events, related to each other by time-space relations and which are 
concrete realisations from sets of possible events. Speaking more philosophically, 
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one can say that events are the result of the melting together of possibilities and 
factualities'69 (1992:86). 
When we look back at the sequence of events, it becomes clear that 'a selection has 
been made from a number of possible events' and looking ahead, there is a set of 
possibilities from which to select, therefore reality can be seen as 'an advance of 
creation' ( :86-87). 
Having established the background, Van der Lubbe and Laurent focus on the process 
of communication, and, in contrast to the approach of Dippel, on the two-way aspects 
of communication as well as the role of the receiver (1992:87). The receiver is also 
important, since the receiver determines what information is due to the fact that 
information is translated/decoded by the receiver and hence the receiver's ability to 
understand is the ultimate limitation. Communication from the receiver to the sender 
must also be considered. 
They therefore see the relation between God and the world as dynamic, two-way 
communication. God is 'the one who limits the multiplicity of unbounded 
possibilities and unifies them in the ordered cosmos. Then each event is, on the one 
hand, the result of an offer of possibilities by God and, on the other hand, the result of 
what the creating genesis has already brought about' (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 
1992:87). This God influences the world and is influenced by it, as in process 
theology. Here we have a God who is not outside the world, pouring in information, 
as may be construed if too much emphasis is placed on God as the source of 
information. 
Yes, God is the ultimate source of information, but this involves creating of 
possibilities and then inviting humankind to make selections, which are not 
''' As Polkinghome ( 1996:27) explains process metaphysics: 'the fundamental metaphysical unit is the 
event ("an actual occasion"), which has what is called its prehensive phase (the "survey" of the 
possibilities of the open future in relation to the events of the past and the divine "lure" to a certain 
direction of occurrence) and the concrescent phase (in which one of these possibilities is actualized)'. 
See also the discussion on process theology in Chapter 6.2.5. 
164 
determined a priori (Van der Lubbe & Laurent 1992:88). The selections made have 
an effect on God by reducing the set of possibilities on offer since each selection 
excludes all of the subset of possibilities. 
In reaction to what he views to be impoverished human concepts of order and design, 
Haught (2000:6) calls for a fundamental rethinking of our concept of God. Based on 
the evidence of the chaotic fossil record, God cannot be simply viewed as the source 
of order. Haught shares with Van der Lubbe and Laurent a process view of the world 
and postulates ( :6): 
• a God who is not only a source of order, but also the 'disturbing wellspring of 
novelty' 
• a cosmos that is not just an 'order' (according to the original Greek meaning) 
but 'a still unfinished process' 
• a God whose prime aim is not that of imposing designs but who would rather 
provide opportunities for the cosmos to participate in its own creation. 
As we have mentioned in the previous section, Haught (2000:73) views God in 
informational terms as 'the ultimate source of the novel informational patterns 
available to evolution'. 
In order to really understand Haught's concept of God, we must understand his view 
of reality, his 'metaphysics of the future' which gives priority to the future and not to 
the past or present (2000:88-89). Haught's position is that true novelty arises out of 
the future and not out of the deterministic and mechanical unfolding of the past, what 
he calls a 'metaphysics of the past'. Haught is saying that algorithmic processes, the 
actions of the laws of nature, are not enough to produce novelty. This is 
fundamentally what Dembski and Davies are saying as well. Furthermore, if we try to 
reverse engineer (which is an inherently reductive, and atomistic, technique) existing 
complex systems such as living beings, we will abstract away the organisational 
principles and informational patterns we are trying to discover (:87). Haught (:200) 
makes the point that we start with a 'meaningfully patterned totality' and that as we 
move back into the past in our reverse engineering process, 'the pattern itself 
dissolves' since 'it was there in the first place only in the mode of being anticipated', of 
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being the target as it were. Pattern or information is 'that towards which evolving 
processes move' and the ontological status of information is fundamentally future 
(:200). 
The active role of chance is also denied. Haught states: 'It is not the occurrence of 
contingency that brings about the future; rather, it is the arrival of the future that 
allows events to have the status of contingency, that is to be more than just the 
inevitable outcome of past deterministic causes' (2000:87). 
Thus the metaphysics of the future is rooted in the intuition that ultimate reality is 'not 
limited to the causal past nor to the fixed and timeless present', but 'is to be found 
most characteristically in the constantly arriving and renewing future' (:88). To 
Haught (:88), this vision can encompass both the evolutionary data and the claims of 
religion regarding how a 'promising God relates to the world'. 
This metaphysics of the future is rooted in the experience of religious people that they 
are grasped by 'that which is to come' (Haught 2000:89). Haught (:89) quotes Paul 
Tillich as describing some religious experience as a sense of being grasped by the 
'coming order'. Haught (:90) calls this future that meets us, takes hold of us and 
makes us new, 'God', which is the 'Absolute Future' that is beyond our provisional 
futures. Not only people but also the whole of creation 'is always being drawn by the 
power of a divinely renewing future' (:90) (see Rom 8:22 as well). Haught's 
'metaphysics of the future' is the philosophical expression of the religious intuition 
that 'all things receive their being from out of an inexhaustibly resourceful 'future' that 
we may call "God" ' and 'the notion that the cosmic present and past are in some sense 
given their status by the always arriving but also unavailable future' (:90-91). 
Haught (2000: 127) concurs with Whitehead's cosmology that God is the 'ultimate 
repository of all the occasions that make up the cosmic process'. Each occurrence in 
the world process thus contributes novelty (information?) to God's big picture, what 
Haught calls being 'harvested into the divine experience in an ever intensifying 
aesthetic pattern' (: 128). This analogy is normally encountered in the form of the 
tapestry argument, where seen from the back the tapestry does not make sense since 
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the pattern cannot be seen, the information is limited, whereas from the front the 
beautiful pattern can be discerned and understood. 
In summary then, Haught's understanding of God is that God is the 'Absolute Future' 
which is 'the source of new being, ... the source of the destabilising and always 
surprising "informational input" that slips into each present' (2000: 144). 
My view is that God is the creator of the ultimate context within which data is 
transformed into information. To illustrate this point we can refer to the first volume 
of the trilogy of four books, the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams, 
in which the answer to everything, the ultimate answer, is given as being '42' (Adams 
1979:135). The joke is, of course, that this is a meaningless answer since a number 
without context can mean so many things! We immediately want to ask: 42 of what? 
Is it 42 gods, 42 kilograms, 42 kilometres, 42 civilisations, 42 laws? Our cosmos 
seems to be a mixture of order and disorder and is very difficult to understand on its 
own terms. God could conceivably provide the context that will ultimately allow 
everything to make sense. 
Our concept of God can always only be partial. What we have here is simply an 
exploration of the new resources, the new concepts that science has given us. 
We now move on to another broad area in which information concepts have been used 
to gain understanding, namely the concept of life. 
5.4 Clarifying our concept of what life is 
We have focused on biological information as the new arena of the divine action 
debate and hence we have already covered a wide spectrum of opinions and uses of 
information concepts70 • We will here just summarise some of the main lines of 
thought. 
70 See, for example, the discussions on Gitt (Subsections 4.2.5, 4.2.7.1, etc.). Davies (Subsections 4.3.2, 
4.3.4, 4.3.5) and Dembski (Subsection 4.4.8.5). 
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The central issue has been that the ongm of life remams a mystery and that 
information plays a key role since the real secret of life is that a living organism is a 
complex information-processing system. We have noted that scientists are in fact 
reluctant to admit in public to the remaining mystery of the origin of life, since they 
do not want to open the door to 'religious fundamentalists and their god-of-the-gaps 
pseudo-explanations' (Davies 2000: 18). 
Apart from the actual understanding of how this information processing works, the 
ultimate problem remains the issue of where biological information came from. Gitt 
and Dembski have homed in on this question and have used it as the source of 
arguments for the existence of God, as the Sender of Information (Gitt's position), or, 
at least, for the existence of an intelligent designer (Dembski's position). 
The context of this source of biological information is not simply that very first 
location and event when life came into being, but is actually the whole universe and 
its history. Biological information is information with a context or meaning, i.e. 
semantic information (Davies 2000:60). If we assume that the source of semantic or 
meaning information can only be the environment of the living organism, then 
ultimately the environment is the whole universe, so we need to know the origin of 
the information content of the universe. In addition, quantum mechanics and 
relativity theory suggest that information is a global rather than a local physical 
quantity; therefore, ifthere are information laws, they must be non-local. 
With regard to our understanding of how the first information-processing system 
came to be, Davies has shown that the top-down (delving back to the possible origins 
of today's complex systems)" and bottom-up (building complexity from scratch) 
approaches do not meet: there is a gap in our understanding. This gap is due to what 
is called irreducible complexity or 'enigmatic circularity' (Davies 2000: 124). 
There are some lines of exploration that may solve this mystery. The study of 
complexity has led to theories of self-organisation and principles of complexity seem 
71 The top-down approach is discussed in Subsection 4.3.4: Fro111 che111icals and energy to 
se{l-organisation, and the bottom-up approach in Subsection 4.3.5: Fro1tt se(f-organisation to life. 
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to have been discovered. The work that is being done in the area of developing 
artificial life via computer models holds promise as well". Quantum mechanics is 
another field with tremendous potential to surprise us. There is, however, no certainty 
that we will solve the mystery of life. 
To conclude this overview, we mention a few of the more speculative theories that 
involve information. 
Biosemiotics73 is a radical view on what life is. It studies the dynamics of living 
systems from the perspective of communication or the exchange of signs. Life is 
simply a network of sign processes. It holds the promise of interconnecting natural 
entities and processes into a web of relations that span the hierarchical scale from the 
cell to the biosphere. The focus is on information as being always for someone (an 
intentional creature). 
Frank Tipler" has achieved a certain amount of fame with his views on the ultimate 
destiny of the universe and how intelligence as information-processing capacity may 
conceivably survive the end of the universe. Life, according to him, is information 
processing (Tipler 1994:124). His 'Omega Point' concept, the completion of all 
existence, will preserve all that has ever been thought and done by any intelligent 
entity and could resurrect them again as well (:12, 110, 219). 
We have touched on some of the different ways in which information concepts are 
being used to describe the mystery of life. Despite the title of this section, I do not 
believe that the mystery has really been clarified yet. We do have a better sense of the 
depth and breadth of the mystery and have started to understand some of the 
underlying principles of complexity. In the next section a brief overview is given of 
72 Cellular automata, an artificial form of life, are discussed in Subsection 5 .6. 7 .5: Cellular Automata. 
"See Section 2.3: The biological roots of information - fi"om biosphere to semiosphere. 
74 His book, The physics of immorto/ity, published in 1994, contains a complete overview of his ideas. 
The universe started with a mathematical singularity and may end in a mathematical singularity as well, 
which Tipler has called the 'Omega Point'. At the very end, the universe will basically be a computer 
of ultimately infinite processing-power. The term 'Omega Point' is taken from the work of the Jesuit 
philosopher-scientist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (Tipler 1994: 110). 
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the role that information-based theories play in describing and linking the hierarchical 
levels of complexity, from atoms to communities. 
5. 5 Linking the hierarchy of organisational levels 
Schmitz-Moormann (1992: 172-184) sketches the evolution of information by 
highlighting the growing separation between information and its physical 
infrastructure as systems grow more complex. This idea is explicated in the table on 
the next page. The table provides an overview of the hierarchical levels of 
organisation and relevant scientific theories and religious concepts. 
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Levels of organisation Integration of inforrnation and structure Relevant theories Concepts used in the science and 
theology dialogue 
Religious conununities Information is efficient, but not linked to a definite Divine inspiration - theology, God as ulti111ate source of inforn1ation. 
(God and people) material infrastructure, experienced as a spiritual God is Word, Information. Revelation as 
reality. information (Dippel). God as the 
ultimate boundary condition (Barbour 
2000: l l l). 
Openness to the divine. i1na~o dei. 
Humans, language Multiple ways of carrying information. Storage is Linguistics. Semantics, meaning. 
comn1unities, society completely independent of the organism. You know 
that you are informed. Creating new information. 
Global information networks form. 
Animals Perception of the lloutside 11 • Complete separation of i Theory of communication . 
structure and information.. The message is created by 
the organism in its own unique form. Information no 
longer fixed to a specific \vay of con1111unicating it. 
Signs~ 
i Biose1niotics. Life= information processing 
Living organisn1s Difference appears between infom1ation and structure Cybe111etic view of Open vs closed systenlS. 
as the information carrier (e.g. DNA). conununication - information (e.g. 
Conm1unication starts. DNA) as part of feedback system. Top-down causation: God acting as a 
top-down cause \vithout violating the 
Systems thinking: Top-down laws describing events at lo\ver levels' 
causation happens \Vhen higher- (Barbour 2000: 1 11). 
level events impose boundary God as connnunicator. 
conditions on lower-level Active infornmtion. 
processes, resulting in 
infonnation flo\v. 
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Levels of organisation Integration of infor1nation and structure ltelevant theories Concepts used in the science and 
theology dialogue 
Autocatalytic systen1s Dependencies between structures develop. j "Laws of complexity". Hard\vare and soft\vare 
Correlation vs. interaction. Differentiation can be f Mathernatical infonnation 
made between information, information storage and theory. 
information transmission. 
Macron1oleculcs Structure becomes ever more con1plex - distinction 
between information and structure starts. 
Molecules and atoms With molecules, the structure becomes more important 
than the raw material. The particle is the message -
information cannot be separated from the structure. 
Matter, energy and The basic building blocks are matter, energy and j The laws of physics. God informing, giving forn1 to 
information. information. The basic information of the universe is t Quantu1n mechanics. everything 
the physical constants. 
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John Haught (2000: 185) makes the key point: 'information allows logically for 
distinct kinds of being and grades of value within what ... may seem to be an 
unbroken continuum of atoms' (:70, 75). That there are discontinuities in the 
separation between information and structure appears to be intuitive. This position 
can be described as a reaction to ontological reductionism, which, in this context, 
claims that the world consists of atoms and forces only. Barbour (2000: 109) has 
defended what he calls 'ontological pluralism' which is 'a multileveled view of reality 
in which differing (epistemological) levels of analysis are taken to refer to differing 
(ontological) levels of events and processes in the world, as claimed by critical 
realism'. Jeffrey Wicken holds the following view of nature: 'Nature produces itself 
hierarchically - one level establishing the ground of its own stability by using 
mechanisms made available by lower levels, and finding functional contexts at higher 
levels' (as quoted by Barbour 2000:106-107). 
Barbour (2000: 108) distinguishes between a structurally defined hierarchy (quark, 
nucleus, atom, molecule, macromolecule, organelle, cell, organ, organism and 
ecosystem) and a fanctionally defined hierarchy, such as the reproductive hierarchy 
(gene, genome, organism and population) and the neural hierarchy (molecule, 
synapse, neuron, neural network, brain and body). In addition, humans participate in 
social and cultural interactions, a network of effects that we call culture? In general, 
process philosophy stresses that the various levels of organisation 'may be integrated 
according to very different principles of organisation, so their characteristics may be 
very different' (:147). With the hierarchy as sketched here, the intention was to make 
just the one main point, namely the separation between information and its physical 
infrastructure. Each level also represents a different context with different 
relationships, which means that information and meaning, which are context and 
relationship-dependent, will continually change as well. 
From a systems thinking perspective, information plays an important role in actually 
maintaining the hierarchy. Hierarchies employ a set of processes to regulate and 
control the use of the communication of information (Checkland 1981 :83). The link 
between control and communication, and emergence and hierarchy is especially 
evident in biological systems (Checkland 1981 :86). The action of control is 
associated with the imposition of constraints, which immediately requires a two-level 
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hierarchy, with the upper level imposing constraints on the lower level. Checkland 
(:87) gives the following example: 'the cell as a whole constrains the 
physico-chemical possibilities open to DNA and makes it "the bearer of a code". The 
upper level is a source of an alternative (simpler) description of the lower level in 
temlS of the specific functions which are emergent as a result of the imposition of 
constraints'. The function of DNA is not inherent in the macromolecule itself, but is 
the emergent result of a hierarchical control process. 
We now move on from life to another broad area in which information concepts have 
been used to gain understanding, namely the issue of God's action in the world. We 
have already covered biological information and molecular biology extensively and 
hence will focus on other aspects of God's interaction with the world. 
5.6 Understanding God's interaction with the world 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The most recent dialogues on the issue of God's action in the world have focused on 
quantum indeterminacy, chaos and complexity, especially self-organised complexity, 
with various models of either top-down or bottom-up causation or combinations 
thereof. We will not cover these models extensively, but only focus on the role that 
information plays in these models. We start off by examining the debate about 
interventionist or non-interventionist positions. 
5.6.2 Interventionism vs non-interventionism 
How to avoid interventionist accounts of God's action in the world is the dilemma that 
is faced by, especially, the scientist-theologians, who, as Polkinghome states: 
... wish to speak of God's action in the world in a way that goes beyond the 
single act of upholding the universe in being. Providential agency must be 
continuously at work in a way consistent with the known laws of nature 
(themselves understood theologically as expressions of God's faithful and 
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unchanging will for his creation). We all75 refuse the word 'intervention', and 
accept the word 'interaction', as the way to speak of divine acts. 
Polkinghome (1996:41) 
Polkinghome (:41) refers to 'acts of intellectual daring in the quest for a causal joint' 
that 'seem necessary if we are to go beyond mere fideistic assertion'. These acts are 
'attempts to take both matter and providence seriously' (:41). 
Robert Russell (1998:191-192) is one of those who have taken up the challenge of 
trying to talk of God's special providence or special action, without being 'forced to 
argue that God's special action constitutes an intervention into these processes and a 
violation of the laws of nature which God has established and which God maintains'. 
Russell (:192) talks of the seemingly unavoidable connection between special 
providence and intervention as having led theologians to a 'forced option'. Liberals 
have restricted talk of God's action 'to our subjective response to what is really only 
God's uniform general action', thus avoiding interventionism, but reducing God's 
action to a 'uniform, single enactment at best, often drifting to a kind of deism' (: 192). 
Conservatives, on the other hand, argue that special providence is God's objective 
'acts in history and nature attested to by faith' (: 192). They accept the price of being 
called interventionists. 
Russell refers to the debate around the role of chance in evolution as an example to 
get to the heart of the dilemma. People such as Dawkins claim that chance pervades 
biological evolution and hence any talk about God's action is unintelligible (Russell 
1998: 192). The liberal response is that God creates through the 'combination of 
chance and law', but Russell contends that 'chance' actually signifies our ignorance of 
what are complex deterministic processes (:192). So, if one regards chance as 'only 
epistemic ignorance and nature is really a closed causal system', then to claim that 
God acts through chance in evolution, and not just at creation, leads to an impasse in 
which it either means nothing, since nature's laws operate without any need for other 
inputs, or you are forced to adopt the option that God does intervene in nature, by 
acting in gaps in the closed causal order (:192). The latter position is the conservative 
75 Polkinghome is referring to Arthur Peacocke, Ian Barbour and himself. 
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position that threatens the dialogue with science and in fact can strengthen the atheist 
position since, if you attack Darwinian evolution and try to replace it by creation 
science or intelligent design", you are agreeing that it is Darwinism itself that must be 
attacked or replaced, and not its atheistic interpretation (: 192). Russell (: 192) feels 
that 'theistic evolution offers the real attack on atheism by successfully giving a 
Christian interpretation to science - thus undermining the very assumption they share 
with atheists, namely that a Darwinian account of biological evolution is inherently 
atheistic'. 
Having made this diagnosis of the root cause of the dilemma, Russell (1998:193) 
argues for another option, namely a 'non-interventionist understanding of special 
providence'. This position is based on an interpretation of nature as being 
ontologically indeterministic, so that nature is not an entirely closed causal system. 
To Russell (:193), the discoveries of quantum mechanics seem to indicate that, at least 
at one level - the quantum level, nature is undetermined, since quantum physics is 
irreducibly statistical. There are thus what Russell (:193) calls 'natural gaps' in the 
causal regularities of nature. In the context of evolution, chance, 'at the level of 
quantum mechanics underlying genetic mutation, is then a sign of ontological 
indeterminism and not of epistemic ignorance'(: 193). Russell(: 193) says that 'we can 
view nature theologically as genuinely open to objective special providence without 
being forced into interventionism' and he calls this view a 'non-interventionist view of 
objective special providence'. 
We will now discuss the details of this 'bottom-up' approach, which focuses on the 
quantum level, before moving on to Polkinghome and Peacocke's notion of active 
information, which deals with other levels of nature as well and is an example of the 
'top-down' approach. 
76 Russell's argument has also been used in the appraisal ofDembski's work (Subsection 4.4.9.3) and in 
the discussion on interpretations and points of departure in Section 6.1. 
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5.6.3 Quantum indeterminacy 
The focus on quantum indeterminacy as the arena in which God can exercise 
providential control without violating any physical laws has a long history. William 
Pollard proposed such a model for divine action in the 1950s (Barbour 2000:86, 
Russell 1998:208-209). Nancey Murphy, Thomas Tracy and Robert Russell have 
been influential proponents (Murphy 1995, Tracy 1995, Russell 1998). In the context 
of our overall focus on biological information, it makes sense for us to discuss 
Russell's explanation of how God can act purposefully, without disruption, within the 
processes of biological evolution at the quantum level. 
Russell (1998:193) has spelled out the benefits of seeing chance at the quantum level 
as ontological indeterminism. God's special action can then result in 'specific, 
objective consequences in nature', but since the quantum laws are 'irreducibly 
statistical', these consequences would still be consistent with the laws of science, 
while at the same time God's action will not entail the disruption of the processes due 
to their indeterminism. The specific claim that Russell (:195-196) makes is that God's 
special actions 'occur directly at the level of, and are mediated by, those genetic 
variations in which quantum processes play a significant role in biological evolution'. 
To support this claim, Russell (:196) needs to show that 'quantum processes may be 
interpreted philosophically in terms of ontological indeterminism and that quantum 
processes are relevant scientifically to genetic variation'. 
The whole point of quantum physics is that it challenges our normal understanding of 
chance that is epistemic - we call it chance when we do not know all the factors that 
caused an event to happen, but we believe that in principle we could have predicted 
the event if we had perfect knowledge of all factors (Russell 1998:200-201). 
Although there are many competing interpretations", Heisenberg's view that 'quantum 
chance points to a fundamental ontological indeterminacy in nature' is strongly 
77 Some exan1ples are Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation which imposes fundamental limitations on 
epistemology, and Everett's 'many-worlds' interpretation (Russell 1998:201 ). 
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supported" (:202). This means that the 'use of statistics in quantum mechanics is not 
a mere convenience to avoid a more detailed causal description', but that 'quantum 
statistics is all we can have, for there is no underlying, fully deterministic natural 
process' [Russell's italics] ( :202). A quantum system is then best described in terms 
of potentialities and actualities, where out of the superposition of 'coexistent 
potentialities', one of them becomes actual at a specific moment in time (:203). Just 
how one of the potentialities is selected to become actual is what cannot be causally 
explained by the interaction of the system with its environment. This leads to the 
possibility that 'we can view nature theologically as genuinely open to God's 
participation in the bringing to actuality each state of nature in time' ( :203). As 
Russell (:203) puts it, 'where science employs quantum mechanics and philosophy 
points to ontological determinism, faith sees God acting with nature to create the 
future'. In information terms, the selection amongst probabilities amounts to the input 
of information. Russell (:203) describes this action of God as realising the promised 
future for all creation by 'acting specifically in all events, moment by moment'". The 
next question is how these quantum events can have larger-scale effects. 
The easiest example is vision. Your eye can actually detect a single photon. In terms 
of our question as to how quantum processes are relevant to genetic variation, the 
starting point is mutations of DNA during replication, which is the ultimate source of 
genetic variation (Russell 1998:205-206). We can speculate that point mutations in 
the DNA arise 'from the interaction of a single quantum of radiation and a single 
proton in a hydrogen bond in a specific base' (:207). The point is that it is possible 
that effects at the quantum level can cascade up to the macroscopic level, although 
there are many uncertainties and other factors, such as the environment, definitely 
also play a role. 
78 Polkinghome (1996:34) confirms that 'almost all physicists and philosophers treat Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle (which was initially an epistemological discovery about what can be measured) as 
an ontological statement of quantum indeterminacy'. 
79 Russell ( 1998:203) mentions that process philosophy, like other metaphysical systems, can fit well 
\vith quantum mechanics, since process metaphysics can suggest that the 'openness of these quantum 
states includes the efficacy of inherent novelty or creativity, along with God's lure and the necessary 
conditions of the causal past'. 
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We have now sketched the lines of an argument for the theological view that God can 
act in a special way that is non-interventionist, provided that nature is held to be 
ontologically indeterminate'°. Again we can formulate this 'bottom-up approach in 
informational terms as being the input of information at the quantum level. Russell's 
overall approach is an example of a theology of nature, a concept we discuss further 
in Chapter 681 • 
A vast quantity of literature has grown around the possibilities offered to theologians 
by the quantum world, but we will here only briefly mention some implications that 
can be drawn from an information point of view. 
Ian Barbour (2000: 166-167), like many others, makes the point that selecting amongst 
the many possible alternative potentialities present in the quantum world conveys 
information without energy expenditure. As Barbour (:166) indicates, in quantum 
theory there is actually zero energy difference between potentialities". Barbour 
(: 166) also argues that if God is omnipresent, then no energy is required for the 
communication of information, in contrast to all other communication systems in 
which the transmission of information between two points requires energy. An 
example of omnipresence, or of a truly global entity, is the wave-function that is used 
in quantum mechanics to describe the wave-like aspects of matter; it contains all that 
is known about a system, it represents the information content of the system (Davies 
2000:66). As discussed in Section 4.2, a key feature of the wave function is that it is 
spread out over space. For example, two particles that have been 'entangled' are 
80 \file do not have the scope in this dissertation to go into all the counter-arguments against this 
position such as theodicy, occasionalism, etc., but Russell (1998) does provide extensive responses. It 
is also worth noting that Russell (:217) adopts a trinitarian and panentheistic view of God - a God who 
is 'supremely active in all reality, as its absolute origin (first person), the forn1 and wisdom which 
structure and guide its processes (second person), and the power which sanctifies and empowers it 
to\vards completion (third person)_ According to this vie\v, God cannot intervene 'because God is 
already universally present in nature' ( :217). 
:-1i Ian Barbour's typology includes a 'theology of nature' under the category of 'integration' and 
Barbour's comments on Russell's work as an example ofintegrationare discussed in Subsection 6.2.5. 
" Barbour (2000:87) has also explained this issue as follows: 'Since an electron in a superposition of 
states does not have a definite position, no force would be required for God to actualize one among the 
set of alternative potentialities.' 
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coupled to each other even ifthey are at opposite ends of the universe. This provides 
yet another example of the truly mysterious nature of the universe. 
5.6.4 Active information 
Peacocke and Polkinghorne view the concept of active information as the key model 
for describing God's interaction with the world" (Polkinghorne 1995:105). God's 
influence is then seen as an input of information rather than of energy, thus avoiding 
the charge of interventionism, and a link is made with the commonly used theological 
language in which the Spirit is described as guiding or leading creation (Polkinghorne 
1995:105, Peacocke 1995:113). The advantage is that God is thus not reduced to a 
demi urge, which acts as just another physical cause among others (: 105). 
Active information seems to be a very difficult concept to pin down, as can be seen 
from the different stances taken by Peacocke and Polkinghorne. Peacocke (1993:164) 
simply suggests that 'the influence of God on the world-as-a-whole might be 
appropriately conceived of in terms of a flow, an "input" of information rather than 
energy'. Polkinghorne (1995:105) is at pains to distinguish it from Shannon's 
information theory, in which information is the measure of the transmission of the 
specification of pattern, or what we have called 'counting information'. According to 
Polkinghorne (: 105), the concept of active information is 'obtained by taking the 
notion of chance in behaviour pattern brought about through the effect of infinitesimal 
disturbance and extrapolating it, in a metaphysical conjecture, to the case of zero 
energy-input'. Polkinghome (1996:36) has described the origin of this idea as being 
the supplementation of energetic causality with 'holistic causal principles of a pattern-
forming kind, leading to what might be called "active information": "active'', because 
the holistic principle brings about actual future behaviour; "information'', because its 
action relates to structure rather than to energetic properties'. 
Polkinghorne (: 107) has to distinguish between active information and Shannon's 
concept of information (counting information) since Brillouin and Szilard have shown 
SJ The use of the concept of 'information input' for God's \Vay of inducing effects in the world \Vas 
pioneered by John Bowker (Peacocke 1996:328). 
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that in order to input information, an irreducible input of energy is needed". 
Polkinghome's concern is that if God has to input energy to input information, we are 
back at the demiurge again. Peacocke (1993:370) agrees that this is problematic 
since, 'in the real world we seem to know of no transfers of information that do not 
involve exchanges of matter/energy'. Peacocke (1993:164) says that 'This seems to 
me to be the ultimate level of the "causal joint" conundrum, for it involves the very 
nature of the divine being in relation to that of matter/energy'. 
Peacocke's way out of this conundrum is by viewing the concept of active information 
as being an extension of the concept of information as used in communications 
theory, rather than being qualitatively distinct from it as per Polkinghorne's view 
(Peacocke 1995:113). Peacocke (:113) extends the concept of information by using 
Puddefoot's analysis". The use of information in the information theory sense 
(Shannon or counting information) can be regarded, as Peacocke (:113) formulates, as 
'explicating the underlying processes ("input" of information) which give shape or 
form (that is 'informing' in another sense) to the brain processes that are our mental 
experiences, some of which constitute our knowing'. Peacocke (:113) says that 'When 
God's interaction with the world, shaping patterns of events, is conceived of in these 
terms, then the way is open to enriching and making more intelligible our idea of 
God's self-communication to the world and furthermore to a fruitful linkage with the 
theological concept of God 's self-expression as the "Logos of the cosmos"'. 
Polkinghorne (1995:108) refers to the 'supposed' problem and believes that here we 
actually might 'perceive some faint clue about what is special in the Creator's 
interaction with his creation and why the language of Spirit is traditionally employed'. 
Polkinghorne (: 1996:40) says that the problem of minimum energy expenditure 
relates to the 'passive information record, which is not the same as pattern-forming 
active information'. Polkinghorne draws supports for this kind of distinction from 
quantum theory, as we will now discuss. 
s.i It \vas discovered recently that energy is required to erase information, therefore if no erasure 
happens, no energy is ,vasted. See Subsection 5.6.7 for more details. 
85 \Ve have discussed Puddefoot's analysis in Section 2.1, together with other definitions of 
information, and have used it in Subsection 5.2.5 as well. 
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Polkinghome's overall model for divine action draws on chaos theory in which an 
infinitesimally small energy input can result in a big change. The other, possibly 
complementary, option is to look to the quantum world, which we have discussed in 
the previous section (Subsection 5.6.3). We can here again note that, as Barbour 
(2000:166) indicates, in quantum theory there is actually zero energy difference 
between potentialities, whereas Polkinghome needs to extrapolate to the limiting case 
of zero-energy input. Polkinghome's defence against this line of argument is to refer 
to Bohm and Riley's version of quantum mechanics in which the 'guiding wave' 
retains its 'ability to influence the motion of the particle, however attenuated the wave 
may become' (Polkinghome 1996:40). This reminds us again of quantum 
entanglement, where two particles are connected even though they may be at opposite 
ends of the universe. Polkinghome ( :40) speculates that while embodied beings such 
as ourselves may need energy to input information, 'it seems coherent to believe that 
God's action could be in the form of pure active information' and that this would 
'afford a particular character to divine agency, consonant with theology's insistence 
that God is pure spirit'. 
It is clear that even though Peacocke and Polkinghome agree that the concept of 
active information has possibilities, they do not actually agree very well as to what 
this concept is. Polkinghome (1996:90) thinks that none of Puddefoot's definitions 
'quite corresponds ... to the concept of active information'. Of course, it is quite 
difficult to give concrete details of a concept that is so difficult to grasp. We have 
discussed elsewhere" John Haught's attempts to use the concept of Tao to try to show 
that information works via active inaction or non-interfering effectiveness which 
provides stmcture and pattern to the universe. In all of these examples, one's opinion 
of their plausibility depends on whether one thinks that the metaphysical 
underpinnings of the argument are acceptable or plausible. Polkinghome (:37) has 
rather strong feelings on the subject": he feels that top-down causality is a 'mere 
slogan' without the 'identification of that openness within the bottom-up description 
86 In Subsection 5.2.7: An exa1nple of the use ofinforrnation-based analogies in theology and in the 
section on God1s action from a process perspective, Section 5.6. 
87 This should not be a surprise coming from a self-confessed 'bottom-up thinker'! 
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alone that. .. affords room for manoeuvre for such a holistic form of causation'. This 
openness must be an ontological gap and not just a gap in our knowledge (:37). 
Polkinghome (:37) says that one needs to make the 'critical realist move from 
epistemology to ontology' to give respectability to one's conjectures. Therefore you 
have to believe in your ontological gaps: you cannot be sure that what we now think 
are ontological gaps will not later tum out to have been gaps in our knowledge after 
all. 
We have discussed the most popular candidate for such an ontological gap in the 
previous section, namely that quantum chance points to a fundamental ontological 
indeterminacy. It is interesting that Polkinghome (1996:40) does not opt for quantum 
indeterminacy when he dares to guess 'about the causal joint by which top-down 
causality is brought to bear'. The reason for this is that he does not think that the 
problem of how the classical and quantum worlds interact has been resolved (:37). He 
opts for a somewhat similar approach, since he assigns divine action to 'a hiddenness 
within the inescapably cloudy unpredictabilities of physical process, interpreted 
realistically as the sites of ontological openness' ( :40). Polkinghome focuses on chaos 
theory rather than quantum theory to follow the popular strategy of using 
epistemology to motivate ideas about ontology. Polkinghome (:35) makes a non-
deterministic interpretation of chaos theory that is not as familiar as the deterministic 
one. He bases his argument on the fact that chaotic systems 'are not totally disorderly; 
their future is contained within the confines of possibility represented by a limited 
range of behaviour called a "strange attractor"' (:35-36). All these possibilities, or 
paths traversing the attractor, have the same energy and they differ only in terms of 
the 'patterns of behaviour they represent' ( :36). The other major factor is the well-
known exquisite sensitivity of chaotic systems to their environment, which means that 
such systems must always be discussed in a holistic context. Active information, 
then, as we have already discussed, is what Polkinghome (:36) calls the 'holistic 
causal principles of a pattern-forming kind', that could detennine which pattern the 
system slips into. The deterministic equations that would normally be viewed as 
being in principle able to describe the behaviour of the system are understood by 
Polkinghome ( :36) as "'downward emergent" approximations to true physical reality, 
applicable only on those rare and specific occasions in which the constituents can be 
treated in isolation from their environment'. This is not often true and the system's 
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behaviour depends on the total situation, environment and equations, and there is a 
causality that flows from top to bottom and bottom to top. Polkinghome (:36-37) 
speculates that there may be 'holistic laws of nature driving the evolution of 
complexity' and that God might in fact interact with creation in the same way. We 
have previous! y discussed similar speculations by Davies about the laws of 
complexity". What is quite clear is that we have no idea as to how these laws might 
work, other than to call them 'holistic causal principles', labelling them as active 
information and, in addition, stipulating that no energy exchange must be involved. 
Peacocke does not go into the depths of the causal joint as Polkinghome did in 
explaining his view of whole-part constraint. He differs from Polkinghome in that he 
thinks that chaotic processes are not the source of openness, rather opting for quantum 
processes and quantum systems, in which 'macroscopic states arise from a chain of 
events initiated by a quantum-controlled one' (Peacocke 1995:112). 
In the context of the top-down causation theory, Polkinghome (1995:107) is sceptical 
of Peacocke's use of dissipative systems (e.g. the Benard instability in convection). 
Peacocke tries to show how 'holistic correlated behaviour is compatible with 
unmodified microscopic process'. These systems show behaviour that 1s 'still 
predominantly energetic in character'. Polkinghome (:107) is looking for 'an 
ontological influence of context on behaviour' and refers to Ian Barbour's process 
point of view as well. Peacocke (1995:115) essentially agrees, but his preferred 
phrasing is 'whole-part constraint'. Higher-level processes plus the boundary 
conditions of a higher complex whole can result in new functions and capabilities 
(Peacocke 1995: 114). Peacocke stresses that the laws of higher-level processes are 
fidly detem1ined by the laws of lower-level processes. Peacocke (:115) agrees with 
"Subsection 4.3.9. 
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Beckner" that process and theory autonomy of higher levels vis-a-vis lower levels 
inevitably leads to 'postulating some non-physical causal entity as operating at the 
higher level over and beyond the effect of the incorporation of the parts into the 
relationships and under the boundary conditions of the whole which undoubtedly in 
many cases affects how the parts behave.' This leads one to what has previously been 
called the 'vitalism position' in the context of describing living entities. Peacocke 
(: 115) is happy to accept this so-called 'weak' anti-reductionist position since the 
strong position leads to the problem sketched above, and he thinks that Polkinghome, 
although he calls himself a strong anti-reductionist, in essence holds the same position 
(Polkinghome and Peacocke both deny vitalism). Peacocke (:115) also contends that 
ultimately there is not much difference between his whole-part constraint and 
Polkinghome's downward-emergence. 
Within the scope of this dissertation, we cannot do full justice to the intricacies of this 
debate. We have simply given an overview to indicate the intricate depths to which 
these debates can go, indicating how difficult these issues are to understand and how 
the same philosophical position can be labelled differently by different people. 
89 Beckner distinguishes between theory autonomy and process autonomy (Peacocke 1995: 113-114). 
Theory autonomy is the autonomy of higher-level theories (dealing with more complex systems) with 
respect to lower-level theories in the sense that the 'higher are not epistemologically reducible to the 
lower' (: 114 ). This deals with the relation between scientific language used to describe different levels 
of complexity, which is what makes it different to process autonomy, which deals with some kind of 
causal independence, so that the laws of the higher-level processes are not fully determined by the 
different kinds of laws of the lower-level processes. The combination of process autonomy with theory 
autonomy is described by Beckner as strong organicism or what Peacocke calls anti-reductionism, and 
that of process non-autonomy with theory autonomy as weak organicism or weak anti-reductionism 
(: 114 ). Peacocke (: 114) characterises his own position as weak anti-reductionism, since he believes 
that the higher-level processes are detennined by lower-levels processes, 'determined' here being taken 
as 1neaning that the higher complex whole cannot be explained without taking into account the lower-
level processes. This bring us to the quote of Peacocke (:115) that we used in the text above, namely 
that he is a \veak anti-reductionist since he agrees with Beckner that the combination of process and 
theory autonomy of higher levels vis-it-vis lower levels inevitably leads to 'postulating some non-
physical causal entity as operating at the higher level over and beyond the effect of the incorporation of 
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5.6.5 The logos concept 
There are many references to the logos concept in the science and theology dialogue'°. 
We need to be careful to in using it out of its original context. As an example, Lucas 
(2001 :181) has castigated Dembski for committing the 'root fallacy' in his discussion 
of the etymology of logos". The etymology of a word can be totally irrelevant and 
misleading. The meaning of a word is its use in a specific context. 
Peacocke's dealing with this problem is exemplary. Peacocke (1993 :295) makes the 
link with the logos concept by starting off with the question: 'How could God 
communicate through Jesus?' He links this question with the problem of God's 
interaction with the world, which he considers as a 'holistic, top-down continuing 
process of input of "information", conceived of broadly, whereby God's intentions and 
purposes are implemented in the shaping of particular events . . . without any 
abrogation of the regularities discerned by the sciences' (:295). People are also part of 
the parts into the relationships and under the boundary conditions of the whole which undoubtedly in 
n1any cases affects how the parts behave. 1 
''
0 Barbour (2000:48,54, 60-61, 63, 114, 167, 176) is a good example. In this dissertation we focused 
on the logos-concept in process theology as an example of an integration-type approach to the relation 
between religion and science (Subsection 6.2.5); in the discussion of Active inforn1ation (Subsection 
5.6.4); and in the discussions on Enriching our concept of God in Subsection 5.3. 
'n De1nbski's study of the word logos relates to his desire to 1resist naturalistic construals of logos' 
(Dembski 1999:226). He argues that meaning transcends convention (:227). Words are not just 
contingent and conventional; there is a 'transcendent realm of meaning' to which linguistics entities 
such as logos are attached (:227). He then argues that logos resists all naturalistic reductions, since it 
was a far richer concept to the Greeks than just another linguistic entity (:227-228). One can ask why 
Dembski focuses so much on the word and not on the whole philosophical system in which logos is 
embedded. Dembski (1999:228-229) discusses the derivation of logos from the Inda-European word 1-
c-g. The root l-e-g has variants l-e-c as in intellect and l-i-g as in intelligent. At the end of his analysis, 
he comes to the conclusion that: 'According to its etymology, intelligence therefore consists in 
choosing betlveen' (:228). In his complexity-specification criterion he makes a connection between 
intelligence and choice. This leads him to conclude that 'the etymology of the word intelligent parallels 
the formal analysis of intelligent agency inherent in the complexity-specification criterion' (:228). 
Dembski (:229) uses etymology to 'prove' that natural selection is an oxymoron since 'it attributes the 
power to choose, which properly belongs only to intelligent agents, to natural causes, which inherently 
lack the power to choose'. To my mind, the only thing that this whole exercise proves is that one can 
prove whatever one wants through the use of etymology. 
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this world and can also be 'informed' by God through the nexus of events in human-
brains-in-human-bodies, and we call it 'religious experience' when the recipient 1s 
conscious of this input from God. Peacocke (:296) asks: 
How ... might we then interpret the experience of God that was mediated to 
his disciples and the New Testament church through Jesus? That is, how can 
we understand the Christ-event if God's self-communication is to be conceived 
of in these terms developed in order to make intelligible God's interaction with 
a world now perceived through the natural and human sciences? 
So the challenge is to use new concepts to express what scholars conclude about how 
Jesus Christ was understood in New Testament times. Scholars such as JG Dunn 
uses phrases such as 'Initially Christ was thought of ... as the climactic embodiment 
of Gods' power and purpose ... God himself reaching out to men ... God's creative 
wisdom ... God's revelatory word ... God's clearest self-expression . . . God's last 
word' (as quoted by Peacocke 1993:296). Peacocke (:296) views these descriptions of 
Christ as being all about God's communication with humanity, and hence as an 'input 
of information' from God, or the 'conveying of meaning from God to humanity'. 
Peacocke (:296) argues that in New Testament times, Jesus was experienced as God 
revealed, as God's communication to the world. So, when John interpreted the life of 
Jesus, he 'conflated the concept of divine Wisdom with that of the Logos, the "Word" 
of God, in order to say what he intended to say about the meaning Jesus the Christ had 
for the early witnesses' (:296). Peacocke (:296-297) refers to the work of John 
Macquarrie, who emphasised the 'beauty and aptness' of applying the logos expression 
to Jesus, since logos, in addition to the image of 'Wisdom', conflates two other 
concepts: 'the Hebrew idea of the "word of the Lord" for the will of God expressed in 
utterance, (especially to the prophets), and in creative activity; and secondly that of 
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"logos" in Hellenistic Judaism", especially in Philo - the Divine Logos, the creative 
principle of rationality, operative in the universe and especially manifest in human 
reason, and which is formed within the mind of God and projected into objectivity'. 
This line of thinking is supported by Ian Barbour (2000:48) who states that in the first 
chapter of John, the 'term Word (logos) merges the Greek principle of rationality with 
the Hebrew idea of God's Word active in the world'. According to Barbour, John goes 
further to connect creation to revelation since he states that the Word became flesh 
(Jesus). The early church affirmed that the very purpose of creation was made known 
by God in the life and death of Jesus Christ. 
In order to make the prologue to John's Gospel easier to understand and to convey the 
import of Word/Logos, Macquarrie has actually substituted 'Meaning' for it. Peacocke 
( 1993 :297) provides Macquarrie's paraphrase (the numbers used below refer to the 
paraphrased verses of John I): 
92 Du Rand (1990:37-42) mentions the many possible influences the Greek and Jewish worlds of 
thought had on John's Gospel. The Greek influence includes the philosophy of Plato and that of the 
Stoics, as well as Gnostic thought about the relation between humanity and God, as well as the attempts 
by Philo of Alexandria to syncretise Jewish, Platonic and Stoic thought (:37-40). The Stoa placed great 
emphasis on the logos concept The Greek word logos means both spoken word and pervading 
principle. Stoic philosophy focused on the latter meaning, and saw 'logos as the ordering principle of 
the universe; the wise person aims to live in harmony with it' (Beardslee 1993:464). Beardslee (:464) 
cautions that this meaning 'was quickly drawn into the interpretation of John's Gospel as 11 /ogos 
theology" developed in the second century CE\ since this was a 'principal means of making Christian 
thought intelligible to its environment; but later logos theology was more rationalistic than was the 
gospel of John'. Du Rand ( 1990:37) also warns that although John might have used the same terms and 
thought systems as those of Plato and the Stoics, it does not necessarily n1ean that he got his ideas fron1 
them. 
For the sake of completeness, we include the following summary of Stoic philosophy. The Stoa used 
logos as a philosophical term to 'signify the divine power of function by which the universe is given 
unity, coherence and meaning (logos spermatikos), nseminal Word 11 , which, like seed, gives form to 
unformed matter; man is made in accordance with the same principle, and is himself said to possess 
Logos, both inwardly (logos endiathetos, reason) and expressed in speech (logos prophorikos)' (New 
Bible Dictionary 1982). 
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(1) Fundamental to everything is Meaning. It is closely connected with what 
we call 'God', and indeed Meaning and God are virtually identical. (2) To say 
God was in the beginning is to say that Meaning was in the beginning. (3) All 
things were made meaningful, and there was nothing made that was 
meaningless. (4) Life is the drive toward Meaning, and life has emerged into 
self-conscious humanity, as the (finite) bearer and recipient of Meaning. (5) 
And meaning shines out through the threat of absurdity, for absurdity has not 
overwhelmed it. (9) Every human being has a share in Meaning, whose true 
light was coming into the world. (IO) Meaning was there and embodying 
itself in the world, yet the world has not recognized the Meaning, (11) and 
even humanity, the bearer of Meaning, has rejected it. (12) But those who 
have received it and believed in it have been enabled to become children of 
God. 
In order to link up again with the information-issue, we can look at the ordinary sense 
of the conveying of meaning which actually starts with the input of 'information' 
(Peacockel993:298). Peacocke (:298) quotes the work of John Bowker who talks of 
the role of the brain in decoding the incoming signals and representing them as 
infonnation. Meaning does not lie in the quantitative information input (the counting 
information), but in the brain's qualitative selection out of this information. Bowker 
sees this as a possible basis for talking about how the presence of God can be 
mediated 'through the process of brain behaviour by which any human being becomes 
an informed subject' and, in the case of Jesus, the incarnate Logos, 'a wholly God-
informed subject' (as quoted by Peacocke 1993:298-299). This is a bold move from 
trying to frame a philosophical and theological concept in scientific terms, to actually 
trying to explain how God could act using information input. Most of the discussions 
in the science-dialogue remain on safer ground! 
Another example ofa bold formulation is that of John Puddefoot (1992:9), who views 
it as remarkable that the biblical authors placed so much emphasis on the creative 
Word. He views the Word as the 'creative agency of God's being' and constructs the 
following chain ofrelationships: 
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Word involves information. Information involves creative power. Because we 
can use language we can organize information to change the world in which 
we live. Word is the beginning of all things. The imago Dei in man has much 
to do with this capacity for language; he speaks and it is done. 
Puddefoot (1992: 10) 
The last word on logos should perhaps go to Ian Barbour (2000:61), who has noted 
the prevalence of models of God as the communicator of information", and the 
connection between this idea and 'the biblical idea of the divine Word [which] can be 
viewed as the communication of rational structure and meaning when the world is 
interpreted in a wider context'. 
We now tum to a process perspective on God's action in the world. 
5.6.6 A process perspective 
God's relation to the world is quite different from a process perspective, as we have 
seen in our discussion of John Haught's work". If the world is seen as an unfinished 
process in which God participates by 'luring' it towards the future, then we are far 
removed from the 'God-in-control' picture in which God imposes a design. 
To Haught, the notion of intelligent design is 'too lifeless to capture the dynamic and 
even disturbing way in which the God of biblical religion interacts with the world' 
(Haught 2000:36). Instead of inputs of design information every now and then as 
Dembski95 has it, this God is active all the time as the source of the 'informational 
input' that enters into each present from the future (: 144). Haught's 'metaphysics of 
the future' is accompanied by a God who creates out of the future (:96). 
"
1 Barbour (:150) says that the theological models of God in the Bible include the model of God as a 
communicator 'expressing meaning and rational structure through the divine Word1• See also Barbour 
(2000:111). 
" In Section 5 .3: Enriching our Concept of God. 
'" Dembski's work is discussed in Section 4.4: William Dembski - Intelligent Design. 
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As discussed previously, Haught (2000:76-80) uses the concept of Tao to try to show 
that information works through active inaction or non-interfering effectiveness which 
provides structure and pattern to the universe without interrupting in any way the 
unbroken continuum of events. Haught (:79) points out that Christian faith also 
intuits that God creates and acts via 'the manner of humble self-restraint rather than 
crude intervention'. The coming of Christ is the event that has shown the 
self-emptying or kenosis of a God whose effectiveness lies in the opening up of the 
world to a new future (:110). 
Haught (2000:98) tries to explain how this action of God can take place by referring 
to complex physical systems that are physically deterministic and show chaotic 
behaviour, yet 'unfold in time almost as if they "know" where they are going"'. 
Haught ( :98) postulates that the future states of the system 'exercise a quietly 
formative effect on them in every moment of their evolution, shaping their trajectories 
in absentia, as it were'. This is yet another way of articulating the idea of information 
input from the future. This action of God may be so subtle that science does not 
notice it due to its orientation towards the temporal past. One needs to be open to the 
power of the future in order to perceive this action. Haught (:98) links this openness 
with the message of prophetic theology, namely that the dreams of the faithful are not 
illusions but intimations of the true reality. 
Of course, not only conscious beings but also inanimate matter needs to be able to 
respond to God. Haught (2000: 166) follows Whitehead by ascribing to the 
fundamental building blocks of the universe a measure of feeling that 'would allow 
them to respond to the persuasive presence of God' which is the lure of a source of 
order and novelty. The cosmos could only respond to the informational possibilities 
'proposed to it by God' if it had a 'subjective capacity to experience and respond to the 
pull of these possibilities' (:167). The world as seen through the eyes of science has 
been emptied of its subjective capacity to respond to God (: 177). 
To summarise Haught's view: he sees a God who humbly withdraws into the future, 
allowing a large degree of autonomy to the world, but does not withdraw completely, 
rather sustaining the world by offering it a range of relevant new possibilities 
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(2000: 119). This is a kenotic God who does not enforce a divine plan, but presents 
opportunities. 
We have now looked at the various ways in which people have used information 
concepts to try to understand God's interaction with the world. Our scientific 
understanding of the world is growing all the time and hence we need to take notice of 
some of the more radical recent developments in order to see whether new 
possibilities have arisen for developing new perspectives on God. 
5.6. 7 The interconnectedness of it all - recent developments in our 
understanding of reality 
5. 6. 7.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to this dissertation, we referred to the view that we are now living 
in the computer/information era in which information is the current metaphor of 
choice for the scientific world-view (Siegfried, 2000:45). We also referred to the fact 
that the concept of information has emerged as a very important fundamental way of 
connecting quantum mechanics, computational theory, complexity theory and 
evolution. In this section we will take a quick tour through these issues in order to 
point out just how radical this new view of the world is. 
According to Tom Siegfried (2000:240), there are 'two lines of thought that provide 
the richest source of speculation' regarding the idea of information as a fundamental 
quantity, namely RolfLandauer's principle and John Wheeler's slogan of 'It from Bit'. 
We will now discuss these two lines of thought. 
5. 6. 7.2 Landauer's principle 
Landauer studied the physics of computing and showed that computing 'in and of 
itself did not require any minimum use of energy', in other words an ideal computing 
system would not waste heat at all (Siegfried 2000:70-71 ). The problem was that 
erasing information required energy. Landauer calculated that erasing a single bit of 
information led to an energy loss roughly equivalent to the energy of a bouncing 
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molecule ( :71 ). This can be visualised as follows: Imagine that you are standing on a 
floor with a ball in your hand and a ball at your feet. This represents a system with 
two states, l and 0. The ball in your hand represents (1), the ball at your feet (0). In 
order to erase the bit, you drop the ball in your hand; but it does not occupy the zero 
state - it bounces back up to the 1 state, unless it loses energy via friction and 
deformation of the ball (as indeed it slowly does as it bounces up and down). Here we 
have the fundamental connection between energy and information. The fact that 
erasing a bit of information requires a minimum energy loss is known as Landauer's 
principle (:72). Further work by Charles Bennett showed that one could in fact 
compute without using energy if one never erased information (:73). This type of 
computing did not involve storing an infinite amount of information, but one had to 
ensure that the computing was reversible, it had to be possible to retrace all the 
computational steps so that any previously generated information could be 
reconstrncted (:73). 
Well, where does this lead to? Landauer has made a startling connection between his 
principle and the laws of physics. He views the laws of physics as 'recipes for 
performing computations' (Siegfried 2000:241 ). Scientists use these laws to calculate 
in advance what will happen and the question is: What would these laws actually 
mean if we could not actually do these calculations? Information processing and 
physical laws 'must in principle be tightly entangled' (:241). The ultimate laws 'must 
be limited to what actually can, in principle, be calculated in the universe we inhabit' 
(:241). We cannot do an infinite number of calculations based on our laws, and hence 
these laws must be idealisations, the 'real' laws must be limited by the universe's 
ability to support these calculations ( :242). We will see in the next section where this 
argument can lead to with regard to our understanding of the situation at the origin of 
the universe. 
5.6. 7.3 Wheeler's 'It from Bit' 
John Wheeler has expressed the same thoughts, but in a different way. He does not 
believe in the actual existence of a continuum of numbers (Siegfried 2000:245). One 
cannot go on ad infinitum with the process of finding another number between two 
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numbers. Wheeler's slogan, 'It from Bit', deals with the fundamental nature of the 
quantum world: 
It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at 
bottom - a very deep bottom, in most instances - an immaterial source and 
explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing 
of Yes-No questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in 
short, that things physical are information-theoretic in origin. 
[my italics](as quoted by Siegfried 2000:245) 
The example Wheeler uses is that of a photon-detector picking up a photon that has 
travelled from a source to the detector (Siegfried 2000:245). If we ask whether the 
detector clicked during a certain interval, and the reply is Yes, we usually say that a 
photon was the cause. So we normally imply that a photon existed. We do not talk of 
the photon as if it exists before the emission or after the detection. Can we, however, 
talk of the photon as if it exists between these two events? Wheeler calls any talk of 
the existence of the photon as a 'blown-up version of the raw fact, a count' ( :245). The 
photon detector count is the answer to the question we posed originally. All that we 
can know is one bit, the answer to a Yes-No question (:246). 
Another example of the consequences of the physical nature of information is the 
intriguing fact that the surface area of black holes increases as information falls into 
them (Siegfried 2000:246). When a massive star explodes at the end of its lifetime, 
the residue is a massive core that collapses due to gravitational attraction. The 
gravitational forces are then so intense that nothing, not even light, can escape from 
falling into it, hence the term 'black hole'. Since any object of any kind contains 
information due to the fact that its structure contains information about the way the 
parts are related, information is lost forever when an object falls into a black hole 
(: 197). This creates a problem since the Jaws of quantum physics specify that 
information is never lost; in principle one must be able 'to trace back everything that 
has happened' in the past (: 197). Here we have a link between quantum physics and 
gravity, the fundamental building blocks of our understanding of reality. Wheeler 
found that as a black hole swallows information, its surface area increases 
accordingly. The increase in surface area is due to the increase in the entropy (or 
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degree of disorder) of the black hole, which increases its size and hence its surface 
area ( :200). The paradox of the destruction of information by black holes remain 
unresolved. Siegfried (:205) says that 'here in black holes, at the intersection of 
gravity and quantum mechanics, was another instance. of information playing a central 
role at the scientific frontier'. Scientist Chris Fuchs has applied Landauer's principle 
to analyse the erasure of information by black holes ( :205). The erasure of 
information requires energy and consuming energy increases the entropy. This leads 
to an increase in the surface area of the black hole. The relationship between the 
destrnction of bits and the increase in the surface area can be calculated, and it agrees 
fairly well with other ways of determining the effect of entropy-increase on the 
surface area (:206). This confirms that Landauer's principle, devised in the realm of 
computers, is also applicable to astrophysics (:206). To Siegfried (:206), this suggests 
that the notion that information is physical, as explicated through the development of 
the physics of information and computation, may 'offer important insights' into the 
development of a theory of quantum gravity that reconciles quantum mechanics with 
general relativity. John Wheeler predicts that in future 'we will have learned to 
understand and express all of physics in the language of information' (as quoted by 
Siegfried 2000:246). 
5.6. 7.4 The universe as a computer 
Edward Fredkin is another scientist who, like John Wheeler, has tried to work through 
the consequences of posing the question regarding the actual existence of a continuum 
of numbers (Siegfried 2000:57-59, Brown 2000:58-60). Fredkin is famous for the 
idea that the universe is a 'gigantic digital computer processing information' (Brown 
2000:59). To Fredkin, 'information processing is at the foundation of everything that 
happens' (Siegfried 2000:58). Whereas traditional dynamics would describe the 
world in terms of matter in motion, with the associated momentum" being the 
property that is conserved, Fredkin holds instead that momentum is nothing but 
information. 'It's the information that tells a particle at one point in space and time 
where it should be at the next moment' and this next moment arrives due to a 
')& Momenh1m =mass x velocity. 
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computation that 'transforms information from the present into the new conditions 
representing the next instant of time' (:58-59). 
Where does this thinking come from? Quantum mechanics has shown that energy and 
many properties of matter are quantised. This has led Fredkin to postulate that 
everything is quantised: space, time and all properties of matter come in indivisible 
units so that nothing is continuous (Brown 2000:59). The benefit of this idea is that it 
places a ceiling on the amount of information in the universe. If aspects of nature 
were continuous, nature would contain an infinite amount of information. This 
universe in which everything is quantised is thus 'analogous to a digital computer 
because, in both, everything would be discrete and finite' (:59). Now we come to the 
crux of the argument where the different elements come together. As Brown (:59) 
says of the state of knowledge in the 1950s when Fredkin did this work: 
If the universe was a gigantic digital computer, the laws of physics had to be 
part of the computer's program. It was known that the laws of physics at a 
microscopic level were reversible, yet all known computers were irreversible. 
We have mentioned Landauer's principle and Bennet's work which lead to the 
possibility of reversible computing without any energy consumption. Fredkin used a 
different approach, by developing the Fredkin logic gate". This works reversibly, 
enabling the construction of a reversible computer (Brown 2000:61 ). A complete 
design for such a computer has been developed (:71). The next step is to make 
explicit the assumption that physics and computation are alike by actually building an 
artificial universe. The machines known as 'cellular automata' allow one to do exactly 
this (:71). 
97 Computers are based on binary logic (true~ I, false~ 0). Any binary logic circuit can be built up by 
cmmecting a selection of AND, OR and NOT gates. An AND gate takes two inputs (e.g. 0 and 1) and 
produces one output (in this case a 0, since 0 is not the same as 1 and hence 0 and 1 = 0). In order not 
to lose information, a Fredkin gate has the same number of outputs as inputs (Bro\VIl 2000:61-62). 
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5. 6. 7. 5 Cellular automata 
The idea of a cellular automaton (CA) was developed by John von Neumann in order 
to show how artificial forms of life could be produced by means of computers (Brown 
2000:72). Self-producing machines were a key notion. Von Neumann came up with 
the idea of 'beings' that lived on a two-dimensional grid, where each square or 'cell' 
was programmed to follow mathematical rules that determine whether they live or die 
or reproduce ( :72). John Conway developed a version called the Game of Life, which 
has been implemented in many freely available software programs. Computer 
scientists and mathematicians have used cellular automata as a 'powerful tool for 
studying how complexity can naturally arise from very simple laws' (:73). Cellular 
automata can not only perform universal computation", but they can also work 
reversibly (:73). Fredkin is fascinated by CAs. He regards them as the most natural 
model for the view that the universe is a computer since they share three properties 
with the physical world (:73-74). CA's computations are local, occur in parallel, are 
reversible, and the rules are the same everywhere. Likewise, the laws of physics are 
also the same anywhere, are reversible, and the computations of physics are also local 
and in parallel. Tom Toffoli and Norman Margolus, by changing the rules of CAs, 
have used them as a way of modelling physics in artificial universes (:75). They have 
called their CAs the 'God Game' because they can play God with this artificial 
universe (:75). The connection between CAs and physics works both ways: physics 
can be described as a computational process and computation is physical (:76). It 
remains somewhat of a leap to take the next step to describe all of nature, and not just 
physics, as a computational process. Although Toffoli and Margolus do not follow 
Fredkin in saying that the universe is a computer, Toffoli has described nature as 
having been 'continually computing the "next state" of the universe for billions of 
years' (as quoted by Brown 2000:76). Margolus has made calculations of the number 
of computations going on in a piece of matter (:76). This depends on the amount of 
energy and for each joule of energy, an astounding maximum processing rate of 
approximately 1033 operations per second is calculated (:76). Fredkin has calculated 
the total amount of computation occurring in the universe by determining the size of a 
CA needed to simulate the universe in all its details. The answer is astonishingly 
98 Alan Turing sho\ved that computers are 1universal in the sense that any one con1puter can do the 
same thing as any other' (Brown 2000:61). 
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small: a CA operating at the smallest possible quantum scale would only need to be 
the size of a fairly large star to 'faithfully simulate the entire macroscopic evolution of 
our universe from the Big Bang to the present in about four hours' (:76-77). Fredkin 
calls the difference of 1063 in space-time volume between the universe and such a 
system, the 'missing workload', which thus forms one of the great mysteries of the 
cosmos ( :77). Fredkin's explanation for this is that 'either something else is going on 
in the universe that we don't know about or God was incompetent on a scale that 
boggles the mind' (as quoted by Brown 2000:77). My position is that we just do not 
know what is really going on! The size of the 'missing workload' shows how little we 
understand. 
We will now briefly examme some of the other ways in which the impact of 
information concepts has been pervasive in all fields of science. Siegfried (2000:240) 
talks of an 'information-computer approach to science', which has grown from within 
science, leading to explorations by scientists such as 'biologists untangling the inner 
action of cells and neuroscientists analyzing the brain to physicists teleporting photons 
and building quantum computers', and all of these explorations have information as a 
'tangible commodity' at their cores. 
5.6. 7.6 Cells 
We start at the cell. In Chapter 4 on Gitt's work we have covered the information-
storage aspect of DNA and the encoding role that DNA plays in the production of 
proteins. Leonard Adleman has been the pioneer in demonstrating that DNA can 
compute" and in fostering the model that the living cell is a programming system, 'an 
information processor extraordinaire' (Siegfried 2000:97). Laura Landweber describes 
evolution as 'having years to compute solutions to all sorts of problems' such as 'what 
is the best approach for the reproductive success of the species'. (:IOI). Evolution 
produces competing algorithms. 
90 See Gitt's discussion of genetic algorithms in Subsection 4.2.6.2 as well. Adleman was the first to 
use DNA in this way to do parallel computation (Siegfried 2000: 111-112). 
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If DNA is the hard disk, then proteins can be viewed as the RAM' 00 where most of the 
computing action takes place (Siegfried 2000:104). The cell's chemistry represents a 
computer's current memory state since 'protein activity changes constantly with new 
inputs of outside information into the cell' (: 105). Bacteria 'know' how to swim 
towards food since circuits of proteins, which are responsive to the environment, 
control the swimming. The messages from outside the cell arrive in the form of 
molecules that are locked onto by receptor proteins in the cell membrane. The part of 
the receptor protein that is inside the cell changes shape, which causes other proteins 
inside the cells to change shape as well, thus triggering a chain of chemical reactions 
that determine the behaviour of the cell (: 107). This is a beautiful example of the 
physical nature of information and, as Schmitz-Moormann has discussed"', there is no 
separation of information and its structure - the shape (information in the relations of 
the atoms) of the 'signal' molecule fits into the docking-area of the receptor protein 
and then the shape of the receptor changes - a real example of shaping information in 
action! The cell computes output from input just like any other computer. In a 
similar manner, the immune system can be viewed as processing information about 
invading organisms (:110). We can now move up the ladder of complexity to the 
most complex biological information processor, the brain. 
5. 6. 7. 7 The brain 
While there is general agreement amongst neuroscientists that the brain computes, one 
should not confuse the brain with a computer. Ira Black, a neuroscientist, pointed out 
that computers and brains both process information by manipulating symbols. In 
computers the 'symbols are electronic patterns', whereas in brains, 'the symbols are 
molecules' (Siegfried 2000:120). The key difference is that there is no distinction 
between hardware and software in the brain since 'molecules are both the symbols 
representing information in the brain and the tools that perform the brain's tasks' and 
therefore hardware and software are the same (:120-121). In a computer, the 
hardware is idle unless activated by the software program. The brain is a 'flexible and 
complicated chemical factory, constantly reorganizing itself in the light of new 
100 . Random Access Memory - for example your Personal Computer's volatile memory. 
101 See Section 5.5: Linking the hierarchy of organisational levels. 
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experiences', and not a hard-wired machine like a computer. An experience induces 
chemical changes that can last from days to weeks. Black asserts that human 
behaviour can ultimately be seen as being the output of all the molecular messaging 
happening in the brain (:121). Brain processes are part of a chemical loop that 
connects genes and environment, and notions such as 'mind' or 'self should emerge 
naturally from understanding the loop (:121). The gap between molecular messaging 
and behaviour can, in principle, be bridged as Black asserts, but it will be a long 
bridge-building exercise in which information processing and the new field of study 
called 'computational neuroscience' will probably play a role (: 121 ). 
5. 6. 7. 8 Computational neuroscience 
Computational neuroscience uses computers to make models of neurons and then uses 
these models to study how neurons compute (Siegfried 2000:121-122). Ultimately, 
the goal is to study how the brain's nerve cells combine to create thoughts and 
behaviour. Neurons are linked into networks and, similarly, artificial neurons are 
linked to each other, forming what is called 'neural networks'. Typically, the neural 
network would assume that neurons are either on or off, depending on the inputs 
received from the neurons it is connected to. Computational neuroscientists try to 
simulate real neurons in which each neuron's output depends on the influx of many 
different messages, and neurons are not actually on or off, but have different rates of 
firing of electrical impulses(: 123). The complexity of the brain is becoming clear. A 
'whole ladder of understanding' is required which starts at the level below neurons, the 
messenger molecules and the protein molecules of the cell membranes, continues up 
to the cell level, then to how cells are connected via synapses, and then we have the 
small networks of neurons that form, finally, subsystems of networks forming the 
central nervous system (:123). In order to get to behaviour, the whole ladder must be 
simulated. We are now still pretty much at the level of the single neuron and here 
progress has been made in understanding how changes in the cell itself can also affect 
behaviour(: 123, 127-128). 
Apart from the fact that we are still at very basic levels of understanding about the 
brain, there are still disagreements about whether the brain is like a computer or not, 
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with Roger Pemose102 and John Searle'°' being prominent denunciators of this idea. 
We will not cover their arguments here, but will focus on the interesting debate as to 
what sort of physical mechanism at work: Is the brain like a computational 
mechanism or a dynamic mechanism? (Siegfried 2000: 130). This question is also 
linked to chaos and complexity theory. 
We have discussed previously'°' the popular notion that thinking, like computers, 
deals with information and that thought is therefore the manipulation of symbols that 
represent information (Siegfried 2000: 131 ). The dynamic view is that 'the mind's 
powers stem not from mimicking microprocessors, but from the natural processes of 
molecules in motion' (: 130). Thought is therefore an aspect of nature like any other, 
and can be described by equations similar to that governing the motion of the particles 
in a system, e.g. the planets in the solar system. Many particles make for a complex 
dynamic system, such as the weather. The key issue is then whether thought is 'merely 
the result of matter in motion, or is it a process of representing and manipulating 
information?'(: 131). 
It may be that both points of view are true in part. The brain is made up of cells, 
which are made of atoms, which are constrained to obey the laws of motion. If the 
brain is a dynamic system, its condition will change as the particles move according to 
the laws of motion and this may in some way determine our behaviour (Siegfried 
2000:138). Dynamics emphasize the way a system's parts change with time, whereas 
the computing view focuses on the arrangement of the system's parts at any given 
point in time (: 138). This arrangement is a structure that represents information. 
Sensor signals enter the brain and change its pattern (neurons firing) to form a new 
structure, and thus input is transformed into output (: 139). Melanie Mitchell of the 
Sante Fe Institute in New Mexico has argued that both dynamic and computational 
102 Penrose put his case that the brain is not a computer, since it can do what no Turing machine can do, 
in the following two books: The Emperor's New Mind and Shadows of the .Hind (Siegfried 2000:126-
127). 
103 John Searle has developed the Chinese room argument \Vhich tries to show that people understand 
what they do whereas computers do not (Siegfried 2000:127-129). An overview of this argument is 
given in Subsection 4.4.5: The complexity-specification criterion in action. 
104 When \Ve discussed Ira Black's position regarding the brain in this section. 
201 
theories are required to explain thought and that a theory is needed that incorporates 
both change and structure (:139). The seeds of such a theory could be found in the 
work done on theories of complexity which attempts to explain how complex 
behaviour can emerge from systems with large numbers of interactions between fairly 
simple constituents. Jim Crutchfield, also of Sante Fe, does not think that the issue is 
whether the brain is dynamic or computes, but rather how the dynamic system (that is 
the brain) performs the computations (:140). Mitchell has found that processes that 
appear to be dynamic, 'like particles in motion, can perform the task of representing 
and conveying information' (:140). He has demonstrated this through the use of 
cellular automata as an example of a device that can learn to compute without 
receiving any instructions from the outside (:141-143). Each cell receives its 
instructions from its neighbours, based on the rules that are set up, and there is no 
central control. Such a system has been shown to perform a computation leading to a 
desired behaviour, e.g. half the cells on and the other half off, and the step-by-step 
progress of the system has revealed a 'pattern of activity that looks very much like the 
plot of particle paths in a dynamical system' (: 142). Mitchell says that the particles 
'move in such a way as to allow the system to compress information about the 
environment and to communicate information throughout the system' (:142). In order 
to find the local rules that will lead to the desired end-result of a certain type of global 
co-ordination, the techniques of genetic and evolutionary programming'°' are 
followed. Strings of computer code that encode the various local rules are allowed to 
mix and combine at random, with the most successful rules being allowed to produce 
the next generation. After many generations, the most successful rules emerge with 
the ability to solve the desired problem and hence the system of cellular automata has 
essentially produced its own program. 
The importance of this work is that it provides a means of understanding how 
sophisticated behaviour such as thinking can emerge when simple things such as 
neurons process information (Siegfried 2000: 143). Ultimately, Mitchell suspects that 
this understanding will help bridge the gap between inanimate machines and living 
entities, as our understanding of what a machine is and what life is changes. Our 
105 See also Gitt's arguments against the significance of these techniques in Subsections 4.2.6.1 and 
4.6.2.2, as well as Subsection 5.2.2.4 for Smith's view. 
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notion of a machine becomes more biological and our notion of biology becomes 
more machine-like. 
This concludes our brief glance at computational neuroscience in which we have tried 
to show how it could play a role in bridging the gap between molecular messaging 
and behaviour to which Ira Black has referred. We have also reinforced the point that 
the distinction between hardware and software is moot in systems such as cellular 
automata, which produce their own programs through an evolutionary process. 
Therefore, unlike our standard computers, this type of computer has much more in 
common with the brain, in which there is no distinction between hardware and 
software. The other point is that these computers are very different in terms of their 
architecture, since they do not have a central controller as do ordinary computers, but 
a collection of simple elements connected in complicated ways, just like the brain. 
The intelligence of such systems can also evolve. We have therefore started to 
address the mystery of how living things can compute, which probably forms the 
basis of intelligence. 
5.6. 7.9 Consciousness, observers and complexity 
We have not yet touched on the mystery of consciousness. This is really at the 
frontline of research, indeed it is probably the final frontier. It is not clear which 
approach would be the best to understanding consciousness, but it is probably safe to 
agree with Siegfried (2000:148) that insight into information processing will be 
central. We will briefly mention a few examples of one type of approach that links 
back to the fact that information is a fundamental part ofreality. 
David Chalmers, in the context of investigating consciousness, dismisses materialism 
and functionalism, and proposes a two-aspect theory, which he calls 'property 
dualism' or a form of panpsychism (Barbour 2000: 145). In this theory, information 
states, which are realised both subjectively and physically, are the fundamental 
building blocks ofreality'06 • 'We might say that the internal aspects of these states are 
10
<' In essence, his theory of consciousness posits the existence of inforn1ation as a ne\v fundamental 
property (Horgan 1999:242). 
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phenomenal and the external aspects are physical. Or as a slogan: Experience is 
information from the inside; physics is information from the outside' (Chalmers as 
quoted by Barbour 2000: 145). 
Another approach has been to combine quantum physics and information processing 
via the notion of observers (Siegfried 2000: 160). If information is a fundamental part 
of reality, and observers are the entities that gather information, then they must play 
some role. Just what the role of the observer is, has been the subject of much debate 
in quantum physics. Barbonr (2000:80) holds that it is not the mind that affects 
observations but the actual interaction between the measuring instruments and the 
system. Information becomes available through this interaction. Barbonr (:80) states: 
'The transfer of information, not consciousness, is the essential featnre of the "collapse 
of the wave function" during an observation'. This is another way of formulating the 
essential role of information in all interactions of matter at the quantum level. 
In agreement with this approach and in contrast to the view that observers are 'some 
sort of magicians pulling reality rabbits out of a quantum hat', a new focus has been 
placed on the role of observers as entities that 'acquire and process information', or 
so-called IGUS (Information Gathering and Using Systems) (Siegfried 2000:160). 
There is a natural connection between complexity, information processmg and 
observers. The understanding of complexity involves information-processing ideas 
and information processing naturally involves the idea of observers (Siegfried 
2000:161). Murray Gell-Mann has outlined a way to understand complexity (:161-
166). One starts out by considering the level of detail that one wants to describe and 
then specifies the sort of language one wants to use to describe the system to 
somebody else. The degree of complexity of a system is then related to the length of 
the shortest message required to describe it. 'Shortest' in this context means the 
shortest computer program needed to produce this description of the system. Gell-
Mann called this the 'ideal complexity' (: 162). We have often met this notion of 
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complexity commonly called algorithmic complexity'07• Basically, the issue is that a 
string of a hundred 11111111111 's can be reproduced by the program 'Print 1 a 100 
times', which is a whole lot shorter yet expresses the same information. The ability to 
shorten or compress the message describing a system is the key to understanding the 
nature of observers (: 163). This is a non-mystical view of observers. Observers are 
seen as being simply the complex systems (human, non-human, non-living) that have 
the ability to compress information about the environment. Not all complex systems 
can compress data. The special ones that can are called 'complex adaptive systems' by 
Gell-Mann and they can adapt and evolve (:163). According to this definition, people, 
and all other living things, are complex adaptive systems, as are some products of 
living things such as human language, the economy and the enterprise of science 
(: 163-164). Complex systems such as thunderstorms are not adaptive since they do 
not compress information as living things do in their DNA. Another key property of 
adaptive systems is their ability to process and compress information to generate a 
schema that 'encodes a system's experience of the environment into principles that 
summarize the regularities of nature' (: 164). This schema provides a representation of 
how nature behaves. It describes the regularities of nature and allows the organism to 
adapt to these regularities. Here again we come up against the issue of randomness. 
A truly random message cannot be compressed and hence will have an equally long 
computer program to represent it. The complex adaptive system must have the ability 
to develop a schema that compresses the regularities and discards the random inputs 
that reduce the system's ability to predict the results of actions. Systems with the best 
schemas will survive because they can predict correctly what will happen. 
Gell-Mann's view is that a similar process underlies the undertaking of science as 
well, with scientists encoding the regularities they discover into a schema or set of 
theories. 
107 See definitions in Subsection 2.1.3. Algorithmic con1plexity is also called the Kolgomorov 
complexity. Kolgomorov showed how a deterministic device (a Turing n1achine, a universal con1puter) 
could manufacture randomness (Siegfried 2000: 169). According to Jim Crutchfield, this notion of 
complexity is actually the same as Shannon's idea of information produced by a source (: 169). We 
have discussed Davies' use of this concept in Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 and Dembski's use of it in the 
context of Complex Specified Information in Section 4.4.7. 
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The best measure of complexity is then not just the length of the shortest computer 
program, but the length of a schema needed to describe a system (remember that a 
schema excludes the random elements) (Siegfried 2000:166). Gell-Mann also 
considers the amount of effort it took to produce the schema, as in how much time 
scientists took to produce the theories. This quantity Gell-Mann calls 'depth' and it 
reflects 'the number of steps in the process leading from a system's origin to its current 
state of complexity' (:166). 
It should be clear that we have arrived at a measure that also reflects information 
content and not information quantity, which is dominated by randomness. The move 
from algorithmic complexity to the schema is a cmcial one since it is the move from 
information as quantity as per Shannon's definition, or counting information as we 
have called it, to information as content. Another approach to content information is 
that of Jim Cmtchfield who has developed the concept of complexity as structure, as 
the non-random stuff of a system. He calls his notion of stmctural complexity 
'statistical complexity' (Siegfried 2000: 169). The statistical complexity is low when 
the randomness is high and it is low when the randomness is low. In the intermediate 
range where randomness and complexity are mixed, statistical complexity is high. 
This tallies with 'depth' since if the system is either very simple or very random, one 
will not take a lot of time to figure it out. The technical definition of statistical 
complexity is that 'it measures how much memory you need to record enough 
information about the system to predict what it will do next' (:170). So ifa system's 
behaviour is very regular, a few measurements will enable accurate prediction. If a 
system's behaviour is random, then one will soon realise that and will not need to 
store information about it since we cannot predict its behaviour in any case. More 
complex systems will produce behaviour that takes longer to understand, is more 
structured and will require more memory to describe and predict. The important point 
here is that when complexity is measured in this way, it is 'in the eye of the beholder, 
or the observer or the IGUS' since statistical complexity measures the ability of an 
observer to predict its environment (:170-171). Thus we are now starting to measure 
something that is meaningful to the observer. We are moving towards understanding 
what infomrntion means to some entity. Statistical complexity and its associated 
information measure are starting to bridge the gap between counting information and 
meaning information. 
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Things get really interesting when we examme the interactions between these 
observers. Crutchfield talks of these observers as 'agents'. They are complex adaptive 
systems which survive by observing their environment, representing the regularities 
thereof in their memories (a schema) and acting accordingly (Siegfried 2000:171). 
Part of their environment is the other agents and they need to figure out each other's 
behaviour in order to be able to predict (compute!) and act accordingly for survival. 
Those that are smarter, with better schemas for recording the environment and better 
abilities to process that information in order to choose the best actions, will survive 
better. This, then, provides a new way of looking at evolution as involving agents and 
computing resources. Crutchfield calls it 'evolutionary mechaniCs' and it can explain 
how new species emerge (: 172). Crutchfield's model as described by Siegfried is 
given below: 
In his view the umverse is a deterministic dynamical system, its parts all 
moving according to natural law and the forces that act on them. Agents 
within this universe do not appear to be deterministic, though, to any agent 
observing them. That's because the observing agent has limited resources to 
make a model or schema of other agents. Since one agent cannot predict 
everything about another agent, some of that other agent's actions seem 
random. With more computational resources, an agent could predict more 
about another agent's actions and therefore choose wiser behaviours in 
response. An agent's model of the jungle, after all, controls how the agent will 
behave in response to various sensory inputs. 
(Siegfried 2000:172-173) 
New features of life can emerge as agents adapt by improving their ability to process 
information. There is a trade-off: if resources are plentiful, agents can develop more 
sophisticated models and store more information about the environment, whereas if 
resources are scarce, agents with simpler models have the edge since they require 
fewer resources. Therefore relatively simple agents such as flies find a niche in a 
complex world together with complex agents such as human beings. From an 
'information-processing' perspective, the different species develop through 
'innovation', in which an agent learns to make a more efficient model of its 
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environment usmg its limited resources, thus becoming a new agent (Siegfried 
2000:173). At the core of Crutchfield's views is the realisation that 'reality is a 
process' that 'balances stability and order against instability and change (:173-174). 
Crutchfield also quotes Whitehead: 'The art of progress is to preserve order amid 
change"°' (:174). In Crutchfield's conception of the universe of'computational agents, 
information storage assures stability and order; information processing permits 
instability and change' and therefore computation 1s the 'paradigm of reality as a 
process' (:174). 
The other fundamental issue that arises out of Crutch field's conception of the universe 
is that the regularity observed in the universe depends on the ability of the observer to 
describe and compute, and hence the regularity is not simply out there to be 
discovered (Siegfried 2000:174). Agents 'bootstrap' themselves up on the basis of 
what works, not necessarily dealing with the full complexity of what is out there. 
Siegfried makes the observation that science is the way that we use to describe the 
universe, and since humans do not have infinite resources, our description of the 
universe will also not be omniscient. We do, however, improve as scientific 
revolutions occur (driven by better use of resources and the discovery of additional 
resources, e.g. computers) that radically change our schemas of the universe. 
Ultimately, our understanding is limited by ourselves, the observer describes reality. 
The link can also be made to the quantum mechanical description of the world. Gell-
Mann, for example, sees the role of the observer as being the something that is betting 
on the probabilities, which I interpret as making one of the many possibilities real 
(:175). 
After our quick survey, it is now time to take stock and speculate about what all of 
this means in the context of trying to understand divine action. 
108 We discussed God's relation to the world from a process perspective in Section 5.6.6. Process 
theology is also discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.5. We can just note here that process 
philosophy sees the basic components of reality as 'not the two kinds of enduring substance (mind and 
n1atter), or one kind (matter), but one kind of event H'ifh two aspects or phases' [Barbour's italics] 
(Barbour 2000: 146). 
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5.6.8 Applying our information-based understanding of reality to the issue of 
divine action 
5.6.8.1 Introduction 
There are a few key speculations about the nature of reality that can have a major 
impact on how we think about divine action. We will discuss the possible impact of 
the linkage between laws, matter and information, and take a look at what CAs teach 
us about control. 
5.6.8.2 Laws, computation and matter 
We have discussed Rolf Landauer's work m computational physics. One of the 
fundamental linkages that he talks about is the limitation placed on the laws of 
physics by the universe's ability to support computation. This leads him to a new 
understanding of the laws of physics. Landauer says that the standard view of the 
laws of nature is deeply ingrained in our culture and uses the Bible as an example 
(Siegfried 2000:244). Landauer interprets 'In the beginning was the Word' as 
meaning that 'in the beginning the controlling principle of the universe was present 
from the outset' (:244). According to him, this means that 'the laws of physics 
preceded existence itself, but his opinion is that 'the controlling principle must be 
expressed within the physical features of the universe' and hence existence comes first 
and then the laws (:244). Landauer is joined in this by John Wheeler who uses the 
slogan 'law without law', and does not think that the laws of physics are 'eternal and 
immutable', but that they are 'like species, mutable and of "higgledy-piggledy" origin' 
(as quoted by Siegfried 2000:245). 
This does leave us with food for thought if our conception of God's action is that of 
the law-giver for the universe and as the continual sustainer of the law. The laws 
guiding the universe's behaviour may arise out of the interaction of matter itself, 
which of itself is doing computation all the time. We can sketch a radical progression 
from a singularity of compressed matter to dispersed matter that forms structure, 
information in the relations within the structure itself. The structure is formed under 
the guidance of laws that can be viewed as being of the nature of information 
processing by the matter involved. If we take seriously Landauer's thinking that the 
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'the controlling principle must be expressed within the physical features of the 
universe', then we move towards a picture of God, not as the distant or initial law-
giver of deism, but as an immanent God, as the controlling principle. John Haught 
formulated the same kind of idea. Haught (2000:76) views informational patterning 
as 'a metaphysical necessity; for in order for anything to be actual at all, it must have 
at least some degree of form, order or pattern'. We can view God as being the 
immanent source of the pattern, out of which flows reality. God's action is then non-
interventionist but essential. When we now bring in Wheeler's idea that all things 
physical have at source an immaterial, information-theoretic origin, then we are really 
sailing in some very deep waters of metaphysics. Perhaps we should be provocative 
and state that we should talk of 'information' instead of metaphysics, smce 
'information' is now corning to the fore as that which is really beyond physics. 
We have been discussing what could be called the ultimate form of local control. We 
now tum to CAs and the lessons learned about control and top-down effects. 
5.6.8.3 What CAs teach us about control 
CAs show us that complexity can arise from very simple laws, and that local 
computational intelligence in fairly simple entities can evolve and combine to achieve 
global co-ordination so that the system as a whole responds appropriately to the 
environment. Our idea of a computer with hardware and software as distinct entities is 
being replaced by that of a network of CAs developing their own programs as they 
evolve as a result of inputs and constraints from the environment. The thinking done 
by Peacocke and Polkinghorne on the concept of active information'°' is relevant here. 
The interaction between CAs and the environment may be the best way we currently 
have of understanding Polkinghome's 'top-down causation' via an 'an ontological 
influence of context on behaviour' (Polkinghorne 1995: I 07) or what Peacocke 
(1995:115) calls 'whole-part constraint' via boundary conditions and high-level 
processes. CAs show us that intelligence can evolve in reaction to the environment 
based on simple building blocks evolving simple laws regarding their local 
interactions. CAs have an interesting combination of local control, co-ordinated 
109 See Subsection 5.6.4: Active information. 
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behaviour and environmental influence. God can be immanent, part of the essence of 
what each cell of a CA is, and God, by being immanent in everything, is also part of 
the environment and hence also exerts an influence on the intelligence that is 
evolving. 
The outcome of this seems to be that rather than a God-of-the-gaps, we can talk of a · 
God who forms the frtness landscape, creating laws and an environment that is 
'informed', shaped with direction. Just as life is not a property of single molecules, 
and CAs are only intelligent as part of the network, so God's creative actions cannot 
be discerned by studying the bits and pieces of the cosmos, but are a property of the 
cosmos as a whole. God's guiding influence can possibly be regarded as operating via 
the setting of the boundary conditions, the informational patterning of reality, the 
design of the fabric of reality, and via the design of the embedded constraints, such as 
the quantisation of everything. 
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6 It is all a matter of interpretation and points of departure 
6.1 Introduction 
As an example of different points of departure, we can briefly discuss the reaction of 
Robert Russell to Dembski's attack on Darwin's theory of evolution. As we have 
noted in the discussion of Dembski' approach, Robert Russell's (1998: 192-193) 
approach is that 'theistic evolution offers the real attack on atheism by successfully 
giving a Christian interpretation to science - thus undermining the very assumption 
they share with atheists, namely, that a Darwinian account of biological evolution is 
inherently atheistic'. This, then, is in contrast to the fundamentalist approach of an 
all-out attack on the results and methods of science. The underlying assumption is 
that the results of science are 'value-neutral' and it is the interpretation of the results 
that depends on one's viewpoint. An atheist such as Richard Dawkins would probably 
deny this since 'letting the results speak for themselves' (as if that was possible .... ) 
suits his atheistic goals. 
In trying to understand the different viewpoints and the different approaches that 
scientists and religious people take, it is very useful to examine the typologies 
developed of the ways in which people have related science and religion. 
6.2 Barbour's four-fold typology of the relationship between science and religion 
6.2.l Introduction 
Ian Barbour is a highly respected figure in the field of science and religion and his 
typology, which dates from his 1990 book Religion in an Age of Science, will be used 
as our basis. Other attempts at typologies will also be mentioned. 
The four-fold typology is (Barbour 2000:2-4): 
• Conflict 
o As an example: Groups that agree that you cannot believe in both God 
and evolution, such as biblical literalists and atheistic scientists. You 
have to believe in either the one or the other explanation. 
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• Independence 
o Science and religion refer to different domains of life or aspects of 
reality and they use different kinds of language that serve different 
functions. Science deals with the How? and religion with the Why? 
o In a weaker version, people hold that science and religion offer 
complementary perspectives that are not mutually exclusive. Conflict 
can therefore only arise when people exceed the boundaries, when 
science philosophises and religious people make scientific claims. 
• Dialogue 
o Comparing the methods of the two fields, pointing out similarities and 
differences, for example, the use of conceptual models and analogies 
for the unobservable. 
o Science raises limit questions that it cannot answer itself (Why is there 
order in the universe?). 
o Using concepts from science as analogies when talking about God's 
relation to the world (God as the source of information?). 
• Integration 
o A partnership model with different degrees of integration. 
o There are three distinct versions with different points of departure: 
• A natural theology seeking proof in nature of the existence of 
God. 
• For example, the use of the argument that physical 
constants appear to be fine-tuned as if by design. 
• The point of departure for the argument is science and 
its results, e.g. as evidence for design (: 118). 
• A theology of nature. The reformulation of religious beliefs 
due to the results of science. 
• The point of departure for the argument is theology (the 
life of a religious community) (: 118). 
• A systematic synthesis. Using a philosophical system to 
interpret both scientific and religious thought within a common 
conceptual framework (as in Barbour's (:28) use of process 
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theology, in which 'both science and religion contribute to the 
development of an inclusive metaphysics'). 
• The point of departure for the argument is metaphysics, 
'the search for the most general philosophical categories 
for interpreting diverse kinds of experience' (: 118). 
The very idea of a classification scheme has been criticised on the grounds that 'the 
relations between science and religion are too complex and too context-dependent to 
be grouped under any classification scheme' (:4-5). Van Huyssteen (1999:282-283) 
argues against rigorous demarcation between the domains of enquiry into science and 
religion that is implied by such models. Although the standards of rationality will be 
different in each domain, the resources of rationality are present in each, allowing for 
interdisciplinary dialogue. We can abandon attempts to unify and integrate all our 
discourses under a single unified form of knowledge. Rationality is present in each 
domain, in theology and in the sciences. 
Another school of thought denies that science and religion can be related at all since 
the ideas of both science and religion are social constmctions and do not describe 
reality at all. Therefore you caunot argue that they are both about the 'same thing' 
Barbour (2000:5). Barbour (:5) sees the purpose of the typology as being to function 
as a 'guidebook' to the interdisciplinary field. He admits that by their very nature 
guidebooks are selective and may oversimplify the complexity of the real world. 
In the context of this dissertation, the typology is used to show the influence of the 
different points of departure that people have and how that affects their use of the 
conceptual models of science. Barbour (2000: 10-11) relates what he calls the 
theological spectrum to his typology ofrelations between science and religion. We 
can represent these relationships as follows: 
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Conflict 
/ 
Naturalism 
+ materialism 
Pantheism 
Liberalism· 
Neo-orthodoxy 
Traditionalism 
Integration 
Dialogue 
Conservatism ~ 
----...=..___,,...,. Independence 
Fundamentalism 
+biblical literalism 
As we can see, the two extremes of naturalism and fundamentalism are grouped 
together under Conflict due to the fact that both make strong claims about nature and 
both demand that one chooses between them as rival versions of the truth. 
Independence 1s a position favoured by conservatism, traditionalism and neo-
orthodoxy. The participants in Dialogue do not fit easily into Barbour's theological 
categories. Pantheism and liberalism favour Integration. 
John Haught developed a typology with the categories Conflict, Contrast, Contact and 
Confirmation (Barbour 2000:4). Conflict and Contrast correspond to Barbour's 
Conflict and Independence, and Contact combines Dialogue and Integration. The 
category of Confirmation deals with 'the vindication by science of the background 
assumptions originally derived from theology', which is viewed as a form of Dialogue 
by Barbour (:4). There are more complicated classification schemes: Barbour (:4) 
mentions those of Ted Peters and Willem Drees. Barbour (:4) mentions that there is a 
trade-off between increased precision and the ability to accommodate a diversity of 
views. 
We will now analyse some of the work in the area of information concepts to see if 
the typology sheds some light on the factors underlying the positions adopted and the 
resultant use of information concepts. 
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6.2.2 Conflict 
We have covered Gitt's work and he is an example of what Barbour calls 'biblical 
literalism'. Dembski is a leading light of the Intelligent Design movement, which 
represents a shift away from biblical literalism to a more nuanced attack on the 
naturalists such as Dawkins. The metaphor of conflict suits both parties since both 
hold strong views that there is only one truth and that there is only one way to that 
truth. 
The conflict is on the world-view level and on the level of the methods of science as 
well. Dembski makes it clear that his approach is two-pronged: a scientific and 
philosophical critique of enlightenment rationalism and scientific materialism or 
rationalism (Dembski 1999: 14, 120). Gitt (1997: 101) is of the opinion that scientists 
are vassals of materialistic' philosophy and that evolution is a metaphysical research 
programme. Dawkins espouses epistemological reductionism and ontological 
reductionism or materialism (Barbour 2000: 94), in other words, there is only matter. 
In reaction, Gitt (1997:47) tries to show that information is another fundamental entity 
whose origin cannot be explained in terms of material processes. 
It is interesting that the status of science is elevated by both parties. Dembski makes 
it quite clear that it is important to be able to detect God empirically(!) because 
science is the only valid form of knowledge in our culture (Dembski 1999:118). Gitt 
(1997:10, 79) is at pains to formulate natural laws oflife that are based on empirical 
reality and to show how evolutionary theory violates these laws. Both Gitt and 
Dembski seek hard, 'scientific evidence', of design in nature. Dembski works hard to 
convince scientists that science needs to include the study of intelligent causes. He 
wants to be included in the inner circle of science, presumably to avoid the label of 
non-scientific that has been attached to so-called creation science. I agree with 
Barbour (2000: 14), who calls it 'scientism' to assume that science is the only reliable 
source of knowledge. 
Both parties agree that the actions of God can be empirically verified. Not only is 
God needed to explain certain events, the mode of God's action is seen to be direct 
intervention. Of course, the atheist would deny that God exists in the context of their 
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analysis of such events, but the common point of departure is that if God exists, 
he/she must be detectable through the methods of science. Dembski talks of . 
'injections of information' that can be detected in the form of complex specified 
information (CSI) captured in design. Dembski (1999:104) claims that he is not a 
deist, but a theist since he wants to assert that God is empirically detectable. His 
definition of theism is contentious. One can ask: What comes first, the adherence to 
theism or the empirical evidence? The answer is probably that the world-view - the 
belief system - comes first. Ifwe believe that God exists and intervenes in the world, 
then we will find evidence of God's interaction with the world. Similarly, naturalism 
assumes that nature is self-sufficient and hence will probably not find evidence of 
God. 
Of course, as Dembski (1999:13) acknowledges, his approach leaves him open to the 
charge of practising bad science and bad theology. As Barbour (2000: 14) notes: 'the 
concept of God is not a hypothesis formulated to explain tbe relation between 
particular events in the world in competition with scientific hypotheses'. Furthermore, 
intelligent design can be seen as a new version of the God-of-the-gaps strategy, in 
which gaps in our knowledge about how information is produced are taken to be gaps 
in processes into which God needs to inject information (Barbour 2000:99). 
Dembski's response is that intelligent design is a research programme at the interface 
between science and theology (1999:13). The programme does not include research 
into the nature of God, however, as that is seen to be fixed or received trnth, but 
science must be expanded. Information is used as the key element in this research 
programme at the interface and, as we have noted, it is a malleable concept with many 
interpretations that can be used to support one's particular position. 
The key issue is that we have a conflict between two belief systems, each of which 
claims to encompass the whole of reality. Thus we have theism in conflict with a 
'metaphysics of materialism' and not in conflict with science (Barbour 2000:14). 
Barbour (: 16) accuses adherents of this conflict model of perpetuating the 'false 
dilemma of having to choose between science and religion'. 
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6.2.3 Independence 
In the context of biology and the battles caused by creationism in the USA, a popular 
response has been that there can be no conflict between science and religion, since 
they are independent, mutually exclusive domains with different methods and 
functions in human life (Barbour 2000:99). From the scientific side, Stephen Jay 
Gould is perhaps the most famous exponent of this approach with his principle of 
non-overlapping magesteria (NOMA) (Barbour 2000:99-100). A magisterium is a 
domain of teaching authority. Science covers the empirical realm of fact and theory, 
while religion covers the question of meaning and moral value (:100). This is perhaps 
better known as the split between the How vs Why questions. This position dismisses 
both the deriving of philosophical conclusions from science and the natural theology 
approach (such as the intelligent design argument ofDembski). 
Theologically speaking, independence is favoured by neo-orthodoxy since it holds 
divine revelation to be pre-eminent and does not want to rely on human reason, thus 
dismissing natural theology (:100-101). From this perspective, the issue of the origin 
of biological information would be seen as being part of a general line of thinking that 
God created the world and that there is a relationship between God and the world, but 
it would not be seen as providing evidence of any kind (:101). Barbour's critique of 
neo-orthodoxy is that the emphasis on transcendence leads to a gap between God and 
nature, and to a neglect of divine immanence and ongoing creation (:101). 
Another popular theological approach has been the use of the distinction between 
primary and secondary causes that was used by Thomas Aquinas (Barbour 2000: 101-
103 ). An example of this approach can be seen in the work of William Stoeger, a 
Jesuit astrophysicist. In the context of an assessment of the biological evidence for 
teleology, he has maintained a careful distinction between the level of metaphysics 
and theology versus the level of science (Stoeger 1998: 163-190). Scientists do 
investigations in terms of efficient causes and often ignore final causes, whereas 
Stoeger would argue on a metaphysical level, and as a Christian, for a primordial 
initiating cause (:187, 186). In contrast to Gitt, Stoeger argues that we cannot 
conclude on 'purely scientific and philosophical grounds' that a conscious divine 
purpose exists (:186). God's intentions are made clear by revelation (:190). God's 
218 
intentions are not evident in evolutionary history, nor are they contradicted by it 
(: 190). When Stoeger talks of biological information, specifically about the genotype, 
he uses the concept of a recipe rather than that of a blueprint (:178). The genome 
controls processes but does not describe the details of the outcomes. Stoeger would 
not talk of a primordial blueprint that contained all the necessary information for life, 
as Gitt would, but of the general course of evolution towards complexity that can be 
interpreted as inevitable in the universe in which we live (:180). The relationship 
between the two levels is that the findings of science partially constrain how we 
understand God's intentions (:190). Complete independence is therefore probably not 
possible, since all our thinking is coloured by our knowledge of the scientific view of 
the world. 
6.2.4 Dialogue 
Dialogue is a very popular approach, which has also been extensively criticised, 
especially by those who hold the conflict thesis. The attempt is often made to show 
similarities between presuppositions, methods and concepts (Barbour 2000:23). 
Emphasis is placed on the fact that the methods of the two fields or domains are 
comparable, for example that both science and theology use conceptual models and 
analogies for the unobservable, and that the concepts used may be analogous. 
Independence, as we have seen, emphasises the differences. It differs from an 
integration approach in that less emphasis is placed on the fundamental oneness of the 
challenge that is faced, namely how to make sense of the world, and less emphasis art' 
the common response that is given, namely the fundamental metaphorical nature of 
our understanding of the world. In addition, a dialogue approach does recognise the 
significant differences that do exist. 
The shared presupposition can be formulated as follows: the world is intelligible, but 
has to be investigated; the information is there, but has to be decoded. Christians hold 
that the world is created by God with a rational order, and thus could have been other 
than it is; information has been embedded, hence the need for and the possibility of 
decoding, partly through scientific methods. 
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Let us examine the methods of science and theology. Barbour (2000:25) says that 
scientific 'theories do not arise from logical analysis of data but from acts of creative 
imagination in which analogies and models often play a role'. Unobservable entities 
are imagined on the basis of conceptual models. Scientific data are theory-laden 
(:25). In terms of the transition from data to information to understanding, the role of 
metaphors and models is essential. We can and do speak of religious data such as 
religious experiences, texts and rituals. This data is also 'theory-laden' with 
conceptual interpretations, and metaphors and models are also used. Although the 
religious data and religious beliefs carrnot be empirically verified and replicated, 'they 
can be approached with ... the same spirit of inquiry found in science', and the 
'scientific criteria of coherence, comprehensiveness and frnitfulness have their 
parallels in religious thought' (:25). 
We have in this dissertation focused mainly on the conceptual parallels between 
science and theology. God's activity in the world can be thought of as the 
communication of information (Barbour 2000:27). As we have discussed 110 , God's 
action can be seen as a non-energetic input of information, a selection out of the many 
possibilities present in chaotic processes that brings about new structures (: 167). The 
divine creating Word also involves the communication of meaning and strncture 
which has to be interpreted in a wider context (:I 08). A parallel can be drawn with 
biological information, in which, for example, the meaning of DNA is dependent on 
almost the whole cell with its various functions (:106). 
Barbour (2000:164) discusses a conceptual parallel for a theological understanding of 
God's relation to nature in which God is seen as 'the designer of a self-organising 
process'. We have discussed the differences between Dembski and Davies. Design 
can be viewed as a prepared plan in the mind of God, which is played out by the 
world and in which chance cannot play a role. However, in the context of self-
organising systems, with the general tendency towards greater complexity, both law 
and chance are part of design. Barbour (:165) talks ofa 'revised deism in which God 
designed the world as a many-levelled creative process of law and chance' and gives 
Paul Davies as an example of someone adopting this position. This position can lead 
110 Refer to Subsection 5.6.4: Active information. 
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to a distant and inactive God. Niels Gregersen attributes a more active role to God by 
proposing that God acts as a structuring cause, limiting the range of possibilities 
within which creatures can act, and not as a triggering cause that would unilaterally 
determine events (:165). This can also be seen as the input of information, in which a 
bit of information halves the possibilities. Gregersen (1998:360) talks of the 
autonomous processes in evolutionary systems being at the same time theonomous 
processes 'if God is the stimulating power of inspiration who elicits the most fruitful 
probability spaces in which the creatures try out their pathways, and who also restricts 
other possibility pathways'. The important point is that Gregersen is willing to part 
with the traditional omnipotent sovereign God, and, although it may be that the 
dialogue with science has pushed him in this direction, he does find biblical support 
for a God of self-limitation. In any case, it demonstrates that one must be willing to 
shift one's thinking away from traditional paths when participating in the dialogue, 
which brings us to Integration, the next category. 
6.2.5 Integration 
Barbour (2000:83) acknowledges that 'there is no sharp line' between the Dialogue 
and Integration groups of proponents. We do have a 'scale' of increasing integration. 
As we have discussed in the introduction to this chapter, Barbour (2000:27-28) 
identifies three distinct versions of Integration, namely natural theology, a theology of 
nature and a systematic synthesis, with differing degrees of integration. 
Natural theology 
As an example of natural theology, we have discussed Dembski's work on intelligent 
design, which shows that the argument for design is alive today. The Anthropic 
Principle has also been the subject of much debate. Barbour (2000:30) thinks that 
natural theology has 'great appeal in a world of religious pluralism, since it starts from 
scientific data on which we might expect agreement despite cultural and religious 
differences' and it is also appeals on a personal level due to the wonder and awe that 
the findings of science evoke. In the case of integration rather than conflict, there is 
one big difference: 'integration-minded' proponents of design do not claim that the 
argument from design offers conclusive evidence of theism, whereas Dembski claims 
at least an overwhelming likelihood if not absolutely conclusive evidence. The more 
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modest claim is made that 'belief in a Designer is more plausible than (or at least as 
plausible as) alternative proposals' (:30). Barbour (:30) acknowledges that the main 
limitation of this argument is that it can, at best, only lead to a remote deistic God. 
This is why Dembski (1999:104) asserts that he is not a deist, but a theist since he 
wants to assert that God is empirically detectable. Natural theology can be combined 
with theistic beliefs 'based on personal religious experience and a historical tradition' 
(Barbour 2000:30). 
A theology of nature 
In contrast to a natural theology, a theology of nature has as its point of departure a 
religious tradition and not the findings of science (Barbour 2000:31 ). Scientific 
findings lead to the reformulation of some of the traditional theological doctrines, 
especially that of creation and anthropology. This approach tries to harmonise 
religious beliefs with scientific knowledge and in the process leads to greater 
adjustments than would be done in the context of a Dialogue type of approach. 
Consistency of theological doctrines with the broad and well-established results of 
science is sought and not direct implication or proof. The purpose is not to argue 
from scientific evidence to God as natural theology does. Our scientific understanding 
of how nature works has an impact on our thinking regarding the relation between 
God and nature. In our discussion on Dialogue, we have covered the conceptual 
parallels based on scientific concepts of God's activity in the world. A theology of 
nature goes further; an example is the models of God the Creator that have been 
created as a result of theological reformulation (:59). We have also discussed the close 
relationship between models and metaphors and analogies in both science and 
theology. We have noted that a metaphor leads to a rethinking of all the concepts 
involved. In the Bible we encounter many different models of God as Creator: God as 
a designer imposing order on chaos (Genesis), as a potter forming an object (Jer. 18:6, 
Isa. 64.8), as an architect laying the foundations of a building (Job 38:4), God as a 
gardener (Gen. 2:8), God as Spirit active in continuing creation (Ps. 104.30), God 
creating through the Word (John 1 ), and God rnling the universe as Lord and King 
(Barbour 2000:60-61). Some of these models are easier to harmonise with scientific 
findings than others. 
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The potter analogy 'assumes the production of a completed, static product' which does 
not agree well with the scientific understanding of nature as an 'ongoing, dynamic, 
evolutionary process', while the gardener concept and God as Spirit have greater 
possibilities ( :60-1 ). The view of God as King has connotations of omnipotence and 
predestination which clash with evolutionary views of nature. We have mentioned the 
analogy between the divine Word and the communication of information in the 
previous section. Polkinghome and others have proposed a model of God as 
communicator of information that does not clash with scientific laws. Dippel talked 
of the 'Divine Informaticus', God as the source of information. The important point is 
that the purpose is not to use science to prove that God exists, but that science is used 
as the source of new analogies and metaphors for talking about God (:61). 
Barbour (2000:88) sees the various proposals, such as that of Robert Russell"' that 
God can act in quantum indeterminacies, as a theology of nature - 'that is, a way in 
which the God in whom we believe on other grounds might be conceived to act in 
ways consistent with scientific theories'. We cannot base an argument for God's 
existence on quantum indeterminacies since we could have argued that the 
uncertainties are due to human ignorance or that it is purely chance that operates. The 
purpose of these proposals is to show that the traditional view of divine omnipotence 
can be sustained without violating the laws of physics (:89). In order to guard against 
claims that this approach is implicitly reductionist, Russell holds that God acts at the 
quantum level and also at higher levels as a top-down cause ( :87). We have discussed 
Peacocke and Polkinghorne's formulation of top-down causation under the heading of 
active informationw. Peacocke holds that God's action is a boundary condition or 
constraint on the relationships at lower levels and that God's purposes are 
communicated through the patterns of events in the world (: 172). These patterns are 
what Dembski has called intelligent design and what Gitt has formulated many 
information laws to try to explain. Peacocke has also used many models of God's 
relation to the world, such as the whole/part relation with God as the all-
encompassing whole, and the mind/body relation, with God as the world's mind 
111 Russell (1998: 191-223). 
112 Subsection 5.6.4: Active infonnation. 
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(: 115). The mind/body relation has also been used by Clayton, for example to defend 
top-down causality by referring to the fact that ideas can cause changes in the brain 
(: 173). There has been a progression in the integration of the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches. Clayton analyses the emergence of higher-level phenomena 
from physical constituents, building a case for what he calls emergent monism (:173). 
In addition, following Peacocke, he works with the mind/body relation as an analogy 
for God's relation to the world, defending panentheism, in which the world is in God, 
but God is more than the world(: 173). 
Barbour's contention is that classic ideas of omnipotence coupled with simplistic 
concepts of design lead to the distant God of deism (2000: 114). God as the 
determiner of quantum-level indeterminacies brings God very close, inside reality as 
it were, but does have a reductionist flavour. Top-down causation guards against 
reductionism and talks of God's role being at the systems level. Peacocke does start to 
rethink some key issues such as omnipotence, stressing the self-limitation of God that 
God suffers with the world (: 115). We have referred to the move from classic theism 
to deism to panentheism. All of these do still seem to have elements of ad hoc 
accommodation to the findings of science. In order to achieve greater consistency 
between science and central religious beliefs, some people do take the bold leap of 
rethinking the whole system of God and creation. We therefore next discuss 
systematic syntheses. 
A systematic synthesis 
We have discussed the adjustments and reformulations of traditional doctrines. A 
more systematic approach is possible in which 'both science and religion can 
contribute to a coherent world-view elaborated in a comprehensive metaphysics' 
which provides the 'set of general concepts in terms of which diverse aspects of reality 
can be interpreted' (Barbour 2000:34). Such an inclusive metaphysics then serves as 
an area for common reflection by the scientist, theologian and philosopher (:34). 
Barbour (2000:34) puts forward process theology 'as a promising candidate for a 
mediating role today because it was itself formulated under the influence of both 
scientific and religious ideas'. We have previously discussed the application of 
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process thought by Haught, Van der Lubbe and Laurent m The process view of 
nature holds (under the influence of quantum physics) that 'processes of change and 
relationships between events are more fundamental than enduring self-contained 
objects' and that 'nature is a dynamic web of interconnected events, characterised by 
novelty as well as order' ( :34). The basic constituents of reality are not 'two kinds of 
enduring substance (mind and matter), or one kind (matter), but one kind of event with 
two aspects or two phases' [author's italics] (:35, 146). Events are 'constituted by their 
relationships and their contexts in space and time' and can be 'organised in diverse 
ways, leading to an organisational pluralism of many levels' (:146). The starting point 
of process philosophy is the human experience as known from within, hence the view 
that 'all integrated events at any level have an inner reality and an outer reality', which 
take on' different forms at different levels' (: 174, : 146). Whitehead attributes 
subjective experience to diverse systems, it simply has 'progressively attenuated 
fom1s' as we move from people to animals, cells and atoms (: 146). Unintegrated 
aggregates such as stones or plants do not have a form of subjective experience. 
Consciousness appears in 'animals with a central nervous system as a radically new 
emergent' and involves the 'unification of information from the past and from the 
body with a new element: the contrast of past and future, the entertainment of 
possibilities, the comparison of alternatives' (: 148). In fact, any unified entity at any 
level 'contributes something of its own in the way it appropriates its past, relates itself 
to various possibilities and produces a novel synthesis that is not strictly deducible 
from the antecedents' (:174-175). This leads to different sorts of causality, all of 
which are non-coercive. Every new event can be seen as a 'present response (self-
cause) to past events (efficient cause) in terms of potentialities grasped (final cause)' 
(: 175). 
Process philosophy leads to a different view of all aspects of reality, including 
conscious beings. It also leads to a different view of God. Whitehead sees God's role 
as being 'the ordering of potentialities' and God as the 'primordial ground of order 
structures the potential forms of relationship before they are actualized'[ author's 
113 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3: Enriching our concept of God, Subsection 5.2.7: An exanzple of the use 
o.f i11JOrn1ation-hased analogies in theology and Subsection 5 .6.6: A process perspective (\\1hich deals 
with God's interaction with the world). 
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italics] (Barbour 2000:175). God is also the 'ground of novelty, presenting new 
possibilities along with alternatives which are left open' (: 175). God influences the 
world through the valuation of certain potentialities to which particular creatures can 
respond, without determining the response (: 175). This can be regarded as another 
way of describing information-flow from God to the world. Van der Lubbe and 
Laurent (1992:87) talk of God limiting the 'multiplicity of unbounded possibilities'. 
Haught (2000:73) views God as 'the ultimate source of the novel informational 
patterns available to evolution'. Every entity is thus the joint product of past causes, 
divine purposes and the entity's own activity (Barbour 2000: 175). 
Whitehead emphasises that God is also influenced by the world (: 175). The central 
categories of process philosophy (temporality, interaction, mutual relatedness) also 
apply to God. God is temporal in the sense that the 'divine experience changes in 
receiving from the world and contributing to it' (: 175). Thus we have a two-way 
information flow between God and the world. God's purposes are eternal but God's 
knowledge is updated by events. God 'influences the creatures by being part of the 
data to which they respond' (:175). In addition, 'God is supremely sensitive to the 
world, supplementing its accomplishments by seeing them in relation to the infinite 
resources of potential forms and reflecting back to the world a specific and relevant 
goal' (:175). 
Theologians such as Johan Cobb and David Griffin have used process thought to 
reformulate Christian beliefs (as discussed by Barbour 2000: 175). The dipolar 
character of process-theism is expressed by referring to God as 'creative-responsive' 
love. God as creative is the 'primordial source of order and novelty, which can be 
identified with the biblical concept of logos as rational principle and divine Word' 
(: 175). God as responsive is temporal, as we have discussed above, and is affected by 
the world. God's relation with people is non-coercive, always depending on the free 
responses of people, all of whom are equally loved and called by God (:176). Cobb 
and Griffin see Christ as 'God's supreme act', the incarnation of the logos, 'the 
universal source of order, novelty and creative transformation' (:176). 
To Barbour (2000: 177), process thought offers distinctive answers to problems in the 
'classical monarchical model' of God. Process thought is 'in tune with the 
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evolutionary view of nature as a dynamic process of becoming, always changing and 
developing, radically temporal in character' (:177). The slow process of evolution is 
consistent with God's evocative rather than controlling role. All entities are 
interdependent, and therefore there are no problems with a soul-body dualism. 
Genuine chance is no longer a threat to God's control as in the monarchical model. 
We have covered the attack on the role of chance that Dembski has made. Process 
thought makes indeterminacy one of its basic postulates and affirms both order and 
chance or openness in nature, since the divine purpose is 'understood to have 
unchanging goals, but not a detailed eternal plan' (: 177). God is viewed as 'the source 
of novelty and order' and not as the 'transcendent Sovereign of classical Christianity' 
(:35). Human freedom is embraced, we are seen to be participants in an 'unfinished 
universe' and omnipotence and predestination are repudiated in favour of a 'God of 
persuasion' (: 178). God is not seen to be powerless, but instead of the power of 
control, which results in a zero-sum game (I win, you lose), we have the power of 
empowerment, which results in a positive-sum game for both parties (: 179). 
Human sin is understood as a 'product of human freedom and insecurity' and suffering 
is no longer a divine punishment, but the part-and-parcel of struggle present in the 
evolutionary world which results in greater value (Barbour 2000: 178). In any case, 
God is no longer omnipotent, and we cannot make God responsible for particular 
fonns of evil. Instead, God is with us in our suffering and works to redeem it (: 178). 
Barbour (2000: 179) stresses that interreligious dialogue is encouraged by process 
theism which is non-exclusive due to the acknowledgement that God's creative 
process is at work at all points in nature and history. According to Barbour (: 179), 
process thought does allow one to speak of the 'particularity of divine initiatives in 
specific traditions and in the lives and experience of specific persons'. Process 
thought is not deistic, the idea of God's continuing action in the world is supported, 
including 'actions under special conditions that reveal God's purposes with 
exceptional depth and clarity'(: 179). 
Barbour's conclusion is that process thought offers a framework that encourages 
dialogue among world religions, as an 'alternative to both the militancy of absolutism 
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and the vagueness of relativism' (:179). He feels that 'we can accept our rootedness in 
a particular community and yet remain open to the experience of other communities'. 
In reaction to this outline of process thought, we may well ask whether the 
metaphysics has been developed to support a particular viewpoint of how God ought 
to be, or whether it follows 'naturally' from a systematic development of the 
implications of the results of science. Some of the criticisms against process theism 
are also instmctive. The question is asked whether the process deity is worthy of 
worship since he/she/it is not all-powerful (Peterson 1999:400). However, God could 
choose to be powerless. This critique seems to stem from a Greek conception of God 
as an all-powerful being. Peterson (:400) also asks: 'If process theists do not conceive 
of God as personal but rather as a principle, how can they make sense of anything 
close to theistic worship?'. This critique stems from a religious belief system and a 
certain conception of what a personal God is. We have discussed how our concepts of 
life and intelligence may change due to research done on artificial life. It may well be 
that the concept of person and personal agency undergoes a transformation. 
Barbour (2000:37) makes the important point that although a systematic metaphysics 
can assist in the search for a coherent vision of a theology of nature, 'neither science 
nor religion should be equated with a metaphysical system' since there is the danger 
that 'scientific or religious ideas are distorted to fit a preconceived synthesis that 
claims to encompass all reality'. We need to acknowledge our metaphysical system 
and its influence on all aspects of our thinking. Our experience is diverse and we 
distort it if we try to fit it into rigid compartments called religion or science, but also 
when trying to 'force it into a neat intellectual system' (:37-38). Barbour states (:38) 
that a 'coherent vision ofreality must allow for the distinctiveness of differing types of 
experience'. 
In any case, it is probably a good idea to be sceptical about systems. Since we have 
been talking about process thought, it is appropriate to add this quote from Alfred 
North Whitehead's book, Adventures of Ideas: 
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Systems, scientific and philosophic, come and go. Each method of limited 
understanding is at length exhausted. In its prime each system is a triumphant 
success; in its decay it is an obstructive nuisance. 
(as quoted in Sowa:2001). 
6.2.6 Which typology? 
With respect to the question as to which typology of relations between science and 
religion is preferred, Barbour's answer is that Dialogue and Integration are 'more 
promising ways to bring scientific and religious insights together than either Conflict 
or Independence' (Barbour 2000: 179). I agree that Dialogue and Integration can lead 
to greater insights into how little we really understand. We do need to be aware of the 
complexity of this undertaking at all times and try to understand and respect the 
depths and subtlety of thinking that exist in both science and religion. Dialogue and 
Integration would seem to elicit such a careful and respectful approach better than the 
Conflict approach in which entrenched positions are being defended. Furthermore, 
the Independence approach may leave unexplored the richness of the interaction 
between science and religion. The Integration approach does contain the challenge of 
avoiding the force-fit of scientific and religious ideas into a conceptnal system that 
was created to give voice to one's ideas of how reality should be. In the end, the most 
important issue may be to retain a sense of wonder, to be hnmble, and to be 
self-critical of one's motives and assumptions. 
It is now time end this discussion by looking into the future to see what riches might 
be waiting for us. 
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7 The role of information in the science and theology dialogue of 
the future 
It is interesting that Claude Shannon, the father of the fundamental theory of 
information, was 'horrified to find that info1mation theory was becoming - well, 
popular' and wrote a paper in 1956 entitled: The bandwagon in which he declared that 
information theory was being greatly oversold (Waldrop 2001 :71). I agree with this 
statement. In this dissertation I have tried to distinguish carefully between counting 
information, meaning information and shaping information. However, as we have 
discussed,' 14 our understanding of how reality is based on information is growing 
rapidly and it provides us with a cornucopia of ideas and concepts that we can use 
(with the necessary care) to understand our world better. We cannot ignore the 
pervasive impact of information concepts on all fields of science and the growth of 
the 'information-computer' approach 115 to science. It is a reality that we are no longer 
living in the clock/force era, or the steam engine/energy era, but in the 
computer/information era. Some would say that we are entering the era in which the 
world is considered as a universal language and that we live in the semiosphere in 
which the biosphere is immersed'". 
The importance of information in the science and theology dialogue lies in the role 
that information will continue to play in connecting the complex hierarchy of 
organisational levels which stretch from the fundamental entities of matter, energy 
and information to living entities, and ultimately to people in language-using 
communities. In this hierarchy, there are a few crucial gaps in our understanding and 
foremost amongst these js the mystery of life's origin. Information plays a central and 
integrating role here as well. We have established that the ability to perform complex 
information processing is what distinguishes the living from the non-living. Barbour 
I l-t Subsection 5.6.8: Applying our information-based understanding of reality to the issue of divine 
actio11. 
'
15 Siegfried (2000:240), see Subsection 5.6.8.5. 
116 The sign-relation network that fonns between creatures exchanging signs constitutes an emergent 
level which is called the semiosphere (Hoffmeyer 1996:58-59). See Section 2.3: The biological roots 
of.i1~fonnation - fro111 biosphere to seniiosphere. 
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(2000:167) believes that God's purpose was to create people and not just intelligent 
information processors, and hence he prefers to draw his analogies for God's 
communication 'primarily from human life, rather than from genetic codes or 
computer programs'. I think that we need to be wary of underestimating the reach of 
the bottom-up approach - concepts are developing that may, in future, bridge the gap 
between counting information and meaning information. The concept of statistical 
complexity as a measure of the ability of complex adaptive systems to predict their 
environment is a promising candidate117 • I would not want to limit the communication 
between God and creation. 
Apart from the use of information in connecting the hierarchy of organisational levels, 
we also have the fact that we have grown accustomed to carving up nature into levels, 
studied by different disciplines, with distinct sets of operational concepts. In our tour 
through the hierarchy of organisational levels, we focused on the disciplines of 
physics, biology, sociology, linguistics, etc. Information concepts are used in all these 
fields and in the interface between them. The bridging of the gap between, say, 
biology and physics, or science and theology is not easy. We have examined in detail 
the problems of using in biology the information concepts from physics. A variety of 
approaches have been developed that try to bridge the gap between hierarchical levels 
and contexts of enquiry. For example, there are process theology, biosemiotics, 
research into artificial life, studies of consciousness, and concepts such as top-down 
causation, emergent properties, supervenience, etc. The variety of approaches will 
increase and computational approaches will become ever more important to 
understanding life. The study of artificial life is here to stay and will become 
increasingly sophisticated as we come to understand better how to simulate the 
complexities of biological life and as our available computing power increases 
exponentially. 
The fundamental challenge - given our assumption that there is only one reality - is 
that our various disciplines and approaches are all limited. In order to increase our 
understanding, we will have to communicate across the artificial boundaries between 
our disciplines. The science-theology dialogue needs to continue, with increased 
117Discussed in Subsection 5.6.7.9: Consciousness, observers and coniplexity. 
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depth, precision and richness. Information will play an important role in integrating 
and deepening our understanding. Metaphysics and physics, when harmonised, could 
have a major impact on theology and the science-theology dialogue. We have 
discussed the idea (which has a long philosophical history"') that form or pattern is a 
metaphysical characteristic of entities. Information is then seen as performing a 
patterning of the world, creating comprehensive wholes, which should not be 
dissected by science in a mechanistic way. Physics is moving away from its 
mechanistic approaches as in the work of John Wheeler and his 'It from bit' concept, 
which considers all of reality as answers to Yes-No questions and.information as the 
'stuff out of which the universe is made. 
As we have said before, perhaps in future we will talk of 'information' as the new 
metaphysics, since 'information' is now coming to the fore as that which is really 
beyond physics. 
The effect of this on the science and theology dialogue will probably be that we will 
see an increasing number of Integration-type approaches, especially systematic 
syntheses. Process theology, to my mind, has made the most of our information-
based understanding of reality. As an example, we have noted the process view of 
God'"; God is seen as being the immanent source of the pattern out of which reality 
flows. God's action is non-interventionist but essential. Especially important is the 
idea that the relation between God and the world is a dynamic two-way 
communication. God creates possibilities and imposes a pattern on these possibilities. 
The possibilities can only be realised through their selection by creation. The cosmos 
participates in creation and this participation can be seen as a series of Yes-No 
decisions. This line of thinking is one example of how Wheeler's idea that all things 
physical have an immaterial, information-theoretical origin enables new integration 
models of science and theology to emerge. In my opinion, this will be the most 
important source of new ways of thinking about God, the world and ourselves. 
118 The history of this idea ranges from Aristotle to Whitehead, as mentioned in Subsection 5.2.6: An 
exa1nple of the use of infor1nation-based analogies in theology. 
119 See the discussion of John Haught's work in Subsection 5.2.6: An example of the use of information-
based analogies in theology and the discussion in Subsection 5.6.8.2: Laivs, computation and matter. 
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At the same time we need to heed the warning of Barbour (2000: 180), who stresses 
that the diversity of reality cannot be captured by a single model since all models are 
limited and partial. Certain models may represent certain aspects of reality better than 
others. Barbour (:180) gives the example of God's relation with people being 
different from God's relationship with rocks. Therefore we should guard against 
overdoing the pursuit of coherence or integration, which might neglect the differences 
between models. We can say that neither science nor religion, nor any system 
developed by human thought, can capture the richness of reality. Barbour (: 180) 
reminds us that: 
... the use of diverse models can keep us from the idolatry that occurs when 
we take any one model of God too literally. Only in worship can we 
acknowledge the mystery of God and the pretensions of any system of thought 
claiming to have mapped out God's ways. 
Perhaps the Conflict-model in the science and theology dialogue is here to stay for 
some time, with an ensuing variation in the intelligent design arguments. I favour the 
view that science cannot be used to prove or disprove God's existence. However, the 
scientific results can be used as a source of new ways of talking metaphorically about 
God. As a trained scientist, I want to guard against the God-of-the-gaps problem. I 
think that the intelligent design movement are building their house on sand since 
irreducible complexity may be better understood in the near future. I agree with 
Gregersen (2000:29-31) that the role of theology is not to explain the world and that 
we should be wary of conflating the levels of a natural and a theological explanation. 
The challenge is how to avoid conflation while engaging in dialogue with science. 
The mind/matter dualism question is going to receive more attention. We should also 
obviate the central control versus local control dichotomy. The study of cellular 
automata (CA) promises to unravel how local computational intelligence can achieve 
global co-ordination. This will be the source of new ways of understanding God's 
creative actions as a property of the cosmos as a whole. The increased understanding 
of non-local laws will also make our view of the universe more holistic. 
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We cannot deny the difficulties that lie ahead. Information is a complex concept. The 
metaphorical use of information is also complex. We need to be aware that the 
science of information is in its infancy and when we ask whether a particular 
information-based metaphor rings true with science, we need to be aware of just how 
speculative information science can be. Care must be taken in using these concepts in 
the science-theology dialogue so that issues are illuminated rather than obscured. 
We need to be aware of the dangers of accepting new scientific myths too easily due 
to the general awe in which science's methods and results are held. Ultimately, our 
judgement as to whether a myth is good or bad lies outside science. 
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Appendix A- Gitt's 30 information theorems 
From Gitt's book, In the Beginning was Information (Gitt: 1997). The relevant page 
numbers are listed with each theorem. 
Theorem 1: The fundamental quantity information is a non-material (mental) entity. 
It is not a property of matter, so that purely material processes are fundamentally 
precluded as sources of information (:47). 
Theorem 2: Information only arises through an intentional, volitional act (:48). 
Theorem 3: Information comprises the non-material foundation for all technological 
systems and for all works of art (:49). 
Theorem 4: A message which has been subject to interference or 'noise', in general 
compnses more information than an error-free message, according to Shannon's 
theory (:55). 
Theorem 5: Shannon's definition of information exclusively concerns the statistical 
properties of sequences of symbols; meaning is completely ignored (:57). 
Theorem 6: A code is an essential requirement for establishing information(:64). 
Theorem 7: The allocation of meanings to the set of available symbols is a mental 
process depending on convention ( :65). 
Theorem 8: If a code has been defined by a deliberate convention, it must be strictly 
adhered to afterwards (:65). 
Theorem 9: If the information is to be understood, the particular code must be known 
to both the sender and the recipient (:65). 
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Theorem 10: According the Theorem 6 only structures which are based on a code 
can represent information. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
establishment of information ( :65). 
Theorem 11: A code system is always the result of a mental process (it requires an 
intelligent origin or inventor) (:67). 
Theorem 12: Any given piece of information can be represented by any selected code 
(page no?). 
Theorem 13: Any piece of information has been transmitted by somebody and is 
meant for somebody. A sender and a recipient are always involved whenever and 
wherever information is concerned (:70). 
Theorem 14: Any entity, to be accepted as information, must entail semantics; it 
must be meaningful (:70). 
Theorem 1 S: When its progress along the chain of transmission events is traced 
backwards, every piece of information leads to a mental source, the mind of the 
sender ( :70). 
Theorem 16: If a chain of symbols compnses only a statistical sequence of 
characters, it does not represent information (:71). 
Theorem 17: Information always entails a pragmatic aspect (:74). 
Theorem 18: Information is able to cause the recipient to take some action (stimulate, 
initialise, or implement). This reactive functioning of information is valid for both 
inanimate systems (e.g. computers, and an automatic car wash) as well as living 
organisms (e.g. activities in cells, actions of animals, and activities of human beings) 
(:75). 
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Theorem 20: The teleological aspect of information is the most important level, since 
it comprises the intentions of the sender. The sum total of the four lower levels is that 
they are only a means for attaining the purpose (apobetics) (:78). 
Theorem 21: The five aspects of information (statistics, syntax, semantics, 
pragmatics, and apobetics) are valid for both the sender and the recipient. The five 
levels are involved in a continuous interplay between the two (:78). 
Theorem 22: The separate aspects of information are inter-linked in such a way that 
every lower level is a necessary requisite for the realisation of the next one above it 
(:78). 
Theorem 23: There is no known natural law through which matter can give rise to 
information, neither is any physical process or material phenomenon known that can 
do this (:79). 
Theorem 24: Information requires a material medium for storage (:85). 
Theorem 25: Biological information is not an exceptional kind of information, but it 
differs from other systems in that it has a very high storage density and that it 
obviously employs extremely ingenious concepts ( :97). 
Theorem 26: The information present in living beings must have had a mental source 
(:98). 
Theorem 27: Any model for the origin of life (and of information) based solely on 
physical anchor chemical processes is inherently false ( :99). 
Theorem 28: There is no known law of nature, no known process and no known 
sequence of events which can cause information to originate by itself in matter(: 107). 
Theorem 29: Every piece of creative information represents some mental effort and 
can be traced to a personal idea-giver who exercised his own free will, and who is 
endowed with an intelligent mind (:113). 
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Theorem 30: New information can only originate in a creative thought process (:113). 
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Appendix B - Gitt's properties, forms and kinds of information 
From Gitt's book, In the Beginning was Information (Gitt: 1997). The relevant page 
numbers are listed below. 
Two fundamental properties of information (84): 
• Property 1: Information is not the thing itself, neither is it a condition, but it is 
an abstract representation of material realities or conceptual relationships, like 
problem formulations, ideas, programs, or algorithms. The representation is in 
a suitable coding system and the realities could be objects, or physical, 
chemical or biological conditions. The reality being represented is usually not 
present at the time and place of the transfer of information, neither can it be 
observed or measured at that moment. 
• Property 2: Information always plays a substitutionary role. The encoding of 
reality is a mental process. 
There are three forms of information (:108-110): 
• Constructional/Creative information (:108) 
• Operational information (: 109) 
• Communication information (: 110). 
There are three kinds of transmitted information (:112-113): 
• Copied information 
• Reproduced information 
• Creative information (relevant theorems are 29 and 30). 
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